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This study is developed in conjunction with the Center for Applied 
Phenomenological Research at the University of Tennessee and the Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences, Sofia, to examine how the editorial pages of The Times of 
London sought to provide a collective understanding of the events of 9/11 
during the first year after the attacks.  Leaning on the methods of historiography, 
phenomenology, and rhetorical analysis, this study offers an interdisciplinary 
approach to discovering meaning translated through the interrelated processes 
of conjuring historical memory, inventing novel, figurative terminology, and 
building narrative structures to frame our understanding of events.  This study 
considers how cultural memories of traumatic, public events are created, 
arguing that the shaping of collective memory and the development of 
historical narrative are tightly interconnected through the language we share 
and create with others.  Results indicate that these editorialists cultivated an 
awareness of time that was steeped in culturally-salient narrative traditions, 
staging an historical drama in The Times, and were therefore always highly 
conscious of the interaction between the editorials as story and readers as 




 This dissertation is part of a larger study undertaken between the Center 
for Applied Phenomenological Research at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia on the editorial response in 
American and European newspapers to 9/11 during the first year after the 
attacks.  As an international project, the newspapers studied represented a large 
swatch of the Western response to the event, coming from North America and 
Western and Eastern Europe.  In North America, The New York Times and The 
Washington Post were selected, representing the cities most immediately 
affected by the attacks.  In Western Europe, The Times of London and El Mundo 
were chosen, both because the governments of the United Kingdom and Spain 
were close NATO allies of the United States, and also because both countries 
had long histories of dealing with terror, from the IRA in the United Kingdom and 
ETA in Spain.  In Eastern Europe, Russia’s Izvestia was selected for several reasons, 
ranging from Russia’s long-standing rivalry with the West to its own battles with 
terrorism in Chechnya, to its long war in Afghanistan, and to its burgeoning, post-
Cold War friendship with the United States.  Finally, from Bulgaria, home to part of 
the study and a transitioning former-Eastern bloc state itself, the newspaper,  
Sega, was selected as a voice new to Western affairs, but with NATO and EU 
membership in sight and a border with Muslim Turkey, a voice intimately 
concerned with the welfare of the West.  This core of newspapers, it was 
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contended, should provide a solid understanding of how the West (Eastern 
Europe included) coped with 9/11 and its aftermath. 
 To that end, this project on The Times of London will be interwoven with 
certain results of that larger study.  In particular, early results coming from The 
Times bore an intriguing resemblance to stylistic results that emerged from a 
study of The New York Times, namely, a significant, rhetorical framing of each 
paper’s response to the attacks.  Noted in the most reflective editorials from The 
New York Times (Pollio, et al., In Press, and Lule, 2002) was their epic structure, a 
retelling of an ages-old conflict of heroes fighting invaders from the outside 
attacking a great city and center of civilisation.  In New York, though never 
referenced directly, this structure took on an Illiadic tone, in which a surprise 
attack from a kind of Trojan horse struck a critical blow against the city in a long 
war between rival civilisations that had festered for many years.  In the UK, 
meanwhile, results suggested that The Times saw 9/11 as a Shakespearean 
historical drama, a retelling of the themes in Henry IV and Henry V.  With that in 
mind, this project began to take a specific shape. 
 As is the case in each of the studies in the ongoing project, this study of 
The Times includes a close, phenomenologically and historically-based reading 
of editorials, or leading articles, dealing with 9/11 and the subsequent War on 
Terror.  In this reading, the study considered the implications of the content of the 
editorials, the historical references The Times included, the novel figures of 
speech that were rated as salient, and the themes that built upon the concerns 
of content, historical referencing, and salient figures, and that took into account 
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their impact on the reading audience.  In addition to close reading, however, 
this study also takes into consideration the rhetorical situation of The Times to 
account for its literary forebears.  Since the literary structure in The Times 
appeared to be dramatic in nature, and since the rhetorical situation in The 
Times was at the heart of this study, it was an easy next step to take a Burkeian 
approach to the rhetorical analysis. 
 To that end, this dissertation begins with an overview in Chapter 1 that 
includes a discussion of relevant psychological, linguistic, historical, rhetorical 
theory and a framing for the focus of the project.  Methods are then developed 
in Chapter 2, including an explanation for the ways in which this study departs 
from previous studies in the overall project.  Next, Chapter 3 presents results for 
the study of The Times of London for content, historical references, salient figures, 
and themes, as well as early rhetorical characteristics.  In Chapter 4, a discussion 
of the results then begins that contemplates the impact that British historical and 
literary awareness has on the coverage of 9/11 and its aftermath in The Times.  
This discussion focuses mainly on the legacy of three central figures—Clausewitz, 
Churchill, and Shakespeare—who appear to provide The Times with an 
underlying frame for the ways in which writers understand events.  Finally, in 
Chapter 5, conclusions, suggestions for further research, and limitations of the 
study are proposed. 
 x 
Table of Contents 
Chapter          Page 
I. Words and Images Scorched onto the Collective Consciousness, Replayed in         
   Flashback: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
   Overview .......................................................................................................................... 1 
   Narrative Reality in Time ................................................................................................. 3 
   Historical Memory and Historical Narrative .............................................................. 10 
   The iconic Image .......................................................................................................... 18 
   Language As Symbolic Action ................................................................................... 24 
 
II. The More the Evidence Is Sifted, the Clearer the Terrible Truth Becomes:  
    Method .......................................................................................................................... 29 
    Overview ....................................................................................................................... 29 
    Reflective, Prescriptive, Descriptive .......................................................................... 34 
    Historical References ................................................................................................... 40 
    Content Categories ..................................................................................................... 42 
    Salient Figures ............................................................................................................... 44 
    Themes ........................................................................................................................... 45 
    Rhetorical Analysis .......................................................................................................51 
 
III. The Elusive Identikit of Terror Is Filling Out: Results ................................................... 54 
     Overview ...................................................................................................................... 54 
     Reflective, Prescriptive, Descriptive ......................................................................... 58 
     Content of Leading Articles ...................................................................................... 60 
     Historical References .................................................................................................. 67 
     Salient Figures .............................................................................................................. 76 
     Thematic Results .......................................................................................................... 87 
 
IV. The Hands on the Clock Have Barely Moved: Discussion .................................110 
      Overview ...................................................................................................................110 
      The Reality of the Historical Past ............................................................................115 
      Historical Narrative and Iconic Memory ..............................................................133 
      Language As Symbolic Action ..............................................................................143 
 
V. Never Before Has the World Felt Itself to Be Such a Global Village:  
     Conclusions ................................................................................................................165 
     General Conclusions ................................................................................................165 
     Limitations ...................................................................................................................167 













List of Tables 
Table           Page 
Table 1. Rates of Editorial Appearances by Reflective, Prescriptive, or Descriptive 
Type ..............................................................................................................................59 
Table 2. Frequency of Content Categories Across Time............................................65 
Table 3. Historical Eras Represented ..............................................................................71 
Table 4. Specific Historical References by Group = ≥ 3 ..............................................72 
Table 5. Historical References by Category = ≥2.........................................................73 
Table 6. Categories of Salient Figures by Total Number of Appearances ..............78 
Table 7. The Civilised/Uncivilised Theme .......................................................................88 
Table 8. The Before/After Theme....................................................................................91 
Table 9. The Duty/Appeasement Theme......................................................................94 
Table 10. The New War/New Kind of Enemy Theme...................................................96 
Table 11. The Visible/Shadowy Theme ..........................................................................99 
Table 12. Co-Occurrence of the Five Major Themes................................................102 
 xiii 
List of Figures 
Figure           Page 
Figure 1. Frequency of Output of Leading Articles for The Times of London ..........57 
Figure 2. Leading Articles from The Times of London Categorized by Content.....61 
Figure 3. Historical References in The Times of London ..............................................68 
Figure 4. Average Historical References per Article by Content Category ...........75 
Figure 5. Thematic Structure for The Times of London ..............................................104 
 






Ask nearly any citizen of a Western nation about September 11, 2001 and 
the answer provided will likely include a description of that day as a history-
shaking event, one that altered what the early part of the 21st century would be 
like.  Indeed, many of us now describe the political culture in which we live as 
pre- or post-9/11, in just the same way time was demarcated in the 20th century 
as pre- or post-World War II.  Part of this thinking comes from our construction of 
the event as it parallels others in our collective memory.  In other words, the 
historical references we choose to give the figure of 9/11 a grounding allow us to 
begin to comprehend and make sense of it.  Perhaps nowhere does this happen 
with the speed of the newspaper editorial, a medium in which the news of the 
day gets a running commentary, and where, from these first metaphors we use 
to describe an event, editorial writers develop larger thematic narratives that 
help order the disorder of a changing world. 
Examining how the editorial staff at The Times of London developed 
textual, historical, and metaphorical themes in leading articles about terrorism in 
the first year after 9/11 becomes an exercise in understanding how a collective 
conscious can be framed and formed.  Since the paper enjoys a high level of 
prestige, it is therefore a paper likely to be at the center of an emerging debate, 
1

politically, rhetorically, and linguistically-charged.  The political, public policy 
debate itself centers on a seemingly obvious question—how should the West 
develop its response to the post-9/11 world?  However, the more subtle rhetorical 
and linguistic debates are more hazardous.  In those first days, when everyone— 
government officials, the media, and ordinary people on the street—knew very 
little, and often seemed paralyzed by the impact of the collapse of the Twin 
Towers, the public discussion had yet to coalesce, a fact that is paradoxically 
both part symptom and part cause of that paralysis.  But once the West began 
to recover its bearings, the debate started to take shape. The New York Times, 
for example, which on September 12th referred to New York City as a kind of 
modern-day Pompeii, a city that is only remembered for having been 
completely inundated by volcanic ash, abandoned that historical metaphor in 
favor of a far more hopeful one: the struggle of New York City was the newest 
version of the timeless clash between epic heroes and villains (Lule, 2002; Pollio, 
et al., In Press).  The Times of London, meanwhile, picked up Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s assurance that the United Kingdom stood “shoulder to shoulder” with the 
people of the United States, invoking similar imagery drawn a half-century before 
in the language of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin 
Roosevelt.  By invoking historical metaphors, the paper gave shape to its readers’ 
understanding of events, gently reminding them of other great struggles, trying to 
instill them with a will to endure. 
In this sense, the papers demonstrate that memory, language, and history 
share a classic connection which is extremely useful when attempting to explain 
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complex, present events. We understand our histories (individual and collective) 
through our memories, which are shaped by our experience—our 
phenomenological being-in-the-world—and our connections with others through 
conversation and dialogue. When we contemplate that connection with others, 
the relationship between memory and history becomes more complex, shaped 
by the culture and language shared between participants.  In effect, memory 
and history in the presence of language—our means of connecting with others— 
becomes memory and history in the presence of metaphor, rhetoric, and 
narrative.  And if those symbols and stories are particularly evocative, they 
become translated further, ultimately shaping our collective memories and 
community identities, our historical traditions and social rituals. The result of that 
process allows us to recognize who we are now by reminding us where we came 
from, and through that past and present, what projections our futures might hold. 
Therefore, the large research questions I hope to consider are (1) How does 
language act as both symbolic action and collective therapy in these leading 
articles, and how are those two functions interrelated? and (2) How do 
metaphor, memory, and narrative intersect to create meaning? 
Narrative Reality in Time 
Key to this arrangement is the connection between the narrator, the 
narrative in question, and the intended audience receiving that narrative.  Both 
psychologically and rhetorically, that connection marks an ever-important link 
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between how various sources frame events unfolding around us, and how we 
come to understand them.  Ricoeur (1984a) argues that this is especially true 
since narrative is the primary means we have of making sense of time and its 
events.  He even goes so far as to note that “time becomes human to the extent 
that it is articulated through a narrative mode,” as though the very basis for what 
humanizes experience is a narrative that reorganizes, reassesses, and retells 
experiences (p. 52).  Narrative lends time a manageable structure, a sense of 
before, now, and to come, that allows us to understand time by understanding 
our place in time.  Once we locate ourselves in time, we can begin to piece our 
narratives together.  Baydala (2003) explains this further by noting that a 
narrative provides both a meaning and a means of referencing human action, 
as though when we provide a narrative for our experiences, we order our 
connections of time, place, and specific event.  In the case of 9/11, that 
locating process is not only a function of understanding, but a much more 
practical process as well, one that helps to identify critical sequences of events, 
motivations for various actions, and perhaps to an even more important extent, 
the greater causes of terror. 
By locating our place in time through narrative, it helps to have linguistic 
markers that help us to make sense of events themselves, even before setting 
them in time.  For instance, before we came to know the events of 9/11 as 
“9/11,” editorial pages needed ways to mark the day as different—history­
shifting.  As a result, The New York Times asked us to “remember the ordinary” 
(“The War Against America,” 2001), or the life we lived before that September 
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morning.  The Times of London, meanwhile, invoked the memory of “that 
shattering day” (“Another Front,” 2001) or the day our lives and our 
understanding of the world, its actors, and its events—in other words, the era in 
which we live—were shattered before our eyes. These metaphorical descriptions 
that begin the process of marking 9/11 are key to our understanding of it as a 
crucial shift in our lives.  But even more than that, they are key to marking a 
crucial shift in our sense of time—our pre- or post-9/11 understanding of the 
world—as they become an axis around which other events in time revolve.  We 
mark our history with metaphorical language that helps to explain not only what 
happened, but just why what happened was so significant to our historical era. 
Coupled with time-marked narrative, historical and metaphorical language help 
provide a meaning for 9/11. 
When metaphor, memory, language, and history intersect, meaning is 
created, through the connection between narrator and audience.  This allows us 
to experience the world through the very natural human connection of dialogue 
through language, a being-in-the-world through being-with-others via the 
symbols we share and the stories we tell. At the outset, the connection between 
metaphor and memory provides the first step in contemplating how human 
beings understand the world.  Pollio (1974) notes that our thinking often works in 
a pattern of associations—comparisons between what we know and what we 
have encountered and do not yet know. These associations happen through 
figurative thought that connects present experience to the past.  Pre-existing 
knowledge provides the foundation for memory by selectively ordering past and 
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present experience, supplying a basis for relating newly-encountered ideas to 
other ideas and for modeling what might work in the future when situations 
appear to be similar. At the same time, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe the 
process through which they believe this association occurs, noting that a 
substitution takes place in which we begin to substitute one idea for another 
over time as novel figurative terms are introduced into our language as various 
events occur. As these new figurative terms begin to freeze as the experiential 
circumstances in which they were first framed fade, the once novel terms 
become terms that we accept without thinking about them.  From this starting 
point, Pollio takes his notion of symbolic association further, arguing for the real 
power metaphorical language such as this has. This 9/11 language, and 
particularly the metaphorical and historical connections it makes, are not simply 
associative markers, but a means of thickening language, jumping out of the 
discourse, by slowing down the way we process the language in order to make 
connections between the tenor and vehicle of the metaphor. They force us to 
consider them, to pay closer attention, to figure out their etymological, historical, 
or cultural foundations to understand completely the assertion they make now, 
in the present, and at the same time, though more subtlety, their influence on 
future action and thought. 
When terms like “Ground Zero” or “War on Terror” become the norms 
through which we name parts of post-9/11 life, our experience is shaped not only 
by images of the Twin Towers reduced to rubble, the on-going war in 
Afghanistan, the subsequent war in Iraq, and the myriad changes in the freedom 
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of movement throughout the West.  Our experience is also partly shaped by the 
memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the original, atomic Ground Zeroes—and 
by the more complicated notion that we are waging a war not against a 
traditionally identifiable nation-state or group as Clausewitz (1976) would define 
war (a concept we do historically understand), but against an emotion, in this 
case, “terror.”  Through the metaphor, “Ground Zero,” we understand the events 
of 9/11 to be catastrophic, relatable to the kind of destruction a great war 
exhibits, most particularly to the kind of destruction an atomic bomb exacts.  
And through the metaphor, “War on Terror,” we begin to understand the 
dangers of the war we are waging in the post-9/11 world; terror, as an emotion, 
as well as a tactic, will likely always be with us.  Therefore, the danger is that as it 
will have no clear boundaries or objectives in the Clausewitzean sense, this 
particular war may never end. More importantly, since both of these metaphors 
become easy exchanges for various events in our post-9/11 life, they have 
become interlinked and part of our larger social consciousness.  Because we 
had a “Ground Zero,” we now have a “War on Terror.”  Through those 
metaphors, we begin to shape our responses to those historical acts and their 
agents. We are at war. We are under attack. We live under the threat of total 
destruction.  But more than that, we shape all future understanding based on this 
premise in the sense that these metaphors help construct the reality in which we 
live. All terrorism in the Western psyche will relate back somehow to this base, 
historical metaphor of “Ground Zero,” shaped on the foundational, historical 
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metaphors that come from World War II, a war in which there was so much at 
stake that there was no option to lose. 
At this point, it becomes a little clearer that one of the ways in which the 
language of 9/11 works is to establish a new concept of reality over time.  Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) argue that reality is socially constructed, framed by 
institutions with particular world-views that negotiate events through their own 
perspectives, built historically through time and place.  Using the Whorf 
hypothesis, we only need to take a short step from Berger and Luckmann to say 
that just as reality is constructed by historical and sociological factors, so too is it 
shaped by language, since the way language is used can in part determine 
how we think—about ourselves, others, time, and place. 
In the case of newspapers, Fairclough (1995) notes that when creating 
new metaphors, the media seeks to work in the context of its audience, using 
metaphors to help a public understand an event and to shape its 
understanding.  Therefore, the figurative language the media develops draws 
upon evocative themes in popular memory and claims to share that memory 
and culture. At the same time, since the media often develops that language 
over a long period of time, it ultimately becomes embedded in the standard 
features of discourse.  In this way, the media embeds prior knowledge into 
current process, creating layers of constructed knowledge which become 
particularly important considering the choice of style and the nature of the 
intertextual linking and renegotiation required for successful embedding.  The 
media, therefore, not only provides a new way to understand an issue, but also 
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to push an ideology, which then directly relates to a social and linguistic 
construction of reality. 
Building up standard features of discourse over time reflects the ideas of 
Kenneth Burke, who notes in Attitudes Toward History (1984a) that the very act of 
applying names to motives shapes our understanding, orienting us for or against 
people or activities; the names themselves also suggest how we are for or 
against them.  Some of these orientations take place at the level of metaphor 
which may ultimately become the key terms of what Burke, in Language As 
Symbolic Action (1966), calls “terministic screens” that structure our thinking 
through language, becoming the symbols by which we understand the world 
and our experience in it.  The language of terministic screens reflects reality 
certainly, but it also selects and deflects reality, therefore guiding, stimulating, 
and narrating further action.  This “language as symbolic action” that Burke first 
identifies in Counter-Statement (1953) works so that individual metaphors get 
taken up in metaphorical themes operating as terministic screens and become 
a particular rhetoric, providing a terminology of thoughts, actions, attitudes, and 
emotions that codifies experience. 
In Permanence and Change (1984b), Burke observes that language of 
this kind is never neutral, but loaded with judgments that take shape because it 
is used by people acting together, as though the language is an adjunct of that 
action, developing a continuing narrative that links action with time and motive 
in an historical sensibility.  Once narrative is built up, it expands, and becomes 
the way through which we select our memory-as-history and the metaphors that 
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come out of it, reflecting the parts of our experience we want to emphasize and 
at the same time deflecting those we would choose to ignore.  In other words, 
out of this process of narrating our experience, having carefully cultivated the 
language we choose to describe it, emerge the figures in Ricoeur’s historical 
ground that take precedence in our era and which obscure those figures that 
recede into history.  Burke further describes this process in Attitudes Toward 
History (1984a), noting that since we search for and create forms of 
consciousness, those forms become our foundation, our means of negotiating 
linguistically (and intellectually) our experiential frame. Prompted by a yearning 
to comprehend what has happened, we promote mechanisms of acceptance 
which judge our historical situation and adopt our role in relation to it. 
Historical Memory and Historical Narrative 
In a related context, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976) would argue that 
terministic screens constitute that person’s “historical prejudice,” and simply 
frame reality by reflecting the history and experience of any one person and the 
institutions that surround him or her in a given time.  Such a recognition of 
personal historicity, Gadamer insists, forces us to realize that anything we 
understand, we understand through and because of context—both the context 
of the situation and of our context as people who experience life socially, 
economically, historically, and institutionally.  This historical prejudice insists that 
we understand our world as people of historical reality—of people in time and 
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place.  History, then, immediately influences whatever decisions we make—even 
dictating whatever decisions we can make. What is available to us, both 
practically and creatively, provide the only tools with which we can build. 
Ultimately, our historical prejudice is the means through which we infuse our 
historical reality with life, since our historical prejudice will largely determine how 
we perceive and understand that experience. 
The “prejudices” that we bring to new experience determine how we 
understand that experience since everything we do has a context, and it is 
impossible to separate context from understanding. That hermeneutic framing 
takes place in the realm of language, since it is through language that we can 
communicate perception, understanding, and ultimately, meaning. 
Hermeneutic framing through language, coupled with Burke’s notion of 
terministic screens, allows us to translate the importance of “being there” 
(Heidegger’s Dasein)—experience within a specific time and place—through the 
dialogue of “being with” (Heidegger’s Mitsein)—or negotiating our experience, 
and the meaning of that experience, with others.  Basing our understanding of 
the world on the time and place in which we live, the language, culture, and 
tradition that influence our lives and our ways of thinking and doing become 
critical foundations for any new constructs we attempt to build. 
This understanding we develop of present history-in-the-shaping, 
therefore, is molded by our memory of history-already-shaped. It is not surprising, 
for example, that one of the first historical metaphors for 9/11 which The Times 
contemplated was the legacy of Pearl Harbor—of a surprise attack from the air, 
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driven by kamikaze pilots intending to die and inflict as much damage as 
possible in the process.  Even though that particular metaphor only lasted for a 
reasonably short period of time in the discussion of 9/11, the larger metaphor of 
World War II that the mention of it conjured has lasted much longer.  Part of the 
reason for this conjuring of memory to help explain the present is, according to 
Frederic Bartlett (1954), that “in remembering, the subject uses the setting, or 
scheme, or pattern, and builds up its characteristics afresh to aid whatever 
response the needs of the moment may demand” (p. 196).  In the sense that this 
could be a specific remembering of an important historical event, Bartlett’s 
analysis provides a way into the workings of historical memory and how it can 
begin to develop on a wider, social level. Repeatedly stressing the importance 
of psychological orientation always occurring within a specific setting, Bartlett 
believes that remembering is an act of placing one set of conditions beside 
another, so that the memory becomes part of a broader ground of memory 
contexts. 
Given Bartlett’s take on how we form memories, and, more importantly, 
how we go about remembering them, the organization of historical memory 
becomes a comparable process.  Historian David Thelen (1989) argues that 
historical memory is always collective and historicized, influenced by and 
influencing culture, negotiating meaning as the historical event remembered 
reflects the concerns of the people of the era doing the remembering. 
According to historian Pierre Nora in Lieux de Mémoire (1996a), historical 
memories are likely to be culturally powerful and pervasive, thriving “because of 
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their capacity for change, their ability to resurrect old meanings, and generate 
new ones along with new and unforeseeable connections” (p. 15).  From this 
perspective, Nora invokes the connection between historical memory and 
historical narrative, the latter existing with the very intention of being retold to 
new audiences in new eras and settings, with potentially far different cultural 
conditions, expectations, and needs in place.  The most powerful of these 
collective memory narratives, Nora believes, mark “a turning point in which a 
sense of rupture with the past is inextricably bound up with a sense that a rift has 
occurred in memory” (p. 1). Considering that one of the most insistent themes 
editorials in The Times of London adopt is a sense of irrevocable change, for all 
intents and purposes a rift in time, Nora’s conjecture that a rupture with the past 
actually focuses the collective memory more pointedly puts into perspective the 
drive to connect the past directly to 9/11 and why it was a continuing struggle 
for The Times.  In terms of historical memory, 9/11 signified an event dramatically 
unlike the events of our recent, collective past. 
At the same time, Thelen (1989) reminds us that the way in which 
collective, historical memory develops points toward how people have always 
“selected and interpreted identifying memories to serve changing needs,” 
searching together and negotiating meaning, and ultimately preserving and 
absorbing that meaning into the present and continuing concerns of the 
community (p. 1123).  In this particular case, those changing needs and 
concerns represent an overwhelming desire to capture the meaning of 9/11, 
what place it occupies in our history, and perhaps more importantly, in terms of 
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our response, what place it will occupy in the historical narratives we tell about 
that day and its aftermath.  Because 9/11 characterizes a terrific rupture in our 
history, our need to reach back, to connect ourselves to challenges of history 
during which we were successful to the great challenge suddenly thrust before 
us is almost overwhelming.  From our fear, anger, humiliation, and despair must 
come our great triumph, just as the horrors of the Battle of Britain and Pearl 
Harbor spurred the generations before us to victories over Berlin and Tokyo. 
Once we capture and refit a resonant-enough collective historical memory to 
our current circumstances, we lend ourselves a sense of the directions in which 
we must travel to overcome present obstacles. We merge our historical horizon 
with our historical past, and subsequently, our historical prejudice shifts to 
incorporate old lessons—lessons we have supposedly learned—into our objective 
of the present.  Essentially, we negotiate the paths we choose after we have 
renegotiated the meaning of our past.1 
Since this negotiation happens as part of a collective historical 
conversation, it becomes an aspect of public discourse.  Theodore Sarbin (1993) 
insists that our concept of history naturally demands storytellers who cannot exist 
as “tellers of history” without narratives designed specifically for their audiences. 
Any time a discourse develops between parties, some kind of dialogue is taking 
place between narrators and audiences.  In this sense, one individual’s 
experience in that negotiation and that historical era—his or her being-in-the­
world—cannot be entirely complete on its own, nor does it explain how that 
1 Stephen Bungay, preeminent historian of the Battle of Britain, invokes some of this 
argument in his Autumn, 2001 article on the war speeches of Churchill. 
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individual comes to understand that experience. Narratives, according to 
Sarbin, offer a psychological framing for making sense of events by creating 
contexts ripe for encounters with the narratives and responses of other people. 
Instead of acting as isolated stimulus-response exercises, the sharing of narratives 
with actively negotiating audiences operates as the tellings and re-tellings of 
organized stories.  If some kind of dialogue develops (which it inevitably does), if 
a person is the product of the heteroglossia of historical prejudice and the 
negotiation of collective memory, then being-in-the-world implies being-with­
others.  In short, understanding cannot happen, until being-in-the-world 
becomes being-with-others. 
Thelen agrees, noting that the construction of historical collective memory 
is never isolated, but made in conversations with others “that occur in the 
contexts of community, broader politics, and social dynamics” (1989, p. 1119). 
Ultimately, with great events that act as foundations (or shake foundations to the 
core), the narrative-building conversations grow larger and larger, including 
more and more parties and their various concerns.  If the narrative becomes 
substantial enough, richly steeped in collective memory, the cultural impulse to 
commemorate it formally becomes that much more urgent. 
Through this impulse, Nora and Nico Frijda (1997) link the urge to 
commemorate to events that signify a rupture with the past.  Describing a lieu 
de mèmoire as a kind of artificially-embodied memory, that by definition marks 
our “intent to remember,” Nora argues that observing commemoration is not just 
symbolic, but an act that “disrupts time, thus consecrating memory” (1996a, p. 
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14).  By marking that event, we separate that moment in time from all the other 
moments of all the other days in our lives that do not stand out, effectively 
indicating how special that moment is in our personal or collective history.  It 
becomes extraordinary—an event to be remembered—and for the most moving 
and life-changing events, a moment of special consideration, or consecration, 
as if by consecrating, we still struggle with the unanswerable questions of the 
event (Frijda, 1997). In the act of consecration, the embodied memory 
becomes a substitution for a simple, shared memory, becoming instead an 
historical artifact, and stops time through its very existence. The commemorative 
exercise of stopping time marks the event as special, separate, and something 
we choose to remember beyond the simplest acts of remembering. 
Events like 9/11, which almost immediately become commemorated 
events, with 24-hour news coverage, temporary cancellation of all kinds of day-
to-day activities, flags at half-staff, moments of silence, and days of mourning, 
Nora claims, “are immediately invested with symbolic significance and treated, 
even as they are unfolding, as if they were being commemorated in advance” 
(1996a, p. 18).  Such events, driven by a socially-constructed meaning that strives 
for a society-wide understanding and acceptance of the events in question, 
despite whatever myriad small events which may comprise them, lose their 
banal, everyday referents and become wholly symbolic.  As opposed to the way 
an individual’s memory of a given event may exist, with its focus on the details of 
circumstance and happenstance in which the individual hears of, sees, or 
comes to terms with the event, the socio-historical commemoration focuses on 
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the larger “circle within which everything counts, everything is symbolic, 
everything is significant” (1996a, p. 20). The event, in becoming historicized 
memory, and especially in the age of mass media, evolves into an iconic figure 
arrested in the long ground of time.2 
In the leading articles of The Times of London, the 9/11 language is not just 
the language of an “editorializing” discourse, one that aims solely to explain and 
comment on a given political, economic, social, or community issue.  Instead, 
this particular editorial discourse appears to aim far beyond simple explanation 
and commentary and into the realm of symbolic, historical action.  The most 
reflective of the editorials are obviously commemorative in their content, 
focusing on 9/11 as a defining moment of our times, the moment after which 
nothing will ever be the same.  Life after 9/11 quite suddenly becomes life in 
uncharted territory, life that begs for a new understanding and application of 
history.  In resisting “rapid, alien and imposed change,” according to Thelen 
(1989, p. 1125), people respond by holding on to what they can, leading to the 
instant commemoration Nora describes.  Only when “the historical framework of 
the nation has been shattered,” can national, historical memory “come into 
being” (Nora, 1996b, p. 636).  Only when the overwhelming need for one exists 
can an icon emerge to help fix the collective vision of the nation. The icon, 
separating an event from the general flow of history, makes figural not just the 
event itself, but the historical past which preceded it, as a time in which life was 
2 “Historicized memory” and “embodied memory” are the same, though “embodied 
memory” specifically deals with something that literally becomes "embodied," as in a 
place or an object that is commemorated.  Nora is sometimes talking specifically about 
physical places—lieux—but lieux really imply "realms" more than "places."   
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normal.  To commemorate an event like 9/11 is to invoke “memories of a past 
that was unchanging, incorruptible and harmonious,” that people “mobilize . . . 
to resist change” (Thelen, 1989, p. 1125), calling upon a past that makes sense in 
the wake of an era of grave danger. Commemoration of 9/11, therefore, marks 
“the abandonment of the traditional channels and modes of transmission” of 
historical events (Nora, 1996b, p. 636) by marking 9/11 as an event that 
transcends history. 
The Iconic Image 
Davis (2003) continues this theme from a psychological perspective, 
arguing that to understand 9/11, we will ultimately have to understand its 
symbolic images if we are to understand our historical era and what actions we 
are taking in it.  By “arrest[ing] images that flare up at a moment of crisis and 
attempt[ing] to internalize and articulate their significance before they 
disappear” (p. 128), Davis insists that we take Walter Benjamin’s3 approach to 
historical consciousness and capture these images while they are still relatively 
novel and their ultimate meanings are still being negotiated, before they 
“disappear, perhaps irretrievably, in the predictable rush toward ideological 
reaffirmations—and national healing” (p. 128). Though the process of 
commemorating 9/11 and establishing images that become socially and 
historically mandated icons of it may sound like one sinister forces could easily 
3 “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” by Walter Benjamin, 1940, Illuminations, 1978, ed. 
and trans. Hannah Arendt, New York: Basic. 
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manipulate, in the case of 9/11, the earliest editorials, particularly from New York, 
embody both Davis’ and Benjamin’s takes, as well as Lakoff’s (2001) description 
of how the iconic images of 9/11 dramatically changed the way we would 
encounter the world. Noting that any building can be symbolic of a person, with 
the various features of a human body, especially the human face, existing as 
figures within the larger architectural ground, Lakoff argues that “the image of 
the plane going into South Tower was . . . an image of a bullet going through 
someone's head, the flame pouring from the other side blood spurting out. It was 
an assassination. The tower falling was a body falling” (¶ 5).  So when the 
editorials describe New York as a body in need of healing (Pollio, et al., In Press), 
they follow along with the logical next step of Lakoff’s description. 
In both cases, the language used to represent bodies in pain derives 
directly from the imaginable experience of the writers.  Lakoff remembers, “The 
bodies falling were me, relatives, friends.  Strangers who had smiled as they had 
passed me on the street screamed as they fell past me” (¶ 5).  The New York 
Times, meanwhile, talks about the need for the “city’s revival” (“Mayor of the 
Moment,” 2001), that after absorbing what amounted to “a supreme national 
horror” (“Heroes Amid the Horror,” 2001), New York would “breathe for a bit” 
(“The Necessary Courage,” 2001), but “would never bow” (“Mayor of the 
Moment,” 2001), and instead begin the “world of consoling to be done” (“The 
War Against America: An Unfathomable Attack,” 2001).  Without question, the 
iconic image of 9/11 is those towers collapsing, two wounded sentinels that for 
30 years had characterized New York City as the center of the Western world.  If 
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Lakoff describes the shock and pain of 9/11, of those towers tumbling to the 
ground, The New York Times, almost immediately, begins to focus on the healing 
that would need to take place in a city victimized by a terrifying, unexpected 
attack.  Finally, Lakoff reminds us that “All those symbols were connected to 
more of [our] identity than [we] could have realized. To make sense of [9/11, our] 
very brain[s] had to change” (¶ 6).  Buildings were no longer buildings and cities 
were no longer cities; they became victims—and survivors. And even though the 
most palpable effects 9/11 had on our international community resulted in the 
violent deaths of thousands at the hands of the terrorists and the launching of a 
worldwide war (not exactly easily dismissible effects), the more chilling success of 
the attacks over time manifested itself as the more invasive and insidious 
“reach[ing] in and chang[ing of] the brains of people all over” (¶ 7).  That iconic 
figure of the towers collapsing, and the consequences of that symbolic death, 
was “replayed in flashback to a newly insomniac world,” as The Times of London 
put it, until it became “scorched into the collective consciousness,” and thrust us 
into our “desire to restore life to New York City,” but also left us “caught in 
obscene free-fall” (“Dig Deep,” 2001). 
The Times has it right.  Since “image is the native language of anxiety, the 
language psyche uses in an effort to mediate the emotional and psychological 
impact of events” (Davis, 2003, p. 127-128), especially for an event with the 
emotional and psychological impact of 9/11, is the language of iconic figures 
that breaches time and forces an historical moment to stand alone as though 
“scorched” into our collective memory.  Because of the natural connection 
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between image and metaphorical language, deciphering the language we use 
to talk about terror becomes a useful tool for understanding just what terror 
means and what it accomplishes, and therefore, how it affects us and our daily 
lives, as well as the larger sweep of history, as evidenced by Lakoff, The New York 
Times, and The Times of London. Essentially, if we can understand the images, 
we can begin to understand the relevant being-in-the-world. In this sense, the 
“ideological reaffirmations” Benjamin talks about that we make through 
language undoubtedly drive the historical policy implications of the “War on 
Terror,” while the notion of “national healing” forces us to deal with the collective 
psychological and historical implications of life after “Ground Zero.” 
Part of what is happening in The New York Times, is that the language— 
through historical and metaphorical themes—is providing a level of collective 
therapy for a general public suffering from a collective sense that something 
terrible has happened.  Rather pointedly, the paper recognizes immediately that 
something has changed irrevocably, and that every part of our lives can 
explode in a fury of jet fuel, like a modern-day Pompeii in which the most 
mundane aspects of life—people getting up, going to work, walking down the 
street on a crisp and perfectly clear Manhattan morning—become trapped and 
suffocated in a super-heated strata of dust. 
While aware that New Yorkers are reminded every moment that the city 
has “suffered an urban avalanche” (“Terror for All,” 2001), across the ocean, The 
Times of London busily identifies just what effects that avalanche will have. 
Noting that the world has been “tempered by fire and changed” (“Terror for All,” 
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2001), The Times quickly understands that “old rivalries [have been] buried” (“Still 
the Enemy,” 2001), and that world leaders are “actor[s] in a drama whose first 
act is unfolding” (“With One Voice,” 2001). Arguing that “the world divides after 
this tremendous event into two camps” with “no middle way” (“With One 
Voice,” 2001), The Times warns that “it would be foolish, it would be immoral, to 
shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001).  For the UK 
and the rest of the world, only by “standing shoulder to shoulder” will Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and others be “best placed to whisper words in the right ears” 
(“The Old War,” 2001). 
While editorialists in New York compassionately concern themselves with 
rescue, recovery, and restoring New York and New Yorkers to health, London, 
understanding that 9/11 “bring[s] to a head the struggle shadowing the West,” 
focuses sharply on setting the stage for the world drama that will unfold now that 
there is “no going back to life before” (“This Is a World War,” 2001).  For The Times, 
9/11 is but the first scene in a drama of Shakespearean importance, with nothing 
less than the survival of civilization at stake. Conjuring the language and 
sentiment of Shakespeare’s Henry IV and Henry V, The Times recasts the roles of 
Henry and Exeter in the drama of St. Crispin and Agincourt—the great literary 
metaphor for the history of Great Britain—once again, just as Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill had during the Second World War.4  In one swift stroke, The 
Times manages to invoke the story “the good man” shall “teach his son” of 
Britain’s “finest hour.” 
4 Churchill commissioned Sir Laurence Olivier to produce a film version of Henry V in 1944 
to raise the morale of the British people. 
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Given the importance of an iconic image of 9/11 and the narrative 
elements evoked by it for The Times, both Brown and Kulick’s flashbulb memory 
hypothesis (1977) and Neisser’s narrative hypothesis (1996) offer a psychological 
foundation for how 9/11 managed to “reach in” and “change our brains.”  The 
basic mechanism for a flashbulb memory, as Brown and Kulick originally 
described it, asserts that an event marked by high levels of emotion, surprise, 
and consequentiality compels us to talk about the event in detail repeatedly, 
yielding a coherent narrative framing the event, and therefore a high level of 
memory recall.  More importantly, Brown and Kulick surmise that certain 
“canonical categories” (p. 23) of the descriptive memories are basic features of 
any of these so-called flashbulb memories, and they remarkably mirror the basic 
theory of rhetorical narrative.  Brown and Kulick’s sense of “place” and “ongoing 
activity” reflect narrative setting and time, as well as narrative acts, while their 
concern with “informant,” a person’s own “affect” and any other particular 
“affects” echo a narrative concern with character, agency, and purpose. 
Finally, Brown and Kulick’s focus on the “aftermath” of the event rather plainly 
emulates the narrative interest in concluding action and denouement. 
What Neisser (1996; as well as Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997) concludes is 
that though Brown and Kulick’s “flashbulb” metaphor supposes that the rich, 
descriptive memory people have of an event forms almost on impact, that 
metaphor does not take into account what more likely happens in the forming of 
these memories long after the time of the event itself.  Instead, Neisser believes 
that these “flashbulb” memories take shape only once we understand the 
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significance of the event in question, once a narrative truly has a chance to 
develop.  For Neisser, narrative structure explains Brown and Kulick’s canonical 
forms, and is what allows the flashbulb to recall “an occasion when two 
narratives that we ordinarily keep separate—the course of history and the course 
of our own life—were momentarily put into alignment” (p. 47).  The flashbulb 
memories reflect not specifically the events themselves, but how they are 
socially-constructed by media, historians, politicians and other public institutions, 
and how ordinary people have come to think about their own experiences. We 
talk with others about the event, how we first heard about it, and how, in the 
case of an ongoing story like 9/11, it develops. Those conversations include a 
terrific amount of rehearsal of the details as we think and re-think our way 
through the events, and result in a concentrated search for the meaning and 
significance of those events. 
Language As Symbolic Action 
Given Neisser’s narrative approach and the epic and dramatic narrative 
themes that appear in The New York Times (Lule, 2002; Pollio, et al., In Press) and 
The Times of London, Burke’s Pentad and his notion of language as symbolic 
action provide a calculus for examining these editorials and the narrative 
structures they present to their audiences in developing the story of 9/11.  In A 
Grammar of Motives (1969), Burke introduces act, scene, agent, agency, and 
purpose as a means of calculating the dramatic ratios of the ways in which we 
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perceive events.  These five foundational elements provide a base for 
understanding and evaluating any kind of narrative, as a means of defining an 
act, the scene in which it takes place, the actor (agent) who carries out the act 
and the means (agency) they use to do so, and also for what purpose they 
undertake the act in the first place.  For Burke, all action is dramatic, filled and 
played out with the motives and causal relationships determined by the interplay 
of elements among the pentadic ratios of the players. Taken in conjunction 
Ricoeur’s (1984a) view that all human understanding is narrative at base, Burke’s 
assertion that all human understanding is dramaturgical reinforces the idea that 
what we know we come to know through story. 
To comprehend how this understanding develops, taking a small step 
back and reconsidering the ever-important psychological connection between 
narrator and audience is necessary.  Ricoeur insists that human thinking and 
experience exist as narrative.  The way we communicate with each other is 
through narrative. And since our being-in-the-world and being-with-others are 
steeped in narrative, the way we understand them cannot happen in any way 
other than narrative.  Sarbin (1993) develops this further, offering that since we 
are surrounded by narrative, all human behavior is essentially dramaturgical. We 
think of ourselves and those around us not just as people, but also as characters 
who fit the historical events (plots) that unfold around us.  Our actions cause the 
plots to unfold, the times and places in which we live set the scene, and our 
positions in the plots give our actions agency and purpose.  Our events are not 
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just events, but links between acts and agents, anchored by base, historical 
metaphors, producing narratives that develop for others to understand. 
Understanding human behavior as a kind of drama assumes an audience; 
drama, more perhaps than any other art form, assumes an audience, whether in 
terms of others actors in the drama or an audience outside the drama. 
Constructed as a series of dialogues, language in drama personifies what 
Bakhtin (1986) describes as a series of utterances, like links, “in the chain of 
speech communication,” unable to be separated from any “preceding links” 
and any “subsequent links” (p. 94).  A dramatic utterance, in effect, is one very 
consciously constructed, one that carefully considers possible responses, and 
indeed expects responses, anticipating potential dialogues that might result.  
When that happens, when the dialogue develops, speakers and listeners switch 
roles as listeners become active in the conversation. At the same time, as Bitzer 
claims (1992), a speaker’s audience also assumes that the speaker must address 
some rhetorical exigence, something which is left unanswered or unfinished to 
which the speaker addresses him or herself that organizes speech, providing the 
motivating principle behind the utterance. 
In our meaning-creating nexus of intersecting factors, the role of rhetoric 
begins to become clear.  Burke’s Pentad essentially follows up rhetorically where 
Sarbin ends his psychological discussion:  act, scene, agent, agency, and 
purpose form a vehicle for creating order and meaning out of events, rhetorical, 
psychological, and historical.  For Burke, the rhetorical Pentad becomes the 
means through which we interpret narrative, the way symbols can, through 
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language and rhetoric, create cooperation between individuals isolated by their 
own being-in-the-world and allow those narratives to have their audience, so in 
that way behavior and history can have meaning for someone else. 
For Burke, like Sarbin, base symbols, or historical metaphors, offer the 
primary means through which we understand the world and our experience in it, 
building up into narratives.  Once built, they then expand (Pearl Harbor becomes 
9/11) and become the ways in which we select our memory-as-history and the 
metaphors that come out of it.  Those metaphors, in turn, become ways of 
reflecting those things about our experience we want to emphasize and of 
deflecting those things we would rather like to ignore.  In other words, those 
metaphors constitute which figures in Ricoeur’s historical ground take 
precedence, and which are obscured. Once symbols expand into narratives, 
particularly into Burkeian dramas of symbolic action, the language they take up 
begins to represent “modes of action” in a “matter of motives” (1969, p. xxii).  
Since Burke focuses directly on the Pentad’s ability to illuminate “the strategic 
spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise” (p. xviii), the motives that the 
Pentad describes can become increasingly complex as the acts and actors they 
motivate become more byzantine.  Because Burke chooses descriptors that 
highlight ambiguity, the chances for overlap are great; act and scene can 
merge, becoming a scene-act ratio, and transform, becoming not just either 
element alone, but both together. 
The act of the terrorists on 9/11—of flying planes into buildings—becomes 
the scene of 9/11—and the most powerful set of images we remember.  Likewise, 
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when we editorialize the event and that editorializing language becomes 
symbolic action in itself, we create rhetorically a drama on our own terms, 
transforming the event into a common ground of understanding, defining the 
act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose that drive the collective meaning we 
achieve. The end result of Burke’s rhetoric then, is that symbol plus rhetoric, in 
the presence of experience, yields understanding of an event via the pentadic 
calculus. The language of the historical and metaphorical themes in these 
editorials does more than act as a mechanism for ordering and framing complex 
events and issues, or as collective therapy.  It also provides a measure of 
symbolic action, involving the audience in the unfolding narrative, offering the 
readership a way into the developments on the ground and in the decision-









This study is part of a larger research effort developed in conjunction 
with the Center for Applied Phenomenological Research at the University of 
Tennessee-Knoxville and the Institute of Psychology at the Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences examining the responses of the editorial boards of a number of 
newspapers across the Western world to the events of 9/11 during the first year 
following the attacks. Specifically, the larger research team is analyzing these 
editorials in terms of the frequency with which editorials concerning the events of 
9/11 appeared, the trends that frequency manifested, the style of editorials, the 
historical references conjured, the topics of content they covered, the salient 
figures of speech they coined, and the overall themes they constructed. As part 
of the group, I began looking at editorials in four papers before finally heading 
the project for The Times, using basically the same, integrative research method 
as the group did with the other papers, but with a design to branch off later into 
a separate, rhetorical analysis. 
At first, the project focused mainly on the response of The New York Times, 
given its status as the most important and influential paper in New York City, the 
unfortunate, primary victim of the 9/11 attacks.  Since the early results from that 
study proved eye-opening to the members of the group, and as the research 
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group grew to include international researchers as well as Americans, the study 
began to expand so as to consider comparing how results from The New York 
Times either stood out from or blended in with responses from around the world. 
The next American paper considered hailed from the second city targeted, The 
Washington Post. But as a group with a strong, international focus—comprised of 
members from the United States and Eastern Europe—a variety of papers was 
ultimately chosen for the study from beyond the United States, including dailies 
from the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Russia, and Spain. 
Those particular countries were represented in part because of the nature 
of dealing with second languages—we needed to have people who could 
adequately read the languages—but also because of these countries’ 
relationships with the United States after 9/11.  As NATO members and Western 
European countries with governments immediately sympathetic to the 
Americans and also having suffered a history of terrorism from the IRA and ETA, 
respectively, both Great Britain and Spain became obvious choices. (Also not 
lost on the group was Great Britain’s imperial history in Afghanistan.)  Bulgaria, 
both because it was home to a number of members of the research team, and 
also because it was an emerging East European nation, developing ties to the 
United States and NATO, was situated as a solid choice.  Finally, as a long-time 
adversary, yet potential new ally, and also with a history of terrorism and a long, 
difficult history with Afghanistan, Russia struck members of the team as a 
particularly interesting choice for study. With those countries in mind and given 
that broad focus, newspapers were chosen on the basis of their national and 
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international prestige, the size of their readership, their relationships to the areas 
of attack, and the rapport the paper’s governing country had with the United 
States.  Finally, some consideration was given to the quality of writing as 
exhibited within the paper. Ultimately, Great Britain’s The Times, Spain’s El 
Mundo, Bulgaria’s Sega, and Russia’s Izvestia were chosen for the European 
study, usually with an eye toward the paper’s independence, influence, 
reputation, and attitude towards the United States. 
This particular study of The Times of London is the third of the papers to be 
examined in this way, and therefore owes a great deal methodologically to 
procedures developed in the previous studies. As in the Pollio, et al. study (In 
Press) of The New York Times and in the Stoitsova, et al. (In Press) study of Sega, 
this investigation included a look at editorials written during the entire first year 
after the 9/11 attacks in order to gather a broad sample of reactions.  It was also 
designed to gauge what long-standing rhetorical, historical, and metaphorical 
themes would emerge from a body of work written over a fairly long period of 
time.   Focusing on an entire year’s leaders1 allows time for a paper to react 
immediately to events, and also to reflect on them, describe them and their 
aftermath sufficiently, and prescribe specific courses of action based on the 
events in question and their consequences. 
As a long-standing and influential paper in the United Kingdom, The Times 
was chosen largely on the basis of its status.  Though other papers—The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph immediately come to mind—also enjoy a 
1 A leader, or leading article, is simply the British term for an editorial. 
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high level of prestige and a broad readership among the British people and 
indeed worldwide, neither enjoys the historical position of The Times as a paper 
operating since 1785.  At the same time, since the era of Churchill and Roosevelt, 
the “special relationship” enjoyed between the people and governments of the 
United Kingdom and the United States underlined a need for a British paper to 
be included in the overall project. A British viewpoint was likely to be both highly 
supportive of the American position, yet also, a distinctively independent voice; 
after all, the British have long relished their position of being not quite continental 
European in their way of looking at the world and yet not just an echo of the 
Americans across the Atlantic.  Finally, The Times is an extraordinarily well-written 
paper by any standards, a factor that cannot be understated when exploring 
rhetorical themes. 
When gathering data from The Times of London, originally, the intention 
was to search the LexisNexis database for any leaders relating to the broad 
notion of “terror” during the first year after 9/11, in order to find any leading 
article that dealt with terrorism in a broad sense, so that the corpus of data 
would include any article that had a direct relationship with the events of 9/11. 
This was the technique originally used for searching editorials from The New York 
Times.  It proved in that case to be highly successful, once the search criteria 
"terror*" was used to encompass "terror" and all its permutations (e.g. “terror,” 
“terrorist,” “terrorism”), which was broader than “9/11” or “September 11,” or 
other search terms that were attempted, and ultimately abandoned because of 
their narrowness. When it was searched for this project, however, the LexisNexis 
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database did not adequately separate out leaders from other articles 
appearing in The Times of London, it was necessary to search quite broadly. The 
Times of London returns could not be accurately narrowed since returns included 
pieces broadly referred to by LexisNexis as "Features.”  At that point, a long list of 
returns was tagged to capture those that were called "Features," as long as they 
also showed evidence of relating to “terror.”  Unfortunately, this process also 
included pieces that were not leaders, but columns, guest columns, letters to the 
editor, and a few other specials. Thus, with the long list of qualifying pieces in the 
"Features" at large category, microfilm of The Times of London was searched 
issue-by-issue to pare down which of these “Features” were actually leading 
articles. This way, pieces on the tagged list could be conclusively identified as 
leaders published between 9/12/01 and 9/11/02, and therefore were subjects for 
this study. 
Narrowing the results from that first exhaustive search, 251 editorials 
comprised the body of material that included the word, “terror,” as a full word or 
root term. As in the previous studies however, this original group of editorials 
required further narrowing.  Though searching for “terror*” did offer the broadest 
spectrum of results, which was necessary in order to include anything related to 
9/11, even during the first days, before “9/11” had even been coined, “terror*” 
also sometimes included leaders not at all related.  In many cases, the “terror*” 
referred to was terror in Chechnya, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, the history of IRA 
terrorism, or other incidents that were not obviously related to the events of 9/11.  
Reducing this body of material further required five independent raters, four with 
33

backgrounds in descriptive psychology and one with a background in language 
and rhetoric and all of whom were trained in psycholinguistics as members of the 
larger research team.  Team members read each leader and scored it on a (0-3) 
scale, with 0 defined as “not related to 9/11,” 1 defined as “little related to 9/11,” 
2 defined as “somewhat related to 9/11,” and 3 defined as “most related to 
9/11.”  Raters’ scores of each of the leaders were then averaged to determine 
an overall value between 0 and 3.  Cutting off leaders with values lower than 
1.75 to include both those articles that were “most related” and also those that 
the raters believed were situated somewhere between “most related” and 
“somewhat related,” 45 editorials, or 17.9% of the 251, were selected as directly 
related to the events of 9/11.  Of these articles, 36 (80.0%) had a value greater 
than 2.0. Average length of each was 779.7 words per article, but the group 
included a broad range, from 359 words to 1853 words. At this point, the output 
of these articles over time was charted, to gauge how the focus of the paper on 
9/11 varied throughout the course of the year, and whether or not there were 
connections between the times of the year that interest spiked and when it 
declined (e.g. major holidays, 9/11 anniversary, start of the war in Afghanistan, 
etc.). 
Reflective, Prescriptive, Descriptive 
Three of the original four independent raters (two of the psychology raters 
and the language rater—the other had dropped out of the research group for 
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The Times of London) were then given the complete set of 45 leaders and asked 
to determine their placement into the reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive 
categories described by Pollio, et al. (In Press) for The New York Times and 
Stoitsova, et al. (In Press) for Sega, based on the definitions developed by the 
American and Bulgarian research teams. Two of these categories—reflective 
and prescriptive—first arose during the study on The New York Times. It became 
clear during the process that different editorials were serving different functions 
for the editorialists—either to reflect on the meaning of 9/11 or to prescribe a 
course of action the country ought to or ought not to undertake because of 
9/11, hence the terms “reflective” and “prescriptive.”  But over time, it also 
became clear that these categories broadly defined how the editorial pages 
focused on various elements of 9/11 and its aftermath over the course of the 
year. At that point, the characteristics of reflective and prescriptive articles were 
identified and defined, and articles were placed in one category or the other. 
Reflective editorials tended to have a past-orientation and typically 
concerned possible ways of thinking about the present event in terms of 
significant personal and national values.  The analysis offered in these editorials 
frequently provided a particular understanding of 9/11 in terms of its emotional, 
historical, and social meanings.  Reflective editorials were defined as being 
philosophical, observer-oriented, and story-like in nature. A following excerpt is 
an example of reflective writing in The Times: 
Six months ago on Monday, the world caught its breath in shock, disgust 
and fear, transfixed by the attacks on America. Nothing was known of 
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the enemy beyond the appallingly, graphically obvious:  that these were 
well-organised terrorists who were ruthlessly contemptuous of life, their 
own along with that of the civilians trapped with them in the hijacked 
aircraft and their victims on the ground.  They had inflicted unimaginable 
carnage, deliberately indiscriminate. The attacks revealed, as they were 
intended to do, the vulnerability not only of the world’s greatest power 
but of every society in which fanatics were at liberty to circulate. It was 
an attack on freedom itself. (“A World Transformed,” 2001)2 
By contrast, prescriptive editorials forwarded particular arguments 
concerning what should, or should not, be done in response to 9/11. Usually, the 
editorial commented on public figures and governmental activities, or presented 
alternatives for action concerning the rebuilding of New York, future military 
actions, and domestic and international public policy.  These editorials were 
defined as being action and participant focused and tended to have a future 
orientation.  The following is an example of prescriptive writing: 
Both in and between countries, Mr. Bush’s effort to “rally the world” has 
created unexpected alliances. None is more dramatic, or more 
significant, than Vladimir Putin’s decision that Russia and the US must 
make common cause, and that “the complete political and ideological 
isolation” of Islamist terrorists is so vital to its national interests that Moscow 
must, for now, set to one side Russia’s deeply rooted historical suspicions of 
any external influences penetrating its Central Asian “near abroad.”  So 
2 The examples I offer for reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive styles all come from the 
same leading article, for reasons I will explain below. 
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far, the relationship has been deftly handled by both parties; Mr. Bush 
should take exceptional care to ensure that this continues to be so. (“A 
World Transformed,” 2001) 
Finally, the definition of descriptive editorials was developed because of a 
need that only emerged when Sega’s relevant articles were coded. A group of 
Sega’s editorials simply did not fit the parameters of either the reflective or 
prescriptive categories. What raters repeatedly discussed was that these 
editorials seemed to be reporting events as much as commenting on them in a 
reflective or prescriptive way.  Since the reporting constituted a description of 
events, the term “descriptive” was chosen to represent these editorials.  Usually, 
these editorials report a story connected with significant events that happened 
as a result of measures undertaken by the United States, the United Kingdom or 
other governments after 9/11. Many of these editorials relate to international 
reactions of protest or support for the American understanding of the War on 
Terror.  Descriptive editorials are largely informational and provide readers with 
an opportunity to draw their own conclusions.  Descriptive editorializing 
resembles this: 
This military engagement is only one facet of a campaign on many fronts, 
civil as well as military, to starve international terrorist cells of space, 
organization and support.  But its “demonstration effect” has not been 
confined to its military dimensions.  President Bush, a politician who, like 
Tony Blair but more unexpectedly, has proved well able to raise his game 
in response to emergency, has substantiated not only his assertion that 
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there can be no neutral ground in this fight.  He has shown how all 
governments, including those in the Islamic world, stand to gain by 
aligning themselves with America to defend civil order against enemies 
within the gates that many of them had hesitated, out of fear or 
ideological ambivalence, to confront. (“A World Transformed,” 2001) 
Unlike results deriving from for The New York Times and Sega, however, The 
Times of London’s leaders proved difficult to categorize into reflective, 
prescriptive, or descriptive categories.  SPSS3 coding was used to evaluate the 
reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive ratings of these raters.  Then the 
language terms “reflective,” “prescriptive,” and “descriptive” were translated 
into numbers (P=1, R=2, D=3) that could be quantified statistically, and then 
recoded into numerical variables. In terms of a reliability analysis, ideally, 
Spearman-Brown alpha reliability ratings should be above 0.80, with an 
acceptable rating over 0.70, noting a high level of reliability across various raters. 
Both The New York Times and Sega reached this standard, with The New York 
Times enjoying an interrater reliability rating for reflective, prescriptive, and 
descriptive leaders of 0.73 and Sega, of a very high 0.92.  However, the interrater 
reliability of separating leaders from The Times of London into these categories 
fell far below that ideal with a score of 0.50. 
Since the raters in question had previously worked on rating other papers 
as part of the team (The New York Times, The Washington Post, and El Mundo), 
none of which presented similar problems, a discussion concerning the 
3 SPSS, a statistical program, allows researchers to analyze large amounts of numerical 




underlying cause for this low level of reliability ensued. The conclusion the group 
reached was that there was a clear, rhetorical reason why reliability ratings 
proved too low to maintain these reflective, prescriptive and descriptive 
definitional categories broadly for The Times. As a whole, and as evidenced by 
“A World Transformed” (2001) excerpted above, leaders from The Times are 
written in a vastly complex style, and what one reader rated as mostly reflective, 
others rated as mostly prescriptive or descriptive.  In other words, unlike editorials 
from The New York Times or Sega, which clearly fell into one of these categories, 
leaders from The Times of London often seemed to fall into more than one or all 
of these categories at once, as though the purpose of the leader was to reflect, 
prescribe, and describe all at once the events at hand, especially as the year 
progressed.  In the case of “A World Transformed,” this was exactly the case:  
one rater believed the leader was reflective, another felt it was prescriptive, and 
yet another thought it was descriptive.  The fact that it very clearly contains 
exemplary elements of each category makes it perfectly understandable why 
readers would categorize it differently.  Even in the significant number of cases in 
which at least 2 of 3 raters ultimately agreed on a category, there was no 
question that other categories were represented in the article—often strikingly 
so—especially early in the year, when a great deal of reflection, description, and 
prescription was happening at once. As a result, separating leaders by 
definitional category was abandoned in favor of observing that The Times 
published leaders that often represented more than one category (which 
actually provides a rich environment for rhetorical analysis of themes), and 
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therefore that gave an acceptable explanation for the low interrater reliability in 
this area. Given this observation, any subsequent analysis of leaders through 
these definitional categories would be handled in a more holistic way that 
allowed each leader to be examined as potentially having multiple purposes, 
and therefore, not codified simply into one form or another. 
Historical References 
The next step involved examining the role an understanding of history 
played in the construction of the leading articles and in the development of an 
overall meaning for 9/11.  The group believed that finding all the historical 
references in the editorials would provide a substantial grounding for the ways in 
which the editorialists were thinking about 9/11 as an historical event, one 
grounded in the long, cultural and historical narrative of the United States 
specifically, but also of the Western world.  If we could track historical 
precedents the editorials leaned on to develop an understanding of 9/11, we 
could take a large step toward developing the overall meaning of 9/11 the 
papers hoped to convey.  Historical references would begin to clarify political, 
social, diplomatic, and military patterns against which to judge the West’s 
behavior in the post-9/11 world. At the same time, historical references could 
very likely illuminate what historical inspirations the papers wanted their 
audiences to cling to in times of trouble. 
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At this point, using the overall coding system developed by the larger 
research team, all historical references made in the leaders (e.g. Pearl Harbor, 
Margaret Thatcher, the USS Cole bombing, etc.) were noted by The Times of 
London team leader and one other member of the team. These 156 references 
included overt references that specifically named historical events or individuals, 
but also included more subtle references, such as Churchill’s noting of the 
“special relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States, 
references to literary figures and quotations from their works, such as 
Shakespeare’s Henry IV, or mythological terms, such as the Hydra.  After this, 
references were broken down by whether they appeared during the first six 
months of the year or the final six months, and also how many appeared in each 
article over the course of the year, to gauge whether or not there was a 
difference in the appearance of historical terms over time.  Finally, articles 
having or not having historical references were noted, to help describe The Times 
of London’s focus on the importance of history in its attempt to reflect on, 
describe, or prescribe answers to, 9/11. 
These historical references were then grouped into several major 
categories, if possible (e.g. the Gulf War, the Cold War, World War II, etc.), in 
consultation with the leader of the overall project. Any reference that had a 
clear connection to World War II, like “Nazi,” for instance, even though the 
reference itself might not specifically name World War II, was included in the 
World War II category.  By grouping references when possible, finding the 
historical pattern the editorialists were using became much easier, since sheer 
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mass implied a level of clear importance.  The fact, for instance, that The Times 
of London had so many references in the first place, but also that over a third of 
those references grouped together quite quickly under seven major categories, 
implied that The Times connected 9/11 very strongly to other historical events. 
References which could not clearly be coded were kept separate, under the 
assumption that they might also function as figural terms which would turn up in 
coding later (which many did), or key parts of thematic structures that might 
emerge later in the project (which some did), whether or not they were part of 
clear, historical groups.   
Content Categories 
With historical references in place, the next step was to track the content 
of these leaders.  Content categories were determined by the team leader in 
conjunction with the team leader of The New York Times study, and also in 
consultation with the team leader of the Sega study, by breaking down each 
article into its primary, textual features, focusing on the main components of 
information the articles attempted to relay to their audience. These features 
represented the topic the leader in question discussed and what evidence or 
arguments it provided while stating its case.  For instance, if the article primarily 
talked about the UK’s response to 9/11, that was its primary textual feature which 
earmarked it for a specific content category. The leader might also note the 
role Prime Minister Blair was playing in Western diplomacy or the response of 
42

British Muslims to the attacks.  Either of these would constitute a main component 
of information that the leader was communicating. 
Once a first list of textual features was composed, the similarities the 
leaders exhibited were tracked, and the various leaders themselves separated 
into groups of articles containing the same, general textual concerns that arose 
from the leaders. The six groups which emerged were named through terms that 
appeared in the articles: (1) The Day That Changed the Modern World, (2) With 
One Voice: We Are All Americans, (3) This Is a Long World War Without Borders: 
Miles to Go Before They Sleep, (4) Osama bin Laden’s Spectre, (5) Intelligent 
Intelligence, and (6) Standing Shoulder to Shoulder: Implications for the UK.  One 
article from each group was chosen as an exemplar to provide the best 
example of the textual features of that particular category.  Each group was also 
tracked to chart the output of articles in each category to determine if the 
concerns developed in each content category remained steady, rose, or fell 
over the course of the year.  By doing this, we hoped to track how the important 
features of 9/11 changed (if they did) over time.  Finally, the distribution and 
average of historical references was charted by content category to determine 
which categories provide the richest sources for historical analogies, and which 




Three independent raters were asked to select salient figures of speech 
(e.g. metaphors, similes, hyperbole, etc.) in each leader to discover what 
terminology was being coined to describe the events of 9/11 and the post-9/11 
world.  By finding salient figures, we also were quite likely to find novel figures of 
speech, or figures that arose directly to depict 9/11 and were entirely new to the 
language. We believed that through doing this we might be able to find 
patterns of meaning that were being reflected at the basic word level of written 
language. All raters had been previously trained to recognize figures for the 
sister project focusing on The New York Times, designed by Pollio, et al. (In Press), 
using the definitions developed by Pollio, Barlow, Fine and Pollio (1977) to teach 
raters a broad variety of figurative usage. Once framed, raters independently 
identified all figures of speech in the 45 leaders from The Times; each rater  also 
selected 15 figures from each leader he or she considered to be the most 
noteworthy, and, therefore, most salient.  From these groups of 15 figures chosen 
from each leader, only those selected by 2 of 3 or 3 of 3 raters were considered 
for further scrutiny.  Trends were identified among the figures of speech that 
appeared in the leaders by the team leader in consultation with other members 
of the team (and sometimes others outside the team with previous experience in 
recognizing and coding figural terms).  Certain figures of speech, for instance, 
clearly were comparing 9/11, and/or its after-effects, to games such as 
“however fluid the chessboard now,” or scientific reactions such as “unleashing 
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a corrosive cycle,” or even to dramatic motifs such as “centre stage.”  As groups 
began to appear, figures of speech were then separated into the 14 categories 
that emerged from the body of research, establishing the broad figural domains 
that helped to establish the ways in which figures of speech were being utilized 
by editorialists to convey specific messages concerning the events of 9/11.  The 
14 categories were named (1) Civilised World, (2) Language, Literature, and 
Drama, (3) Characters, (4) Change and Time, (5) Medicine, (6) Games, (7) 
Science and Engineering, (8) Vision and Shadow, (9) Body, (10) Nautical, (11) 
Rooting Out and Closing In, (12) Terrain, (13) Responding to Danger, and (14) 
Natural Disasters. 
A final step involved calculating the mean and standard deviation of the 
number of salient figures per article and then correlating these numbers with the 
number of words per article to yield a rate of measure.  Ideally, this correlation 
would demonstrate whether or not there was a clear connection to the number 
of salient figures we gathered from each leader to the number of words in that 
leader. Through this figure, the team hoped to learn if the impact of salient 
figures was affected by the length of the text. 
Themes  
Lastly, a thematic analysis attempting to synthesize the body of 
information already developed was performed across the 45 leaders. With 
historical, textual, and figurative categories already in place, each article was 
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reconsidered in terms of the overall thematic interpretations emerging from 
previous coding of historical, textual, and figural effects, as well as from a re­
reading of the leaders.  For instance, since there were historical references to the 
Cold War, a number of textual discussions reminding readers of successful and 
disastrous Cold War approaches to problems similar to 9/11, and, finally, a 
number of metaphors emerging from Cold War events, individuals, or ideology, 
could we say that there was an overall theme running throughout the leaders 
that surfaced at least in part from of our understanding of the Cold War?  
Adapting integrative techniques described by Pollio, Henley and Thompson 
(1997), thematic analysis focused on discovering patterns of meaning emerging 
from the description of human experience that appeared in the leaders.  
Realizing that as individuals who experienced some part of 9/11 it would only be 
too easy to impose what we knew to the text, it was necessary to develop a 
system for evaluating data that helped us to recognize whatever preconceived 
notions we had about the event, and suspend them from the evaluating process 
whenever possible.  By focusing on the descriptive language of the leaders 
through a bracketing procedure, it was possible to focus on the descriptions in 
the leaders themselves instead of imposed theoretical frameworks raters brought 
to their reading. We could, in that sense, develop our understanding of what 
was happening in the leading articles of The Times by looking at what appeared 
in The Times.  The group felt able to approach the meaning that developed from 
the text because we looked at what was coming out of its content, historical 
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references, and salient figures, and how they were directing an audience’s 
response. 
To be able to do that appropriately, while avoiding imposing meanings 
onto the text, the team leader for The Times of London discussed themes that 
emerged from the data with the team leader The New York Times, along with 
others, including the team leader for Sega, taking a close look at the texts with 
an eye toward always backing up suppositions with evidence arising directly 
from the texts. This small, hermeneutic circle of researchers (most of whom were 
members of the larger research group) seemed to provide an independent, 
external auditing voice for the process.  The result was that I was allowed to 
present tentative interpretations of the data with which the group could interact, 
evaluating whether my interpretations were supported by the relevant texts.  In 
the leaders from The Times (as well as the other papers in the group), these 
thematic interpretations were examined not simply to determine the frequency 
with which certain themes were mentioned, but rather recurring patterns of 
meaning and how those patterns focused the readers’ understanding of the 
meaning of 9/11 as put forth by the paper, in tandem with the prior examinations 
of historical, textual, and figural categories. 
Each editorial was reexamined after the coding of content, historical 
references, and salient figures to determine remaining elements in play.  First, the 
content, historical references, and salient figures for each article were 
reconsidered to discover what elements, if any, appeared throughout these 
three areas. If a particular element appeared throughout, then it was noted as 
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a potential theme.  If that element lent an additional level of understanding for 
the entire article by clarifying, enriching, or synthesizing the textual, historical, or 
figural concerns of the editorial, then it was tagged as a theme.  In most 
instances, this was the case, and themes were derived from the common 
concerns shared by content, historical references, and salient figures. At the 
same time, particular attention was paid to elements that appeared in multiple 
editorials, but that seemed to be speaking specifically to The Times’ audience.  
These elements, often visual, theatrical, or pedagogical in nature, appeared to 
be almost moral-like, or aphoristic, as though this was the nugget of meaning The 
Times hoped the readership would take and consider independently. 
Because the team was looking not only at individual texts but also across 
the body of texts and across the body of data already gleaned, the themes 
elucidated could adequately describe experiential patterns by linking together 
separate areas of the texts which exhibited experiential relationships with one 
another. This part-to-whole approach, including the historical, textual, and 
figurative data into this process of determining thematic interpretations, led to a 
highly integrated thematic structure which described experiential patterns and 
interrelationships among the themes emerging from the leaders.   
In the case of the Cold War question noted earlier, for example, the 
question was not could there be a theme, but what was the meaning of a Cold 
War-related theme?  For example, a theme did surface that allowed The Times 
both to reference the Cold War as a guide, but also to focus more directly on 
how this new notion of war after 9/11, waged by entirely new enemies with a 
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previously unimaginable design of war, was extraordinarily different from the 
Cold War and all other wars preceding it.  Probing the language of the leaders, 
the group finally decided to use a play on a phrase first used by Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and picked up by The Times. The response to 9/11 
represented “a new battlefield” and “a different kind of conflict” (“This Is a World 
War,” 2001), with new enemies and tactics, and even a new concept of the 
theatre of war. The group decided to call this particular thematic category, that 
reappeared throughout the leaders, “New War/New Kind of Enemy,” after a 
term The Times coined to describe the difficulties of anticipating the varieties of 
complications this new approach to waging war would present (“It Won’t Be 
Quick,” 2001). 
Once themes were set, the group felt the need to quantify just how the 
various parts of the overall thematic structure existed concurrently, so the 
connections between themes were charted, noting co-occurrences shared by 
the various themes.  Since any one leader could show evidence of more than 
one theme, each leader’s thematic elements were noted.  Each time a 
particular thematic combination occurred (whether individually, or in various 
groupings), it was listed. At the end of listing all of the themes that appeared in 
each leader, it was possible to see the thematic combinations which had the 
strongest links, and which appeared most frequently across the body of leaders. 
By doing this, it was possible to understand how these themes really worked 
together to form a coherent, developing whole that provided an overall 
structure for the leading articles. 
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At that point, five individual thematic domains—(1) New War/New Kind of 
Enemy, (2) Duty/Appeasement, (3) Civilised/Uncivilised, (4) Before/After, and (5) 
Vision/Shadow—were developed into an overall model structure for the leaders, 
based on the strength of their common links.  Themes that often appeared 
concurrently were grouped near each other in the model, so that a strong 
connection between those particular themes was visually evident.  Since each 
of the individual themes appeared concurrently with the theme of 
Civilised/Uncivilised, that theme was given prominence in the model, marking its 
position as a thematic anchor. 
Taken collectively, these interlinked, themes required a ground to 
complete the frame. The ground of the overall structure was determined by 
examining how each of the themes was discussed by themselves and in 
conjunction with others.  In this case, the themes gave focus to the ways in which 
The Times seemed to hope its audience would view two specific elements that 
characterized the experience and meaning of 9/11.  First, a concern with Time 
developed as a contextualizing ground given the extraordinary spotlight The 
Times gives to viewing any individual event in its proper temporal context. 
Indeed, The Times takes careful note of the connection it draws between “The 
Times” (the present), and “Times Past” and “Future.”  Time was very much an 
experiential ground, one that focused on how individuals were living through the 
events of 9/11 and their aftermath.  Secondly, History developed as a second 
ground, one obviously connected to Time. With History, The Times aimed to give 
individual lived experience a more formalized structure, and History became the 
50

means of describing 9/11 as an event happening collectively, one generally 
acknowledged by civilised institutions.  History, therefore, was symbolic of an 
individual memory of 9/11 being transformed by collective memory that large 
numbers of people acknowledge, thereby lending that memory a shared 
meaning across Western culture. 
Rhetorical Analysis 
Where this particular study takes a step away from the larger group’s 
research on the post-9/11 editorials is in its rhetorical focus on narrative style. 
Because the core of both the American and Bulgarian research groups is 
psychological in nature, they chose not to develop the rhetorical implications of 
their data.  My background, however, as a person coming from rhetoric, 
linguistics, and history, led me to consider more deeply the rhetorical implications 
the data might support. When the research group for The New York Times 
concurred with Lule’s (2002) assertion that the structure of these editorials 
(specifically reflective editorials) held the form of an epic narrative, we began to 
look for similar patterns in other sets of editorials.  Until we examined The Times of 
London, however, The New York Times appeared to be unique in terms of 
employing a narrative structure. Once The Times of London began to show 
evidence of resembling a drama in much the same way that The New York Times 
resembled an epic, I decided it would be highly instructive to conduct a 
rhetorical analysis of The Times of London. 
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In addition to the hermeneutic steps outlined previously that follow along 
the original, psychological framing for the overall project, this study also included 
a rhetorical analysis of the leaders from The Times of London. The analysis 
focused specifically on the narrative framework, using Burke’s Pentad (1969), 
discussed earlier.  The Pentad provides a guide to order the rhetorical setup of 
the editorials in the paper, demonstrating how the leaders were framed in a 
dramatic or narrative way, breaking down elements of the paper into the 
Burkeian categories act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. These categories 
help to frame the readers’ understanding of events, and therefore provide a 
story or performance-like narrative for the audience. 
Since one research question—How does language act as both symbolic 
action and collective therapy in these editorials and how are those two functions 
interrelated?—focuses on language as symbolic action and the other—How do 
metaphor, memory, and narrative intersect to create meaning?—focuses on a 
method of developing meaning through narrative, Burke’s ideas seemed an 
effective way to round out the earlier research that is more psychological in 
nature.  Once the data analysis for The Times was finished, I took a closer look at 
both papers to see whether they matched up with the act, scene, agent, 
agency, and purpose ratios of the Pentad. With figural and thematic elements 
already in play, this turned out to be a question of matching figural and 
thematic elements to various Pentadic ratios.  Both papers figurally personified 
cities, countries, and organizations into agents, as though they were individuals 
instead of more nebulous groups of people.  Both also spent a great deal of time 
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developing the scene of attack or the scene of battle. Without question, both 
papers spent a great deal of time describing the acts involved in the attacks 
and their consequences, even at times going so far as to make them figural 
actors, as well as defining the purpose of such action and its justifications. 
Perhaps most interesting, however, was the way in which the papers described 
agency. In a narrative sense, both papers made figural the many modes of 
agency at work in the post-9/11 world, for instance, from healing a body to 
playing a game to picking up President George W. Bush’s sense that searching 
for al-Qaeda was like going on a hunt. 
Once various parts of Pentadic elements were identified, the rhetorical 
analysis basically consisted of simply putting such component parts together as 
a kind of script with its various motifs and sub-themes, a process that entailed 
drawing from the historical, textual, figural, and thematic elements that were 
already part of the research.  Characters emerged from discussions of individual 
agents or of things personified, while plots developed from discussions of acts 
and the agency through which they were being undertaken, particularly by the 
West, and the purpose for which they were embarked upon.  Finally, scene 
emerged from visual descriptions appearing in the texts, usually (but not 




The Elusive Identikit of Terror Is Filling Out 




Since this project is part of a larger study, progress on the data for The 
Times of London was regularly compared to data previously gathered in other 
parts of the study.  This resulted in a data set that benefited from what the 
earliest studies in the project gathered.  Nevertheless, to a great extent, what 
each study sought to find was the same, and the search developed in largely 
the same way. 
Completing the project using earlier studies as models provided one very 
central benefit: the framework of these earlier studies provided the key concepts 
on which this analysis focused by cross-referencing several varieties of data.  
Historical references tracked the way The Times used history to bolster a point.  
Content categories traced the reporting of the news The Times highlighted in its 
leaders over the course of a year.  Novel figures of speech underscored the way 
The Times chose to characterize 9/11 at a very basic discourse level.  And 
themes allowed for the possibility of synthesizing textual, historical, and figural 
data into coherent interpretations of how to understand the events of the 
period.  These four parts of the study illuminated the view that The Times took 
when underlining the meaning of 9/11.  Each area yielded strong data with a 
variety of topics for study on its own.  Taken together, this data yielded 
 55 
something a bit more intriguing—strings of data that appeared to be traveling 
through multiple sets. 
For instance, after September 11, the notions that we had been tempered 
by fire and changed, or that 9/11 was a turning point in history, representing a 
change in our sense of time, emerged not only in figures of speech.  They also 
emerged in direct comparisons to historical references, such as Pearl Harbor or 
the adoption of the Truman Doctrine in response to the spread of Soviet 
communism.1  At the same time, however, this change in our sense of history also 
made a clear impression in the textual concerns of The Times.  Several articles 
argued that 9/11 was “the day that changed the modern world” to the extent 
that 9/11 marked a change in all manner of daily life, politics, economics, and 
culture.  Finally, this change in our sense of time emerged as a way for The Times 
to frame our point of view of events as those happening before or those that 
could only happen after 9/11, or even more precisely, the way we understand 
that certain events must happen after 9/11. 
As more and more results came in, it became apparent that the more a 
feature turned up in the various data, the more certain it was that The Times was 
using that feature as a critical means for understanding 9/11 and its aftermath.  
These cross-referencing features acted as the bedrock for anchoring each of the 
                                                     
1 Pearl Harbor is more specifically linked to the notion of our being “tempered by fire and 
changed” through 9/11, in the sense that the attack on Pearl Harbor involved a 
bombing, but also that it marked the entry of the United States into World War II, just as 
9/11 marked an aerial attack and an entry into the War on Terror.  The sense of the 
events of 9/11 as a “turning point in history,” meanwhile, linked up with the notion of the 
Truman Doctrine as an endeavor by the West to fight, in part, the spread of an ideology, 
just as the 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror spurred an effort to fight, in part, the 
spread of Islamic fundamentalism. 
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data sets, providing critical links between categories, and therefore, the critical 
links The Times chose to draw between 9/11 and its place in the larger sweep of 
historical time and in the cultural milieu of the West.  Subsequently, in many 
cases, these features became key figures in a rhetorical analysis, providing 
crucial connections between present data and Burke’s Pentad. 
The earliest step involved distinguishing a body of articles most related to 
9/11 from the larger group of 251 articles immediately identified as having 
something to do with the broad notion of terror.  The group of 45 leaders that 
ended up comprising the main body of data surprised us in a number of ways.  
First of all, simply because given the size of the original sample, we expected a 
larger number of 9/11-specific leaders.  Upon reexamination, the most common 
trait of these leading articles began to emerge:  The Times of London produces 
leaders that are complex, laden with historical and metaphorical figures that ask 
the audience to connect whatever the subject of that particular leader is to 
other subjects, both historical and current.  So quite often, “terror” was a 
secondary concern of a leader that was more concerned, for example, with 
Chechnya or the Middle East, without necessarily being directly related to 9/11, 
even though the constructed spectre of 9/11 was evident.   Once these leading 
articles were charted across time, the shape of the curve revealed that the 
frequency of output of these 45 leading articles (see Figure 1) over the course of 
the year was highly front-loaded, with the vast majority (36 of 45) of these leaders 






































During this two-month span, the 9/11 attacks themselves are discussed, 
and also the first major phase of the conflict in Afghanistan takes place.  The 
remainder of the leaders generally revolve around three main themes: (1) an on-
going need to develop an effective intelligence and security apparatus to 
protect citizens and interests throughout the world (Leaders 37, 43 and 44); (2) a 
reflective instinct that asks the audience to reassess the meaning of 9/11 given 
what we know at a given point in time (Leaders 38, 41 and 45); and (3) concerns 
regarding the end of the conflict in Afghanistan as well as a combination of  
elements from the other two groups (Leaders 39 and 42).  The remaining leader 
(40) concerns problems arising in developing a memorial to firemen in New York 
City. 
 
Reflective, Prescriptive, Descriptive 
  
 Once it was clear that the alpha value assessing the interrater reliability of 
the reflective (story-like reflections on the meaning of 9/11), prescriptive (policy-
oriented prescriptions for what ought to be done in response to 9/11), or 
descriptive (describing or summarizing events surrounding 9/11 in terms of “what 
we know so far”) character of the leaders was very low, at 0.50, a concern arose 
over whether or not to develop that part of the analysis further.  The first step in 
making that decision involved determining what data we had.  In terms of 
numbers, as Table 1 demonstrates, the reflective, prescriptive, or descriptive 
characterizations of 30 articles was agreed on by all three readers, with another  
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Table 1. Rates of Editorial Appearances by Reflective, Prescriptive, or Descriptive Type 
 
 Reflective Prescriptive Descriptive Uncategorizable 
3/3 Readers 
5 26 0 N/A 
2/3 Readers 1 (d) 
1(p) 7 (d) 3 (p) N/A 
Totals 
7 33 3 2 
Percentages 
15.6% 73.3% 6.7% 4.4% 
 
 
10 agreed on by 2 of 3 readers, leaving only 5% of articles uncategorizable.  
However, the numbers fail to present a clear picture of these ratings.  On 
discussion, each rater expressed the difficulty with which he or she chose a 
category—a problem far less prevalent during comparable ratings for The New 
York Times, The Washington Post, or El Mundo.  For many leaders, in fact, raters 
were willing to change their original rating to match up with other raters.  But  
despite the convenience of having the alpha value rise, ultimately, it was 
decided that sacrificing a higher alpha value for a broader discussion of the 
rhetorical qualities of the leaders that led to the difficulties in making the 






Content of Leading Articles 
 
After delineating how leading articles fell into the reflective, prescriptive, 
and descriptive categories, a next step toward understanding how The Times of 
London became aware of the meaning of 9/11 rests in a description of the 
content the paper’s editorial writers decided to cover.  Overall, each of the 45 
leading articles fell into 1 of 6 categories.  Figure 2 provides a clear accounting 
of the textual interests of each of these categories. Each leader is listed by 
category in terms of its position in the set of 45, and then is followed by a brief 
description.  Exemplary articles that provide the best examples of textual frames 
and constituent features for each category are in bold. 
 These categories represent the major subjects The Times developed over 
the course of the year, and the titles of these categories emerge from the 
language of The Times.  More importantly, these six categories represent a first 
glance at what topics The Times felt were important enough to cover in 
extended depth.  The first two categories, The Day That Changed the Modern 
World (Category A) and With One Voice: We Are All Americans (Category B), 
both discuss 9/11, its overall meaning in the sweep of history, and the powerful 
possibilities it has given the world (especially the West) for banding together in a 
post-Cold War era.  The real difference between the two categories lies in their 
framing focus:  Category A observes that 9/11 symbolizes an irrevocable 
change, a rift in time, while Category B notes that 9/11 represents a unique  
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Category A:  The Day That Changed the Modern World 
1) 9/11 is the day that changed the modern world 
25) Universal gaze has turned towards New York—Statesmen today are blinded by the 
explosions in America—Life will not return to normal until their vision is restored 
41) World is transformed—Decisions yet to come will be immeasurably harder 
45) Hands on clock have barely moved since 9/11—Legacy of 9/11 rests in three theatres 
(America’s relationship with the rest of the world; Islam’s attitude toward the remainder 
of humanity; and the central structure of the international system itself)—Innocence and 
indulgence ended on 9/11 
 
Category B:  With One Voice:  We Are All Americans 
 
2) We are all Americans—9/11 assaults are an attack upon all—Tragedy for America 
could be a turning point for the world—Instinctive global coming together in solidarity 
with the dead—America can build on and sustain that sympathy 
3) The world must reject terror with one voice—9/11 was never an American catastrophe 
but the world’s—There is no middle way between the terrorism of 9/11 and the free world 
12) Never before has the world felt itself to be such a global village—Terrorism is a 
leveler—World waits for dust to settle 
33) Send a message understood by millions—Voicing America’s and world’s contempt 
for the terrorists—New York rally is a massive and modern defiance 
 
Category C:  This is a Long World War Without Borders:  Miles to Go Before We Sleep 
 
4) History demands we not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength—Make the price of 
terrorism unbearable 
5) This is a world war—Americans must temper use of force with shrewdness—We must 
refuse to let 9/11 push country into recession—War is a new battlefield and a different 
kind of conflict 
6) Mount the leadership campaign against invisible enemy without borders 
7) Pakistan is in grim political position—Sheltering terrorism means facing penalties—
continued sheltering of terrorism will hasten the isolation and disintegration of Pakistan 
8) We must act with speed not haste—America’s reach needs to be equally long as the 
terrorists’—West must outmatch the terrorists in having the will to prevail 
9) Businesses are economic victims of terrorism—Governments must move to limit the 
damage triggered by 9/11 on markets—Economic cavalry needed from US and Europe 
14) Financial crisis means snatching defeat from the jaws of any military victory—
Collapse of World Trade Center should not mean collapse of world trade 
15) This is a long war with decade as timeframe—US and allies must convince everyone 
that the world is utterly changed—This war is an ambitious campaign waged the world 
over—Mobilisation is gathering pace 
18) It won’t be quick—This war defies traditional response to attack—Now is a time for 
steady nerves and precise actions 
19) Place layer upon layer of global support on NATO core and the other close allies 
20) Pragmatic layering of decisions needed to cooperate flexibly—War script must 
constantly be rewritten 
28) Nerve needed to break cycle of Middle East from feeding on fear 
30) There can be no backing away—Afghanistan is one corner of a worldwide canvas 
 
Figure 2. Leading Articles from The Times of London Categorized by Content 
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31) Need to keep resolve to win battle for public opinion, not just military battle—We 
must ignore defeatist chorus at home 
38) This does not feel like war—This struggle is frustrating for civilians because there 
cannot be a clearcut military victory, and because it is so much less clear what 
individuals can do—September 11 has put Americans back in touch with that “date 
which will live in infamy” 
39) We must win the peace—There can be no premature embrace of an illusory 
peace—The military has miles to go before they are spared to carry blankets 
40) al-Qaeda may base its specious philosophies on racial lines but Americans should be 
colour-blind—Injustice being done to this uniquely courageous urban army becomes 
clearer if one tries to reverse the ethnic model 
42) US must not feel constrained to act by the concerns of others but would still work best 
in concert with a coalition—Thwarting threats of “mass terror” has become the absolute 
essence of American foreign policy 
 
Category D: Intelligent Intelligence 
 
10) Air safety is an immediate concern 
22) Intelligence is badly needed and the most deadly new weapon the West can have 
 
32) Airport insecurity is still the norm 
37) Crash in suburban New York will reinforce sense of vulnerability—We must look again 
at airline and airport security—This crash will challenge America’s leadership—We are 
only now returning to normal life 
43) Intelligent intelligence is badly needed—We need to rethink our means of gathering 
intelligence if it is to be effective 
44) Security means expect the unexpected, maintain vigilance 
 
Category E: Osama bin Laden’s Spectre 
 
16) bin Laden is Taleban’s official guest—Taleban is playing out deadly farce—Their 
behavior underscores the utter necessity of this unwelcome war 
21) Tourniquet is tightening on bin Laden/Taleban 
26) bin Laden/Taleban are Afghanistan’s bane 
29) Not a war in which you can negotiate—Osama bin Laden is an Ian Fleming-like villain 
35) bin Laden’s spectre of nuclear terrorism hanging over world 
 
 
Category F: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder:  Implications for the UK 
 
11) Terror is growing in the West—We need Patriot Act-type measures in the UK—Terrorism 
should have no hiding place 
13) Britain should not extinguish all signs of normal political life 
17) Britain girds against present danger—We must find the proper balance between 
standing shoulder to shoulder abroad and thwarting sleeper cells at home in the UK 
23) Find balance between determined deployments against terrorists abroad versus 
desperate confusion at home—London is the terrorist haven of Western world 
 
Figure 2, Continued. 
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24) How do we defend the UK?— We should take every reasonable precaution and 
some that would be considered unreasonable in normal times 
27) Fatwa on terror is needed from British Muslims to stand up and say that terror is not the 
way of Islam and make their revulsion explicit —West has no quarrel with Islam 
34) Battle does not have a finite point—Blair fully committed to phase one, but future 
phases must be preceded by process of deliberation and consultation 
36) Blair’s shuttle diplomacy designed to forge new community of nations 
 
Figure 2. Continued. 
 
 
chance for the civilised world to show solidarity and transform America’s 
“tragedy” into a turning point for the world. 
The third, and largest, category, This Is a Long World War Without Borders: 
Miles to Go Before We Sleep (Category C), focuses on the War on Terror, how it is 
being waged, as well as how it should be waged.  With special focus on the 
broad, hard-to-define nature of the conflict, these leading articles pay particular 
attention to the War’s effect on financial sectors and specific nations, the 
importance of international public opinion towards it, and the duty the 
Americans and NATO allies have to wage it.  At the same time, this category, 
perhaps more than any other, epitomized the struggle raters had in judging the 
difference between reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive categories.  Though 
the content of these leaders was often very prescriptive, the tone often tended 
toward the reflective or emotional, particularly when the paper reminded 
readers of the West’s duty to fight this war.   
The fourth category, Intelligent Intelligence (Category D), deals exclusively 
with the premium placed on intelligence in this new war by reacting to the fact 
that the West was caught brutally unprepared on 9/11.  Highly prescriptive and 
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demanding that the West must be savvy about how it gathers intelligence, not 
depending too much on any one source or method, Category D’s last 
appearance concentrates on the importance of maintaining vigilance despite 
reaching the end of the war in Afghanistan.   
The fifth category, Osama bin Laden’s Spectre (Category E), begins to 
profile bin Laden and his sympathizers in the Taleban regime and elsewhere, 
developing his seemingly larger-than-life qualities, identifying him as the kind of 
villain Ian Fleming might have created as a foil for super agent James Bond.   
Category E, however, also calls into question the nature of the Taleban regime, 
labeling its behavior in the period between 9/11 and the beginning of the war as 
farcical as well as menacing. 
The sixth, and final, category, Standing Shoulder to Shoulder: Implications 
for the UK (Category F), asks the same question all Western democracies did 
after 9/11—what does 9/11 mean for us?  In the case of the UK, of course, the 
Prime Minister’s promise to “stand shoulder to shoulder” with the United States 
throughout the War on Terror lent that question special importance in The Times.  
As a result, Category F took pains to describe what was needed from the British 
government and its citizens to fulfill duties at home and abroad while carefully 
balancing the tensions between freedom and privacy on the one hand and 
secrecy and security on the other. 
 Table 2 presents a tracking of the appearance of each of the content 
categories throughout the entire corpus, with groups I-IV representing the first 11 
leaders (I), second 11 (II), next 11 (III), and the final 12 (IV).  The purpose of this 
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The Day That Changed the 
Modern World 
1 0 1 2 4 
Category B: 
With One Voice 2 1 1 0 4 
Category C:  
This Is a Long World War 6 5 3 4 18 
Category D: 
Intelligent Intelligence 1 1 1 3 6 
Category E: 
Osama bin Laden’s Spectre 0 2 2 1 5 
Category F: 
Standing Shoulder to Shoulder 1 2 3 2 7 
 
 
analysis was to see whether or not there were clear trends in the concerns of the 
editorialists at given times throughout the year, and to see whether those trends 
(if indeed they existed) were consistent with the political and social decisions 
being made at the time.  The Day That Changed the Modern World and With 
One Voice, although low in absolute number, seemed to appear more or less 
evenly throughout the year, particularly when taken in tandem.  Feelings of 
international camaraderie (With One Voice) were slightly more important 
immediately after 9/11, and the feeling of a rift or stoppage in time appeared 
nearer to the end of the year, when the impetus to move forward, away from 
the events of 9/11 themselves, had slightly greater value. 
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As the largest category of articles, This Is a Long World War tracks right 
through the entire course of the year, without many significant gaps in the 
corpus, though once the war in Afghanistan ends, the focus clearly shifts away 
from thoughts of war.  At the same time, bin Laden’s Spectre, concentrating 
solely on bin Laden and his Taleban allies, reveals a surge during the middle of 
the corpus, particularly as the war in Afghanistan ends and the hunt for bin 
Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders picks up. 
Intelligent Intelligence and Standing Shoulder to Shoulder, which focus 
most of all on long-term policy concerns, emerge most strongly when the need 
for changes or redefinitions in policy becomes more imperative.  Looking at the 
intelligence apparatus, Intelligent Intelligence turns up briefly at the beginning of 
the year, when 9/11 first happens with no warning.  Not unsurprisingly, Intelligent 
Intelligence emerges in full force only after the initial shock of the day died down 
and voices throughout the West began to ask the question, How could 9/11 
happen?  Similarly, as the shock and sympathy of the British people and 
government began to shift towards a policy of close and continuing work with 
the United States and others during the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent 
hunt for bin Laden, Standing Shoulder to Shoulder emerges. It remains a concern 
of the editorialists through the end of the year, after the war in Afghanistan had 
for the most part ended, and the truly long-term national and foreign policy 






The first point at which the leading articles in The Times of London make a 
truly radical departure from their counterparts in the reflective articles from The 
New York Times comes with the enormous attention the writers in London pay to 
historical precedent.  As shown in Figure 3, The Times of London included 160 
historical references in the 45 leading articles, including 35 articles with 
references and 10 without references.  Also of note are the large spikes in the 
number of references in articles 1, 5, 29, 31, and 38.  Though the first four articles 
are rather long—over 1,000 words in each—article 38 is below mean length, with 
only 519 words.  Article 1 deals directly with the 9/11 attacks, and with 15 
historical references, makes a strong attempt to connect these attacks with 
some previous experience in whatever ways are possible, even if these 
connections, by admission, come up short.  Article 5 builds the case for war in 
Afghanistan, paying close attention to the history of war in the region as well as 
to the laws of warfare, to define the right to go to war and to describe potential 
strategy.  Article 29 develops an understanding of Osama bin Laden and the 
American and British attempt to capture him, while also taking a closer look at 
how the “special relationship” between the US and UK since the days of 
Roosevelt and Churchill is playing out in this new conflict.  Article 31 presents the 
case for continued vigilance and war-time footing, despite the fact that the 
ground war in Afghanistan is ending.  Article 38, falling on December 7, is a direct 


































1941 and on New York City, Washington, D.C., and rural Pennsylvania on 
September 11, 2001 had on the American consciousness. 
No historical references occur in articles 7, 10, 13, 25, 27, 30, 32, 37, 42 and 
43.  In each of these cases, the articles are rather short, but the overriding factor 
appears to be contextual rather than simple length.  These articles fall into one of 
three categories:  how modern Islam and Islamic nations must respond now (7, 
27); how the West must respond now (13, 25, 30, 42); and how we must secure 
our future now (10, 32, 37, 43).  In each case, the focus lies in a decision that must 
be made or in a policy that must be changed immediately in which the correct 
mode of action is so obvious to the editorialists that there is no need to dwell in 
the past to understand the choice.  The leading articles of this group are usually 
short and clear and discuss post-9/11 concerns such as air safety or intelligence, 
usually noting on a basic level that we need tighter air safety or better 
intelligence.  The articles with more historical references usually discuss issues that 
are more complicated, or at least that are presented in a far more complicated 
and extensive manner, in which the paper feels a clear need to justify the 
position that it takes. 
More important than individual numbers, however, is the simple fact that 
The Times of London presents a strongly historicized account of 9/11 and its 
aftermath.  In this sense, there is a contrast to its counterparts in other parts of the 
world.  The Bulgarian daily, Sega, which published 43 editorials, for instance, only 
made 29 historical references (Stoitsova, et al., In Press).  The New York Times, 
publishing 20 reflective articles and 79 prescriptive articles, produced 94 total 
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references, with another 6 references noted, but debatable (Pollio, et al., In 
Press).  To be sure, since a decision was made during the gathering of references 
to collect any possible historical reference, the total number might ultimately be 
somewhat inflated.  Nevertheless, The Times of London’s 160 historical references, 
by the calculus of simply comparing the three papers to each other, is quite 
different.  While the New York writers of the 20 reflective editorials with which this 
current study is most linked are largely focused on the current moment, 
concerned as they are with healing their city and citizens, and using only 4 
historical references, the writers in London place greater importance in 
connecting 9/11 to the past, as well as in considering its importance for present 
and future decision-making. 
Considering the number of historical references in The Times of London, 
examining the eras and topics they repeatedly referred to is pivotal to 
understand how history was being used.  Pointedly, as shown in Table 3, The 
Times relied on the history of the modern period, primarily drawing on the 
examples from the post-World War II era.  Though the Ancient and Pre-World War 
II eras2 received attention, The Times clearly did not use them as frequently as 
references to the post-9/11 era.  Only references to the ancient, mythical Hydra 
stand out as significant in addition to these two time periods.  While the number 
of entries for the World War II era (24) seems low compared to the number of 
references used from later in the 20th century, these references take on a slightly  
                                                     
2 References from the Ancient period included examples such as Psalms, Jeremiah, 
ancient Rome, or Greek mythology; while references from the Pre-World War II period 
included examples such as the Enlightenment, the Thirty Years’ War, the Barbary States, 
or Shakespeare. 
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Table 3. Historical Eras Represented 
Historical Era Appearances Percent 
Ancient to Middle Ages 8 5% 
Pre-World War II 21 13% 
World War II 24 15% 
Post-World War II to 9/11 107 67% 
 
 
different meaning when one considers that The Times places so great an 
emphasis on the 12-year period comprising the World War II era, compared to 
the decades and centuries comprising each of the other three periods. 
At this point, it was necessary to determine which specific historical events 
The Times chose to relate to 9/11 and its aftermath.  When viewed by group in 
Table 4, the World War II era references (with the sub-group, Pearl Harbor, which 
notably shows up 11 times on its own, the most of any single event that fell into a 
larger category) becomes a far stronger source of history for The Times, providing 
the largest number of references if taken by group.  At the same time, the 
collection of the First Gulf War, the Cold War, previous terrorist attacks for which 
the al-Qaeda organization was culpable, and the very recent, European, and 
NATO-led Kosovo campaign demonstrates the importance of the post-World 
War II era in The Times’ understanding of how the West should deal with al-
Qaeda after 9/11. 
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Table 4. Specific Historical References by Group = ≥ 3 
 
Historical Reference Appearances 
World War II 
             





Gulf War/Kuwait 16 
Cold War 
 
        JFK/Cuban Missile Crisis 
 
          10 
 
3 
Kenya/Tanzania Bombings 6 







 Table 5, meanwhile, provides a broader understanding for the kinds of 
events The Times dealt with to provide an historical framework for understanding 
the 9/11 age.  Largely pointed towards World War II through contemporary 
times, only three references to the Hydra and two references to the Thirty Years’ 
War stand out in the historical timeline The Times develops.  The remaining 
examples for the most part fall under the categories outlined in Table 4, with 
World War II, the Gulf War, the Cold War, Kosovo, and previous al-Qaeda events 
represents again in large numbers. 
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Table 5. Historical References by Category = ≥2 
 
Historical Reference Appearances 
Gulf War/Kuwait 16 
Pearl Harbor 10 
Kenya/Tanzania Bombings 6 
Cold War 4 
World War II 
 3 
JFK/Cuban Missile Crisis 
 3 
USS Cole Bombing 3 
Kosovo 3 
Hydra 3 
Franklin D. Roosevelt 2 
Bill Clinton’s decision not to take Osama bin Laden 
(1998) 2 
Margaret Thatcher  (Relationship with Ronald Reagan 
during the bombing of Libya in response to 1986 Berlin 
bombing and Gulf War alliance with George Bush) 
2 
Ronald Reagan (1986 bombing of Libya) 2 
Vietnam Conflict 2 
George H. W. Bush (41) 2 
Chechnya 2 
Masood Assassination 2 
Israeli/Palestinian Conflict 2 
Slobodan Milosevic 2 
Nazis 2 
Thirty Years’ War 
2 
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In Figure 4, the number of historical references is tracked across the 
various content categories, in order to help describe the kinds of content most 
related to the use of historical citation.  In The Day That Changed the Modern 
World, With One Voice, and This Is a Long World War, historical references 
appear quite often, and at relatively the same frequency.  Intelligent Intelligence 
also shows a fairly high frequency of historical references.  But in Standing 
Shoulder to Shoulder, there is a clear drop, and with bin Laden’s Spectre, the 
appearance of historical references is less that 1 per article. 
What Figure 4 reinforces is the strength of the links between historical 
references and content categories.  In the report on content categories, it was 
noted that The Day That Changed the Modern World proposes that 9/11 
represents a rift in history.  At the same time, With One Voice encourages a post-
9/11 solidarity in the historically-allied West.  In both cases, The Times clearly 
orients commentary historically, drawing on common threads of Western socio-
cultural, political, and religious history to answer why this time and this war are 
truly different and why the nations of the West must join together to survive.  This 
Is a Long World War and Intelligent Intelligence, meanwhile, lay the groundwork 
for a War on Terror—a war on a tactic and an emotion, as opposed to a war on 
a country or group of countries.  This treatment demands some historical 
precedent to make that case effectively, and demonstrate how the traditional 
rules of engagement have been adapted in similar cases.  But, even bin Laden’s 
Spectre, drawing a profile of bin Laden and the Taleban, and Standing Shoulder 




















With One Voice This Is a Long World
War























9/11 world, have to rely on history to make the profile complete and the 
reporting accurate, largely because decisions concerning present policy issues 




 Once raters selected the figures of speech, those that were chosen by 2 
of 3 raters as most salient for each of the leading articles were then compiled 
into a single list.  Overall, 543 figures were identified as salient, with a mean value 
of 12.06 salient figures (SD=1.97) per editorial.  Because editorials were of 
unequal length, ranging from a high of 1853 words for Leader 45 to a low of 359 
for Leader 12, with a mean length of 779.71 words (SD=388.17) per article, the 
relationship between the number of salient figures chosen by raters and the 
number of words per leading article was correlated.  The value for this 
correlation was r(43)=-0.59; (p<0.1), suggesting that as the length of the article 
increased, the likelihood of finding salient figures decreased.  This is possibly the 
result of cutting off the number of figures the raters chose at 15, favoring the 
shorter article, instead of raising the limit, which might have favored longer 
articles. 
 The more important results, however, are related to the figurative domains 
that emerged out of the leading articles and how they organize themselves into 
distinct categories.  Overall, there were 14 figural categories, several of which  
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were interrelated.  Table 6 lists the 14 categories of salient figures that emerged 
from the data along with their total number of appearances in the body of 
articles.  All of the 543 salient figures that emerged from the data were able to 
be coded into one of these 14 categories.  Note that these totals sometimes 
include the same figure twice.  For example, “tempered by fire and changed” is 
counted both in Category 4 and 7 because it is both a metaphor representing 
change and also the reactive properties of heat. 
 Category 1, Civilised World, was defined by making distinctions of 
modern/primitive, West/East, democratic/theocratic, and good/evil, as well as 
having an underlying purpose of calling the modern, democratic West (and 
countries elsewhere choosing to identify with it) to its honorable duty to defend 
itself from a primitive, theocratic evil coming from the East.  Arguing that the 9/11 
terrorists envisioned a world “ruled by theocratic thuggery,” the post-9/11 
“conflict without front lines” was being waged to “restore moral authority” in the 
world, by confronting the “core of tensions between civilizations” of “fanaticism 
versus freedom” and “tak[ing] up the cudgels against fear.”  While the Islamist 
“enemy was shorn of scruples” and “sworn to shred the fabric of freedom,” 
America was “freedom’s home,” and justice was “civilisation’s most potent 
weapon” in this “stand against [the] terrorist menace” in which the “world 





Table 6. Categories of Salient Figures by Total Number of Appearances 
 
# Figural Categories Total Appearances 
1 Civilised World 96 
2 Language, Literature, Drama 79 
3 Characters 74 
4 Change and Time 55 
5 Medicine 48 
6 Games 44 
7 Science and Engineering 43 
8 Vision and Shadow 43 
9 Body 33 
10 Nautical 21 
11 Rooting Out and Closing In 18 
12 Terrain 18 
13 Responding to Danger 17 








 In Category 2, Language, Literature, and Drama, the focus of the figures is 
not quite so clearly intended to rouse the public as are the metaphorical terms in 
Category 1.  The implied directives of the category, however, replicate many of 
the foundations of western literary, rhetorical, and dramatic thinking.  From the 
ancient rhetorical stance that a statesman who could use language well was 
also a good model for citizens, the leaders take note that before 9/11 the 
“President use[d] words like pieces of wood,” but became a more effective and 
attractive leader once he “found his voice and hit his stride.”  At the same time, 
the articles underscore the importance of narrative frameworks in our ability to 
understand the world around us, noting that world leaders are actors “in a 
drama whose first act is unfolding,” even as the “Taleban is playing out a deadly 
farce.”  Meanwhile, language plays a central role in how the War on Terror must 
be fought, since “careless language costs lives” and the West must work hard to 
“dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating” and “hone the rhetoric of 
readiness.”  Finally, this category allows The Times to allude to literary figures 
themselves, providing ever-important links from what we already understand to 
what we are desperately trying to learn.  The Times asks that we shake the 
Shakespearean impulse to “call spirits from the dusty deep” in an effort against a 
villain “straight out of an Ian Fleming story,” in order not to be “overcome by the 
same jaundice as Jeremiah” as the “bells tolled” for the victims of the attack 
from the “enemy within the gates.” 
 In much the same way, the main thrust of Category 3, Characters, reflects 
the literary and rhetorical complexity The Times brings to these articles.  Given the 
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extensive number of figures used to conjure a dramatic sensibility in Category 2, 
Category 3 develops a highly personified notion of the various world leaders 
(and bodies) in the forefront of the post-9/11 world, picking up on the notion that 
world leaders are actors in a “drama.”  To a great extent, the Prime Minister starts 
this figuring process, assuring Americans early on that the British are “standing 
shoulder to shoulder” with their American allies.  In that sense, “Britain has shown 
a deft hand and a resolute eye” as the “West plans retaliation,” and “America is 
crouched,” while the “Taleban hurls defiance.”  As the al-Qaeda “terrorist 
Hydra” survives in some form after the initial attack on Afghanistan, The Times 
becomes more concerned about a shift in the “American national mood” and 
“America’s will.”  Still, it is quite proud of “Britain’s solidarity” with the States even 
though “Britain is as alone as after the fall of France,” while “Europe’s solidarity 
with the United States melts into nothing.” 
 Taking a turn less involved with the narrative elements of the 9/11 story, 
Category 4, Change and Time, deals exclusively with 9/11 as a rift in history, a 
point at which the world is “tempered by fire and changed” and there is “no 
going back to life before.”  All our assumptions “turn upside down,” as our “old 
habits” and “laxity of the past” become “glorious mundanity” in the 
“abomination’s wake.”  In this way, “September 11 shattered [our] innocence.” 
The “world caught its breath in shock” in the “transformative moment” of this 
“new kind of war” against a “new kind of enemy” that ushered in an era of 
“permanent vigilance” which “swept every issue from the agenda” other than 
the War on Terror.  
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 At first glance Category 5, Medicine, should resemble some of the most 
important work The New York Times is doing with its metaphors of healing.  Here, 
the British do deal with the healing necessary in New York and America, and 
indeed across the collective, Western psyche, noting that the “desire to restore 
life to the city” was key to helping “economic victims of terrorism” and “halt the 
collapse of the world economy.”  At the same time, the “tragic side effect of the 
attack on America” was strong enough that it is necessary to “lift the malaise 
hanging over Western cities” and “restore the lifeblood of democracy,” while 
“reviving something of New York’s bruised zest and gusto.”  The British take is also 
partly a commentary on the features of a successful prosecuting of the War on 
Terror.  In a war without obvious enemies, there is “pressure to alleviate the root 
causes of terrorism” while at the same time avoiding “political headaches” that 
are part of the cause of the “psychological blow struck by the terrorists.”  The 
answer lies in “surgical strikes” against terrorist “cells” that are “spawning” in the 
“festering troubles of the Middle East” in order to “eradicat[e] the menace” of 
terrorist regimes. 
 In a related sense, Games, Category 6, speaks to the skills necessary for 
winning a war.  First comes the warning that the West “must not shirk this slow, 
deliberate test of strength” despite the fact that the enemy does not “play by 
the book,” and instead must deliver a “riposte to the carnage visited on 
America.”  This war is a “marathon effort to rid the world of terrorist cells,” and 
“however fluid the chessboard now,” the “diplomatic footwork” the West 
displays will be vital when the world is “speculating on the war against terrorism.” 
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 Addressing the power sources of the conflict, the ferocity of the 
anticipated conflagration, and the crucial speed in building an effective anti-
terror response is Category 7, Science and Engineering.  The events of 9/11 were 
“scorched into the collective consciousness” by a “true bolt from the blue” that 
brought about a “wave of emergency legislation.”  As a result, the “deadly force 
of the express train bearing down” on the terrorists was a measure of the 
“diplomatic momentum.”  Nevertheless, it would be prudent not to pour “fuel on 
flames of Islamic fundamentalism,” but instead to “galvanise public opinion” in 
the Middle East and elsewhere, “build[ing] a military coalition” that allows a 
“pragmatic layering of decisions” to “dismantle” the “apparatus of terror.” 
 Category 8, Vision and Shadow, takes a different tack, aiming to describe 
al-Qaeda and its many lairs as well as reflecting on the scene of greatest shock 
in New York.  So as the “flush of horrified sympathy fades” it becomes clear that 
“terrorism should have no hiding place” and no “muddied” or “fuzzy policies” 
should allow the terrorists to “melt [sic] into the shadows.”  The Times compliments 
the Blair government in the days after the attacks, noting that as the “elusive 
identikit of terror is filling out,” Britain has shown a “clear-sighted resolve.”  But, 
that to “uncover the network that made London the terrorist haven of the 
Western world” the government must take a critical next step and avoid any 
“tendency toward tunnel vision” while the “universal gaze is turned toward New 
York.”  “Shadowy al-Qaeda” still lurks, with a “spectre of nuclear terrorism,” and, 
therefore, any so-called peace before that spectre is lifted is “illusory.” 
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 Category 9, Body, meanwhile, returns The Times to a personifying motif in 
which various players (individuals or not) in the post-9/11 world are actually 
bodies operating with the day-to-day habits of human beings.  The “evil we saw 
strike at the heart of the United States” was “at the heart of the conspiracy” to 
level a “terrible blow” against Western economic well-being.  As such, 
“immediate steps” need to be taken to insure that industry can “recover some of 
its position” of the pre-9/11 landscape.  In the meantime, finding those who 
“slipped between aliases,” requires a “level-headed response” and an answer 
from Muslims in kind when Christians “speak of extending the hand of tolerance.” 
 For an island nation, of course, Nautical metaphors permeate the 
language, as reflected in Category 10.  Terror undoubtedly poses a threat to the 
ship of state, since “terror rots the timbers on which civilisation rests.”  To “stiffen 
response” for the “long haul,” the West has been “called to the colours,” 
because the United States “will not fire more than a warning shot or two.”  To the 
Prime Minister’s credit, meanwhile, he “saw his duty” and “his course was fixed,” 
as he helped to put the “bin Laden network in a state of disrepair.” 
 Category 11, Rooting Out/Closing In, aims to describe the “hunt” for al-
Qaeda and the environments in which it takes place.  It is important, therefore, 
“to cut off any room for manoevre” as the “murderous networks are hunted 
down.”  Not only does the West need to “build a diplomatic fence around 
Afghanistan,” it also needs to “root out the terrorists in our midst” so that it is 
possible to “close the gaps in this unconventional, common front” and set about 
“tackling the root causes of extremism.” 
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 Directly related to the “rooting out” in Category 11, is the importance of 
Terrain, the subject for Category 12.  In the “treacherous political terrain” of the 
post-9/11 world, countries supporting terrorist groups find themselves in a “grim 
political position,” while the countries surrounding Afghanistan represent a 
“perilously unstable launching pad” for the allied thrust into the region, even 
though the “world stands edgily at the brink” of war.  Managing the 
“treacherous Afghan wastes” of a “countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters” will 
take time, so that in the hunt for al-Qaeda, “as networks regroup, the trail may 
go cold”. 
 The picture of the West Responding to Danger, Category 13, presents a 
dire scenario, in which the West desperately needs to awaken to the dangers of 
the 9/11 age.  In order to “mount the leadership campaign,” the West needs to 
demonstrate it has the “character to rise to the challenge” after so many “met 
terrible deaths” on 9/11.  In the aftermath, there are “bargains to be struck” and 
the “enemy of my enemy should be courted” if we are to avoid the “horrors of a 
full-scale nuclear attack.” 
 Finally, Category 14, Natural Disaster, describes the overwhelming scene 
in New York on 9/11 and the continuing threat.  On 9/11, New York “suffered an 
urban avalanche.”  In “sifting the rubble mountain,” rescue workers and 
investigators worked in a “noxious covering of dust and ashes.”  Now the “world 
waits for the dust to settle” after the “spate of attacks.” 
 Within each of these categories, the importance of civilisation and the 
civilised world is emphasized.  Very often, the salient figures are used either to 
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draw a contrast between the civilised and uncivilised world, to cultivate the 
importance of a civilised concept of duty, to propose methods for a civilised 
response to 9/11-style terror, or to describe how extreme, uncivilised behavior 
alters our notions of time itself. 
 Taken as a whole, figural categories represent elements of Burke’s 
dramatistic Pentad, in various ratios.  To a great extent, the figurative results were 
the first that pointed towards the possibility of an overarching dramatic structure 
in the leading articles because of the significant concentration of literary, 
dramatic, and personifying, character-driven figures.  These figures appeared to 
lay down a basic set of characters, in the Characters and Body categories, and 
a scripted plotline, mostly developed in the Language, Literature, and Drama 
category, in which various acts and agencies arose to drive the plot forward in a 
carefully described set of scenes with specific purpose. 
The most pervasive Burkeian ratio representing a merging of dramatic 
elements is the act/agency ratio, which appears in Categories 5 (Medicine), 6 
(Games), 7 (Science and Engineering), and 11 (Rooting Out and Closing In), 
defining the action and how it was taking place.  Three other ratios make three 
appearances.  Purpose characterizes Categories 1 (Civilised World) and 4 
(Change and Time), which outline the reason to fight al-Qaeda.  Act/agent 
surface in Categories 2 (Language, Literature, and Drama) and 9 (Body), 
developing the interaction between characters and plot.  Finally, scene 
emerges in Categories 12 (Terrain) and 14 (Natural Disaster), setting the scene of 
the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent battle sites.  Four other categories 
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meanwhile show evidence of distinct ratios that appear only once.  Agent in 
Category 3 (Character) identifies the actors.  Drawing the scene’s relationship to 
plot action Scene/act is Category 8 (Vision and Shadow).  Purpose/act/agent in 
Category 10 (Nautical) delineates the connection between plot action, the 
means of carrying out the plot, and duty the characters have to follow through.  
Lastly, the very unique act/attitude in Category 13 (Responding to Danger) 
explains how the West has reacted to the challenges of September 11. 
An ability of language to lend order to events that occur outside our 
traditional scope reinforces the dramatic rendering these figurative categories 
represent.  But at the same time, figures of speech would also appear to possess 
their own dramatic component, and function in ways that are similar to the 
narrative properties usually associated with prose.  That being said, if in 
comparing figurative results to thematic results several of the same dramatic 
properties appeared, the dramatic nature of The Times’ response would 
strengthen this preliminary evaluation, and bolster the case that The Times makes 











 A total of five themes were identified from the data: (1) 
Civilised/Uncivilised, (2) Before/After, (3) Duty/Appeasement, (4) New War/New 
Kind of Enemy, and (5) Visible/Shadowy.  Together, these themes represent the 
underlying currents driving the perspective through which The Times would like 
readers to understand 9/11, including the policy decisions politicians make, the 
value system that is the foundation of the West and its institutions, the way the 
West sees (and must see) the world after September 11, and, finally, our concept 
of historical time. 
 In effect, tracking themes allowed me to look across and through all of 
the data for patterns of meaning that permeated the group of texts.  At the 
same time, underscoring themes is a deep sense of what The Times would like 
the audience to take away from the texts in developing a meaning for 9/11.  As 
patterns began to emerge from the data, the understanding The Times was 
working out started to take shape, and notions about how the world organized 
itself in terms of time and space, Orient and Occident, were set to change.   
 To illustrate the theme of civilised and uncivilised worlds, Table 7 provides 
a selection of excerpts from leaders tabbed in whole or part as connected to 
this theme; it also presents a breakdown of notable thematic features 
demarcated in each excerpt.  As might be expected given the importance of 
civilisation in the figural results, a major thematic meaning emerging from the 
data concerned a clash between the civilized, democratic West and the  
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Table 7. The Civilised/Uncivilised Theme 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
Civilised/ 
Uncivilised 
This attack was, as Tony Blair says, not 
against America alone but part of a battle 
between terrorism and the entire free world 
which can be met only by standing 
shoulder to shoulder. Mikhail Gorbachev 
famously said that in ending the Cold War 
he was doing something terrible to the 
West, depriving it of its enemy. The enemy 
today is Moscow's, Western Europe's, 
America's and the law-loving world's. 
Against this monstrosity, the grandest of 
coalitions must be forged if evil is not to 
prevail (“Terror for All,” 2001). 
 
 Terrorism vs. the 
entire free world 
 








vs. the grandest 
of coalitions 
 Washington and the West must establish 
beyond doubt that the civilised world is 
able and determined to defeat religious 
extremists and aggressive dictators 
anywhere that they arise, particularly in the 
Muslim world, where bigotry, fanaticism 
and religious hatreds against the West sit 
too easily alongside the gentler arts of 
reason (“Still the Enemy,” 2001). 
 









vs. the gentler 
arts of reason 
 
 This was never an American catastrophe 
but always the world's. It is the world's 
literally as well as metaphorically. The silent 
dead of many lands will speak to that truth; 
their countrymen must hear them. We are 
all counter-terrorists now. That cannot be 
repeated too often by the politicians we 
trust to defend our freedoms. And they will 
need to muster all their eloquence 
because this will be a war of attrition, 
costly, long and full of risk, against fanatics 
within the gates (“With One Voice,” 2001). 
 




Table 7, Continued. 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
 Civilised/ 
Uncivilised 
The Prime Minister. . . has been helped in his 
role by a powerful personal conviction that 
truth must grapple with falsehood to 
prevail and that civilised values, when 
delivered with his own brand of charm, 
have the best possible chance of 
prevailing. . . . 
September’s tragedy. . . has made possible 
the forging of a new "community of 
nations" able to defend the institutions of 
freedom. . . . There are values of civilised 
society; it is not an arrogance to assert 
them, but a necessity. (“The Blair Shuttle,” 
2001). 
 
 Truth vs. 
falsehood 
 
 Authors of 
September’s 




 The size of the contingent within either the 
community of Islamic scholars or on the 
streets who have felt able to ask 
themselves whether Islam would be well 
served by a revolution in thinking - similar to 
that experienced by the Christian Church 
through the Reformation or for the Jewish 
faith courtesy of an Enlightenment - is tiny. 
It is this unfortunate state of affairs, not 
globalisation or any other trend that may 
be connected with America, that is at the 
core of the tension between civilisations 
(“One Year On,” 2002). 
 









uncivilized, theocratic terrorist havens.  At the same time, the content categories, 
With One Voice and Standing Shoulder to Shoulder, were re-emphasized here, 
as the question of who was represented in the civilised world and what that 
representation implied was answered.  This structure also gave ample 
opportunity for the development of historical references that re-drew alliances 
and reinforced alliances already struck, while playing out the ages-old 
understandings of “us vs. them” and “East vs. West.”  In some form, this theme 
anchored all the others, and certainly was the overarching theme appearing in 
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The Times.  Though the theme represented slightly different meanings in different 
contexts throughout the course of the year, it underlay almost all of what The 
Times published and framed what was written. 
 A second major theme in much of The Times’ treatment of 9/11 and its 
aftermath concerns 9/11 as a rift in time, or as The Times puts it in the first article’s 
very first line, 9/11 is “The Day That Changed the Modern World.”  Such a day, 
quite obviously, is very rare; when it occurs, the consequences are epic, for good 
or bad, and a thorough change in our perception of history results in a before-
and-after dichotomy.  On a day like 9/11, all experience is described as being 
part of a world before the event occurred or after, noting the change in time.  
Reflective of the figural category, Change and Time, as well as historical 
referencing of other events that marked dramatic changes in our perception of 
when historical eras begin and end (for instance, the American entry into World 
War II after Pearl Harbor), the thematic structure Before/After focused on how 
time itself seemed to change after that September morning, and how the West’s 
self-narrative had to shift.  Table 8 breaks down this Before/After theme in some 
detail. 
Another significant theme, particularly given the paper’s focus on 
Civilisation, is that the civilised West has a clear duty to answer uncivilised 
terrorists forcefully.  Any other behavior smacks of appeasement, of the former 
Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, as he signed away parts of Czechoslovakia 
in order to ensure “peace in our time.”  Figurally, Nautical and Games  
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Table 8. The Before/After Theme  
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
Before/After [The United States] will fight as a nation 
grimly conscious that it has been tempered 
by fire and changed, perhaps for ever, by 
the ordeal. The psychological impact will 
be greater than that of Japan's destruction 
of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and will 
reach far beyond America's borders. By 
comparison with yesterday's smashing of 
hijacked American aircraft into American 
targets, Pearl Harbor was easy to 
understand; it was for most Americans at 
the edge of their world. Yesterday there 
came a true bolt from the blue, aimed to 
humble the heart of the nation (“Terror for 
All,” 2001). 
 
 The US was 
tempered by fire 
and changed by 
the ordeal 
 
 Yesterday there 
came a true bolt 
from the blue; by 
comparison, the 
destruction of 




 "Human kind / Cannot bear very much 
reality", wrote T.S. Eliot, a poet whose most 
celebrated work closes with the spectacle 
of the towers of the civilised world 
plummeting to the earth. There was much 
that was unbearable in the reality of the 
last week. Words and images are scorched 
onto the collective consciousness, 
replayed in flashback to a newly insomniac 
world. We still see the bodies pressed 
against skyscraper windows or caught in 
obscene free-fall; we still imagine the 
airline passengers learning that their 
slaughter would itself be used as a 
weapon. The poignant simplicity of so 
many valedictions. Never before has the 
world felt itself to be such a global village - 
a village on the southwestern tip of 
Manhattan, a few blocks northwest of Wall 
Street (“Dig Deep,” 2001). 
 
 Much was 
unbearable in 
the reality of the 
last week 
 










 Never before has 
the world felt 
itself to be such 
a global village 
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Table 8, Continued. 
 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
Before/After Six months ago on Monday, the world 
caught its breath in shock, disgust and 
fear, transfixed by the attacks on America. 
Nothing was known of the enemy beyond 
the appallingly, graphically obvious: that 
these were well-organised terrorists who 
were ruthlessly contemptuous of life, their 
own along with that of the civilians 
trapped with them in the hijacked aircraft 
and their victims on the ground. They had 
inflicted unimaginable carnage, 
deliberately indiscriminate. The attacks 
revealed, as they were intended to do, the 
vulnerability not only of the world's greatest 
power but of every society in which 
fanatics were at liberty to circulate. It was 
an attack on freedom itself (“A World 
Transformed,” 2002). 
 
 Six months ago, 
the world caught 
its breath in 
shock 
 




 This then is the paradoxical conclusion on 
September 11. In a vast number of ways 
that contribute much to the conduct of 
life, it has altered very little. In a small 
number of extraordinarily important 
spheres, it may change everything. We are 
only at the beginning of the attempt to 
understand what this will demand of 
capitalist democracies such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom. In that 
sense, while it is September 11, 2002 today, 
the hands on the clock have barely moved 
since September 11, 2001 (“One Year On,” 
2002). 
 
























metaphors appeared, as well as figures of Civilised and Uncivilised worlds.  This 
theme was also rich in historical references, as it forcefully struck the same notes  
Prime Minister Churchill did after the fall of France in 1940, when he called 
upon the British people to brace themselves to their duties and stand up to an 
enemy that aimed to break the foundations of civilised society, thrusting it into a 
new age of darkness.  This Duty/Appeasement theme, developed in Table 9, 
surfaces throughout the year, particularly in the lead-up to the war in 
Afghanistan, but also later, once the fiercest fighting had slowed and the world 
began to work its way back to normal again. 
 The fourth theme emerging from the data, and presented in Table 10, rose 
from the War on Terror itself, or as The Times described it, “a new kind of war 
against a new kind of enemy.”  This theme paid attention exclusively to the war 
and its many, often non-traditional, fronts, concentrating not just on military 
efforts, but also on the importance of waging a multi-dimensional conflict. Since 
al-Qaeda aims to disrupt the world economy and institute an Islamist theocracy 
throughout the historical realms of the Islamic world, The Times widened the 
scope of the battle for the West beyond the need for sheer military might.  New 
War/New Kind of Enemy picked up a variety of figural categories, with 
metaphors of Science and Engineering, Medicine, Games, Rooting Out and 
Closing In, and Responding to Danger having particular importance, while 
historical references were quite broad, drawing especially on the history of World 
War II and the Cold War to provide contrasts.  Finally, like the content category, 
This Is a Long World War Without Borders, the topics of this theme recognize that  
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Table 9. The Duty/Appeasement Theme 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
Duty/ 
Appeasement 
This is a tense time for the world and a time 
for steady nerves and precise actions. It is 
right that the United States should punish 
the Taleban for refusing to hand over Bin 
Laden and that it should go into 
Afghanistan to seek him out. It is right that 
the training camps and terrorist 
infrastructure should be destroyed. . . . This 
is a war without end and a war that we 
can never be certain we have won. Even 
after cells have been smashed and there 
has been peace for many years, nobody 
can be sure that another terror movement 
will not emerge. That, however, should not 
deter the West from the long, hard struggle 
ahead because the alternative is too awful 
to contemplate (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 
2001). 
 





 It is right that the 
US should punish 







 The threat of 
terror should not 
deter the West 
from the long, 
hard struggle 
ahead because 
the alternative is 
too awful 
 America bears the greatest burden of 
leadership, but Britain's interests are just as 
fully and directly engaged in this struggle. 
Many Britons were killed in New York; this 
was the deadliest ever terrorist attack on 
British citizens. But Mr. Blair is right that this 
would be Britain's fight even if not one 
British person had died. The national 
interests of this country are directly 
engaged, because at stake are the lives 
and livelihoods of all. There is no backing 
away—and no scope for failure (“Another 
Front,” 2001). 
 
 The national 
interests, lives, 
and livelihoods 
of all are at stake  
 
 There is no 
backing away—
and no scope for 
failure 
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Table 9, Continued. 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
Duty/ 
Appeasement 
Liberals should be cheering that America 
has irrevocably accepted its obligations as 
the world's only superpower. They should 
welcome an allied strategy whose aim is to 
inflict minimum civilian casualties and give 
Afghans a new start to free them from 
perpetual civil war and a regime that 
subjugates women, denies human rights 
and rules by theocratic thuggery. Those 
who doubt the outcome are the real 
isolationists. This war is winnable and the 
West has the resolve, whatever the 
domestic panics to come, to achieve it 
(“The Defeatist Chorus,” 2001). 
 





 Allies aim to give 
Afghans new 
start to free them 
from perpetual 









 The West has the 
resolve 
 When the flames came from the World 
Trade Centre, it is said to have taken Tony 
Blair no more than minutes to see his duty. 
It was clear to him that he should give the 
United States Britain's full support in what 
would surely be a wearying war against 
the common terrorist enemy. Even had so 
many British citizens not been among the 
dead, his course was fixed (“A Man Alone,” 
2001). 
 
 Blair took no 
more than 
minutes to see his 
duty 
 
 Blair knew he 
should give full 















Table 10. The New War/New Kind of Enemy Theme 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
New War/New 
Kind of Enemy 
As political leaders work to overcome the 
obstacles to military and diplomatic 
success in the war against terrorism, it is 
vital that the avoidance of a serious 
economic slump is never far from their 
minds. A financial crisis bringing economic 
ruin to millions would be a terrible blow to 
the global capitalist system and a triumph 
for those out to destroy it in any way they 
can. It would snatched defeat from the 
jaws of any military victory the free world 
won. . . . The collapse of world trade would 
bring almost as much satisfaction to the 
terrorists as the collapse of the World Trade 
Centre. It must not be allowed to happen 










 The collapse of 
the World Trade 
Centre must not 
bring about the 
collapse of world 
trade 
 But whatever action America and its allies 
take against bin Laden's Afghan lairs, that 
will be a foretaste only of a vastly more 
ambitious campaign, waged the world 
over. The US is preparing, and mustering 
allies in every quarter it finds them, even in 
Sudan and Cuba, for a new kind of total 
war, one that takes into account all forms 
of human organisation from banking to 
intelligence, from weapons proliferation 
and organised crime to poverty and its 
relief. In this campaign classic war fighting 
may have an occasional role only; 
terrorism's underground forces will be 
fought where they operate and with 
methods that are anything but 
conventional. And it will be a long war 
(“Long War,” 2001). 
 
 Action taken 
against bin 
Laden’s Afghan 
lairs will be a 
foretaste only of 




 US is mustering 
allies in every 
quarter, even in 
Sudan and 
Cuba, for a new 
kind of total war 
 






 Terrorism will be 
fought with 




Table 10, Continued. 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
New War/ 
New Kind of 
Enemy 
This is not to imply that all and any "enemy 
of my enemy" should be courted, let alone 
trusted; the mistakes the West made in the 
1980s in arming Afghans against the Soviet 
Union, and Iraq against Iran, must not be 
repeated. But it does point to a pragmatic 
layering of decisions to co-operate flexibly 
on the basis of common aims that may shift 
in the course of the long campaign ahead. 
What will be required is not a coalition but 
a palimpsest, a political, military and 
intelligence-sharing script that is constantly 
rewritten (“Palimpsest,” 2001). 
 
 This war requires 
a pragmatic 
layering of 
decisions on the 
basis of common 
aims that may 
shift in the course 
of the long 
campaign 
 




that is constantly 
rewritten is 
required 
 No intelligence-gathering operation will 
ever be comprehensive, just as no building 
can be wholly secure. The essence of 
security, however, is permanent vigilance 
and re-examination of old assumptions. No 
senior intelligence officer should be relying 
on tried and tested methods. The confusion 
in America is a warning to all Western 
intelligence services; they should pay 
critical and concentrated attention to an 
unclear and present danger (“Intelligent 
Intelligence,” 2001). 
 







 No senior 
intelligence 
officers should 
be relying on 
tried and tested 
methods 
 
 The West should 
pay critical and 
concentrated 









this War on Terror is going to end neither quickly nor easily, but will morph from 
one military, economic, and cultural front to another. 
The final theme, Visible/Shadowy, is the one least interlinked with any of 
the others, and the one that appears most infrequently, though it appeared 
often enough and with sufficient clarity to present a striking theme.  Presenting 
an embodied means to make sense of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror, 
Visible/Shadowy is very closely linked to its figurative counterpart category, Vision 
and Shadow (see Table 6, p. 78 ).  While textually linking up with Osama bin 
Ladin’s Spectre and The Day That Changed the Modern World, this theme is 
geared very much in the present and future, and therefore, its historical 
referencing is weaker than other themes.  This theme focuses on the pivotal 
place of intelligence in this war, what we can and cannot see, what is 
democratic and open versus what is criminal and shadowy, and most 
importantly, what we are prepared for and what we cannot yet imagine.  Table 
11 presents this thematic category. 
These five themes do not occur one by one.  Quite the contrary, they 
often overlap and co-occur, and create layered patterns of meaning that 
stretch through the leading articles.  By tracking their co-occurrence, one finds 
clues toward each theme’s larger contextual framework.  Linking them together, 
especially with the figural, historical, and textual elements that provide thematic 
building blocks, helps to shape The Times’ understanding of 9/11.  Moreover, 
considering that two of the most important figural categories—Language, 
Literature, and Drama and Characters—appear across all these themes, and are  
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Table 11. The Visible/Shadowy Theme 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
Visible/ 
Shadowy 
[T]here is no single stroke that will slay these 
invisible enemies, no one riposte that will 
“take out” this threat. Effective mastery of 
this terrorist network—and the one 
certainty is that many people are 
involved—will require a changed attitude 
of mind to every aspect of civil as well as 
military security (“Terror for All,” 2001). 
 
 No single stroke 




 The elusive identikit of terror is filling out. 
American negotiators came away 
yesterday from talks in Pakistan with 
agreement to co-operate in tracking down 
bin Laden and a mass of valuable data on 
Taleban garrisons and equipment, 
weapons dumps and the airstrips where it 
keeps its small airforce. . . . The moment 
intelligence coalesces there will be a swift 
spring. America is crouched (“Crouch, 
Spring, Crouch,” 2001). 
 
 The elusive 
identikit of terror 
is filling out 
 
 The moment 
intelligence 
coalesces there 
will be a swift 
spring 
 Not only have the freedoms of Western 
societies been used to mask a terrible 
conspiracy of destruction, but those 
employed to guard these freedoms have 
signally failed to do their job. The worst 
lapses have been in intelligence and 
counter-intelligence. . . . Hindsight 
underlines blame but clarifies the need for 
action. . . . And Parliament must look hard 
at what legislation, now hampering 
investigations, may need to be suspended 
or repealed. A new war demands new 
weapons. Intelligence is by far the most 
deadly (“Intelligence Needed,” 2001). 
 
 Freedoms of the 
West have been 







but clarifies the 
need for action 
 
 Parliament must 
look hard at 
legislation 
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Table 11, Continued. 
Theme Excerpt Thematic Features 
Visible/ 
Shadowy 
Like the rest of the population, politicians 
have responded with a tendency towards 
tunnel vision, despite the best efforts of the 
media to continue to draw their eyes to 
the rest of the world. Even where journalists 
have been able to keep attention 
focused, action in these countries has itself 
diminished, as the universal gaze has 
turned towards New York. . . .  For President 
Mugabe, the atrocities in New York have 
been convenient. Not only have they 
eclipsed reports of continuing violence 
against white farmers and his 
determination to ignore the undertakings 
given by his negotiators in Nigeria; they 
have also led to the cancellation of next 
week's Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in Brisbane. . . . 
[S]tatesmen today are blinded to other 
issues by the explosions in America. Life will 
not return to normal until their vision is 
restored (“Tunnel Vision,” 2001). 
 
 Population and 
politicians have 
responded [to 
9/11] with tunnel 
vision, despite 
the best efforts of 
the media to 
draw their eyes 
to the rest of the 
world 
 
 Even where 
temporarily able 







 Statesmen today 
are blinded by 
the explosions in 
America 
 
 Life will not return 
to normal until 











not intricately interwoven with any one of them, this points again towards a 
dramatic sensibility translated across the themes, as though the whole body of 
text can be taken as a kind of script with its own meta-theatrical elements. 
  Table 12 charts the co-occurrence of themes, and presents the total 
number of appearances each theme makes.  The two most frequent themes are 
New War/New Kind of Enemy and Civilised/Uncivilised.  The next two themes in 
line, Duty/Appeasement and Before/After, also represent themes that The Times 
took very seriously.  The difference between these two separate groupings results 
from the number of times that each of these four themes appeared in 
conjunction with other major themes.  New War/New Kind of Enemy showed 
evidence of overlapping with each of the other themes, though 
Civilised/Uncivilised and Duty/Appeasement were natural thematic 
counterparts, since both of those latter themes flowed directly into the aims and 
impetus for waging the war. 
 Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After both occur with three other themes, 
and particularly with each other, appearing nine times in conjunction, the most 
frequent of any co-occurring theme pairs.  This common co-occurrence suggests 
that our understanding of what civilised and uncivilised signify was considerably 
challenged by the events of 9/11, and that in its wake, we could define ourselves 
or others with those terms in quite the same way.  At the same time, 
Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After also appear evenly with other themes, 
corresponding to the large number of salient figures that appear in the Civilised 
World and Change and Time figurative categories (see Table 6, p. 78). 
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x 4 6 0 6 16 
Civilised/ 
Uncivilised 




X X X 1 3 6 
New War/ New 
Kind of Enemy 
(22) 
X X X X 8 26 
  
  
 Duty/Appeasement only occurred with two other themes, representing a 
case in which a theme’s overall track is highly concentrated in a few areas.  In 
each case, those links were significant, since in each group its appearances 
occurred almost equally.  It also defines the role The Times expects the British 
notion of duty to play in this conflict.  Knowing one’s duty is critical in wartime in 
the face of the intense pressure to perform at critical moments, and in this so-
called new kind of war, one without traditional rules or boundaries, duty can still 
be a constant.  At the same time, the British notion of duty is intricately 
interwoven with the British notion of what constitutes civilised society; to be 
civilised is to do one’s duty. 
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 Finally, the theme of Visible/Shadowy occurred six times, primarily in co-
occurrence with Before/After or New War/New Kind of Enemy.  Given these 
numbers, thought was given to calling Visible/Shadowy a sub-theme.  Instead, 
the appearances of Visible/Shadowy were deemed so striking as to require a 
separate thematic category, despite its relatively small frequency of 
appearances. 
Taken together, the interconnection between themes can be 
characterized by a gestalt relationship, visualized as a geometric figure 
grounded by an awareness of time and history.  Representing the five themes in 
this way emphasizes not only the importance and clear identity of each theme, 
but also the interrelated nature of the common themes and their overall 
concern with temporal and historical contexts.  This complete pattern, therefore, 
describes an inclusive picture of the thematic understanding of 9/11 and its 
aftermath that The Times of London developed in the course of 45 editorials 
appearing in the year-long period following the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 Figure 5 presents this understanding in the form of a geometric figure, a 
pyramid, in which the center is defined by Civilised/Uncivilised, the theme most 
central for understanding The Times of London’s overall thematic structure.  At 
the same time, the four corners at the base of the pyramid are defined by each 
of the remaining four themes.  Appearing against the combined background of 
Time and History, all five themes are grounded temporally and culturally, by the 























Figure 5. Thematic Structure for The Times of London
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
               
 
 
     









 To put this understanding in clearer perspective, when The Times writes 
about civilised and uncivilised worlds, it describes the civilised world as having 
undergone a Reformation and Enlightenment that forever separated the 
institutions of Church and State, implying that a civilised society requires such 
separation.  By contrast, in the dichotomy The Times develops, the terror-driven 
uncivilised world still exists in the dark ages of history, unenlightened, unreformed, 
and unrepentant for the strict religious fervour that drives its understanding of the 
world.  At the same time, Civilised/Uncivilised readily compares today’s enemy to 
the enemies of the Cold War, which offer an historical context for this struggle.  
The Cold War in many ways becomes the dominant metaphor to represent a 
war of ideologies that the West fully understood.  Unlike the enemies in the War 
on Terror, the Soviet enemy wanted ultimately to survive; that war was about 
expanding circles of power, not the seemingly indefatigable heart of jihad. 
In the theme of Before/After, the historical contrast presented is Pearl 
Harbor, and 9/11 is described as something having happened “never before.”  
To that end, the overwhelming shock of 9/11, through its sheer power, forces us 
to gaze over and over at the kamikaze airliners screaming into the Trade Center 
Towers, almost as though if the day is “replayed in flashback,” we will ultimately 
accept it as having been real.  In this sense, time itself is demarcated by 9/11, by 
“the reality of last week” so that something as simple as the thought of “last 
week” becomes figural.  Even a year later, “the hands on the clock have barely 
moved since September 11,” as though time became frozen by that moment, 
and has yet to fly again.  
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When speaking of the contrast defining the theme of Duty/Appeasement, 
more temporal emphasis is placed on the future, in the “long, hard struggle 
ahead,” a “war without end.”  Immediately recognizing the War on Terror as 
something radically different than the West has experienced, The Times 
nevertheless instantly understands that this war will not be quick.  It will instead 
require steady nerves and a fixed course, a clear resolve to see it through to its 
bitter end.  But time past is still evident, since it is our duty to “free [the Afghans] 
from perpetual civil war.”  In that sense, this war can become our instrument to 
correct some of our more tragic mistakes. 
The theme of New War/New Kind of Enemy develops in much the same 
way as Duty/Appeasement, with a temporal emphasis on the future in which “it 
will be a long war” and the “essence of security. . . is permanent vigilance.”   
Time becomes a feature of this new war, as though the fight will in part be 
against time, against growing distracted or weary as the permanence of war 
bears its weight.  The historical emphasis, meanwhile, rests on not repeating past 
mistakes, as in arming the Afghan mujahadeen against the Soviets or Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq against Iran during the 1980s.  Part of being vigilant, in the view of 
The Times, is thinking long-term, of identifying far more frightening long-term 
enemies from the ranks of myriad short-term allies. 
Finally, the focus in Visible/Shadowy rests in our ability to look, in terms of 
“hindsight,” for those to blame for the failures of 9/11.  It becomes crucial not to 
ignore our mistakes; it steers part of our duty to the dead and our continuing 
struggle.  But danger lies in our tendency to get stuck in that day, since “life will 
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not return to normal until vision is restored.”  Unless we can see what is coming in 
the fog of this long war, we will suffer in its wake. 
In terms of the overall rhetorical structure, the interconnections that 
develop between the themes highlight Burkeian notions of ambiguity by 
emphasizing the points at which themes, what Burke might call motives, 
intersect.  The trend, for example, of Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After 
working in tandem so often suggests that the underlying motives framing those 
themes are merging, and in that way, transforming what either means on its own.  
In the merging of themes, The Times seems to be creating specific frames for 
understanding the various actors, actions, and motives behind the conflict. 
As an illustration, the theme of Visible/Shadowy is not just an obvious 
commentary on scene, but also on implied commentary of the agents, acts, 
and their agencies involved—some are blind, some are hiding.  The underlying 
definition of duty in the theme of Duty/Appeasement, in its connection to the 
New War/New Kind of Enemy theme, remains in line with our traditional, military 
notions of doing one’s duty, and with an agent and his agency.  But when 
placed alongside the theme of Civilised/Uncivilised, that military definition 
merges with a deeper sense of duty to one’s society, one that is more 
interwoven with the larger, moral concerns of preserving the tenets of civilised 
society, avowing an underlying purpose for the struggle.  At the same time, the 
interconnections between the theme of New War/New Kind of Enemy and each 
of the other themes suggest that this war lurks at the fringes of many of the 
critical ways we characterize ourselves.  It will challenge our notions of 
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civilisation, duty, and history accordingly, shaping our acts, our understanding of 
the agents involved, the extreme agency they may sometimes choose, and 
ultimately, their underlying purpose. 
For The Times, references to time and history seem to represent a means 
to locate 9/11 in the great sweep of Western civilization. Just as World War II did, 
9/11 created a temporal rift in which every subsequent event will be marked as 
happening before or after.  In the same way, 9/11 represents an historical shift in 
the way we think.  Just as the Cold War changed the way we think about war or 
the Reformation and Enlightenment altered our perception of religion and the 
Church, 9/11 will change our conceptions even more, asking us to realign how 
we respond to the pressing needs of military readiness, economic well-being, 
diplomatic and cultural engagement, and religious conviction.  In any event, all 
of these concerns invite us to place the figure of 9/11 and its various thematic 
meanings against the ground of time and history to enable us to make sense of 
the event and its consequences. 
 To that end, the exceedingly strong link between Civilised/Uncivilised and 
Before/After reinforces how critical our understanding of history is to our sense of 
narrative reality whenever we find ourselves face-to face with a history-shaking 
shift.  On 9/11, all our pre-9/11 notions of civilisation came crashing down with the 
Twin Towers; after that, not only was everything immediately different; it had to 
be different.  This thematic link suggests that the way The Times accounts for that 
shift is in the symbolic linking of the terrorist attacks of September 11th to an 
assault upon all of Western civilisation and its history through the rhetorical, 
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thematic structuring it uses to symbolize the event.  For the editorial writers of The 
Times, the scene/act of the Towers falling, the agents who wrought their 
destruction with such seemingly unpredictable agency, and the very purpose of 
the attack merge so ferociously that their editorial pages must draw the 
attention of their readers to that point.  It marks a decisive shift in the West’s 
awareness of its own historical civilisation. 
 Taken together, the themes and rhetorical stances developing in The 
Times of London display a profound sense that the events of 9/11 represent a 
significant alteration in the course of Western civilization, a fundamental change 
in the way we understand historical patterns, and, finally, a paradigm shift in how 
to interpret what we see happening in the so-called uncivilised world.  At the 
same time, The Times does not hesitate when calling on the West to fight the 
most dangerous elements of the shift, noting that it is our duty to defend our 
culture, heritage, and history, and also to redefine carefully and thoughtfully the 
legacy we wish to leave after this long, world war.  Ultimately, in their focus on 
our temporal conceptions of reality, the themes of The Times reflect our sense of 
history as narrative, as a collective set of stories told and re-told over the course 
of time, begging us to learn from them.  In this sense, 9/11 becomes a dramatic 
turning point in our historical narrative. 
The Hands on the Clock Have Barely Moved 
Chapter 4: Discussion 
Overview 
In the days immediately after 9/11, as the Western world reeled in shock 
and terror, it quickly became aware that the symbol of the Twin Towers 
crumbling signaled a profound change in the world order. The search for 
understanding, for a way to make sense of what had happened and what it
ultimately meant, was just beginning. What was certain was that the West could 
no longer look out at the Middle East as a troubled, distant place; the West had 
to look in, because the trouble had come to it, broadcast live around the globe.
By September 12th, everyone knew the terrorists had ensured that the world was 
now irrevocably different.
The editorial board for The Times captured this sentiment immediately;
9/11 was “the day that changed the modern world.”  Unlike New York, London
was not a new-age Pompeii, buried beneath an “urban avalanche.”  The 
Londoners writing The Times enjoyed some distance. And with that distance, The
Times went to work. Acknowledging that New York and New Yorkers needed to
heal, having nearly suffocated in the rubble mountain, London could rally the
troops, define the long mission ahead, and prepare the West for its inevitable 
riposte. As the United States’ longtime ally, the United Kingdom stood in a 
position to share both the American grief (the second greatest number of 
110 
casualties at the World Trade Center were UK citizens) and the battle it would 
fight. At the same time, the UK was also the closest American ally, the nation
“best placed to whisper words in the right ears” (“The Old War,” 2001). 
 Across the Atlantic, The New York Times focused on the hole tearing
through the heart of the city and the growing vulnerability building up around it.
For the writers in New York, there would be no quick understanding of this kind of 
attack; this was an attack on the collective, New York soul. The suffocating 
smoke and ashes gave way to the million-ton pile in Lower Manhattan, a 
continuously burning mountain of debris fueled by what remained of the World
Trade Center, and the victims who had been trapped inside. The memory of 
person after person, plummeting from the top floors of the towers, lingered on,
and with each new disclosure of information about that day, their ghosts 
reappeared. Victims’ postal codes were transformed into a kind of map of the 
fallen, with the disturbing realization that most of the dead hailed from just a few 
neighborhoods. The parts of the towers that were not reduced to rubble were
cared for as though they were fallen heroes, the assassinated sentries that had 
manned the gates of Manhattan.  Each grizzly corpse, or part of a corpse, was 
treated to solemn funeral rites as it was carefully removed from the pile that 
came to be known all too quickly as Ground Zero.  Every holiday became a 
reason to pause, to reflect on how strange this one felt compared to just a year 
before, when the city was still bustling, blissfully unaware what fate held in store 
on a crisp, September morning.
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New York also needed something to cling to, something to give shape to 
the struggle ahead. Outside of the events of Pearl Harbor sixty years before, no 
attack inside the mainland in American history provided even the remotest 
parallel.  New York—and the rest of America—searched for a frame of reference 
to make sense of events and to define a common goal. What emerged in the 
reflective articles of The New York Times, as a result, was an epic structure,
replete with a solid, archetypal foundation for traditional, epic storytelling (Lule,
2002; Pollio, et al., In Press).  Lule noted four main themes in The New York Times—
(1) The End of Innocence (Everything Has Changed); (2) The Victims (We Might 
Have Been); (3) The Heroes (amid the Horror); and (4) The Foreboding Future (as 
Horrible as It Is to Imagine) (2002, p. 280).  Similarly, Pollio, et al., mentioned four 
related, reflective themes of their own—(1) Fracture and Division; (2) Death and
Destruction; (3) Consolation and Commemoration, and (4) America’s Strength
(In Press).  Despite differences between the last figures in both groups, one that 
Pollio explains by noting the difference in the temporal framework of the two 
studies, what was amazing about these structures was that both notably lack a
theme for the villain. The New York Times instead rarely mentioned the villains or
a quest for vengeance, but instead “focused inward” on healing, emphasizing
“the sacrifice and suffering that had been and would be endured by the 
American people” (Lule, 2002, p. 286). New York was simply not quite ready to 
consider the bellicose vision of what would come next.
As The New York Times set about the process of healing the city, The Times
of London began to build the West’s argument for a massive counter-assault,
112 
one that took into consideration the variety of threats the terrorists posed and 
the variety of vulnerabilities the West suffered.  The Times struck upon the need to 
“call spirits from the dusty deep,” but not to run headlong on “a fool’s errand,”
echoing the advice Shakespeare had offered almost 400 years before (“Replies 
of Steel,” 2001).  But this was no fool’s errand, at least where the hunt for Osama 
bin Laden in Afghanistan was concerned. The fool’s errand to be avoided was 
at home, where, in the hearts of the great democracies of the West, debates
would rage on, questioning for what price would this war be fought. The Times
remained convinced that democracy was something worth salvaging, that its 
great, inherent debates must continue, but that it must not make shackles for
itself, hijacked from action by endless, indecisive debate.  It was the West’s duty
to defend democracy, certainly.  But it was also the West’s duty to rescue its
civilisation from the clutches of fanatics who acted most easily when the 
mechanisms of democracy were mired in inactivity.
Specifically, The Times focuses on three key areas: (1) constructing an
historical case for war, with an eye to the theory of war developed by
Clausewitz, in which historical references provide the basis for the theme, New 
War/New Kind of Enemy; (2) drawing a thematic parallel between the battles
the West, particularly the UK, was readying itself to fight in 2001 and 1940 through 
the wartime speeches of Winston Churchill, in which there is a convergence of
historical references with the themes, Duty/Appeasement and 
Civilised/Uncivilised; and (3) narrating a thematic and figural literary framing of 
the events of 9/11 into a Shakespearan-style drama, taking a cue from Henry IV
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and Henry V.  In this last section, the focus points of content categories provide 
various exigencies for building the drama.  In Burkeian terms, the purpose for 
which the war is being fought develops from the five themes and the figural 
categories, CIvilised World and Change and Time. The figural categories, Vision 
and Shadow, Terrain, and Natural Disaster, along with the Visible/Shadowy
theme, set the various scenes of the war. The way that The Times personifies 
agents driving the drama appears in the figural category, Characters.  Finally,
the war responses to 9/11, and the means of carrying those responses out,
combine as act-agency ratios in the figural categories, Nautical, Medicine,
Science and Engineering, Rooting Out and Closing In, and Games.
Combining these three elements—the historical basis for the War on Terror,
the themes that define what The Times believes is at stake, and the narrative
framing of events through an historical, dramatic structure that underscores the 
rhetorical discourse—allows The Times to develop a clear picture of the impact 
of 9/11, what the War on Terror is about, how the West can best carry itself in
battle, and perhaps most importantly, how to win the day.  Contrasted with what
was happening in New York, London steps into the debate ready to help its ally
emerge from the dust hanging over Manhattan and stand shoulder to shoulder 
in a battle that The Times believes threatens the very foundations of Western 
civilisation.  As a result, The Times casts 9/11 and its aftermath as watershed 
events, specific in their own time and circumstances, but ultimately, a conflict 
undeniably linked to moments in history that, in threatening its survival, shaped 
the Anglo-American world. 
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The Reality of the Historical Past
Working with this awareness, The Times focuses its editorial approach on 
laying out an argument for a firm, unyielding Western response to the attacks of 
September 11. Understanding that this conflict would likely stretch the traditional 
Western concept of war, The Times undertakes an historical explanation for the 
reasons why the War on Terror is justified.  The sheer number of historical 
references The Times utilized reflects this aim, but more importantly, the kinds of
references they choose to highlight underscore the conclusions they draw.
For example, unlike the history of European warfare culminating in the First 
World War, The Times concludes that the War on Terror would not be a war 
fought because of territory, kingly power, or age-old alliances. As a result, The
Times never lingers for long in discussions of pre-20th-century Western history, with 
only 29 of 160 total references coming from before World War II (see Table 3, p.
71), since that history does not accurately reflect the end goals of the War on 
Terror. At the same time, despite al-Qaeda’s claim that it hopes to reestablish 
the Islamic caliphate that ruled much of the world in the Middle Ages, The Times
views their ultimate aims quite differently, since the editorial pages do not 
mention this period.  For The Times, the phenomenon of al-Qaeda terrorism is a 
modern one, much more wrapped up in the concerns of the last 100 years of 
Middle Eastern history than the last 1000. 
More surprisingly, given the 24 historical references raised (see Table 3, p.
71), from The Times’ point-of-view, the ultimate war aims of War on Terror also do 
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10 The Times does draws links to the behavior of bin Laden and the Nazis, particularly with 
regard to bin Laden’s ability to inspire cult-like fanaticism through a “specious” religious 
philosophy based on “racial lines” (“Long War,” 2001; “Not Correct,” 2002; “One Year 
On,” 2002).
not share a true counterpart in the history of the Second World War. Although
Adolf Hitler was a megalomaniac who hungered for German racial purity and 
fed on the German people through his cult-like manipulation of the Third Reich10, 
he was still the elected leader of Germany, a clearly identifiable nation-state.  
The Nazi terror was a state-mandated terror, not the terror of an independent,
underground organization.  Since Hitler, as the German leader, launched 
conventional war throughout Europe, successfully employing a military blitzkrieg
against nearly every Allied combatant, Great Britain’s fight against the German 
Blitz, no matter how terrifying for the people of London, was therefore an 
exercise in surviving a conventional conflict, no matter how unconventional its 
means.  Similarly, although Pearl Harbor was a sneak attack executed by
suicidal, kamikaze pilots, they attacked a traditional, military target, the 
American Pacific Fleet.  For Americans in 1941, the target of counter-attack was 
clear—Tokyo. After Lend-Lease and the Atlantic Charter, as well as after 
numerous appeals from Prime Minister Churchill for an American entry into the 
war, it was only a matter of time until the Americans declared; the Japanese 
simply provided the impetus the American government needed to convince the 
American people that this war was necessary. 
When World War II is referenced, The Times is careful to highlight why this
conflict will be different, and particularly, why the attacks of 9/11 are not merely
a repetition of the attack on Pearl Harbor, which it references directly 10 times 
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(see Table 4, p. 72 and Table 5, p. 74). Winfield, Friedman, and Trisnadi (2002)
concur, noting that “The Times alleged that the analogy to Pearl Harbor was a 
historical fallacy” since Japan was “a recognizable enemy [that] had different 
goals.”  While 9/11 “had more numbing complexities, the challenges were larger,
and the psychological damage would also be greater” (p. 297).  In that sense,
the easiest historical comparison the Americans could make was an 
inappropriate one. That easy comparison fails to take into account the 
conditions of this new kind of war, something The Times notes right away, on the 
12th of September:
The psychological impact will be greater than that of Japan's destruction
of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and will reach far beyond America's 
borders. By comparison with yesterday's smashing of hijacked American 
aircraft into American targets, Pearl Harbor was easy to understand; it was 
for most Americans at the edge of their world. Yesterday there came a 
true bolt from the blue, aimed to humble the heart of the nation. (“Terror
for All,” 2001)
Later during the year, after the Afghanistan phase of the War on Terror winds 
down, The Times comes to the same conclusion.  On December 7, 2001, writing 
directly to compare the condition of the contemporary world to what the world
was like generations before, The Times argues that “these two devastating 
attacks, 60 years apart, are not comparable.” While the attack on Pearl Harbor 
“was an act of aggression against a military target. . . by a country which had
already invaded China and which, the United States was reluctantly concluding,
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it would have eventually to confront,” by contrast, “September’s slaughter of 
civilians had no basis in strategic calculation” (“One Sunday in 1941,” 2001).
The real similarities between 9/11 and its aftermath and the Second World 
War are the effects both had on the United States and its relationship to the 
world, particularly to its closest ally, the United Kingdom.  “September's tragedy,” 
The Times observes, citing Henry Kissinger, “united [America] even more strongly
than did Pearl Harbor and made possible, provided that the campaign against
terrorism is pursued with exemplary vigour, the forging of a new ‘community of 
nations’ able to defend the institutions of freedom” (“The Blair Shuttle,” 2001).  
While the uniting of America is the one significant link the two dates of infamy
share, the most meaningful connection between the Second World War and the 
War on Terror is that they both “aligned the rest of the world” (“One Sunday in
1941,” 2001), helping to form a “new community of nations.”  Specifically, the 
community of nations begins with the Anglo-American alliance, forged by
Churchill and Roosevelt in the darkest days of World War II.  That “special 
relationship” proves itself again in the days after 9/11, with Tony Blair acting as an 
unofficial liaison between the United States and the other allies (“Just the 
Beginning,” 2001). In the immediate wake of 9/11, The Times notes, “old rivalries 
have been buried, resentments of the sole superpower set aside and snide 
commentary abandoned,” replaced by a solidarity in the West such that “every
Western leader has pronounced the appalling assaults on Washington and New 
York to be an attack upon all” (“Still the Enemy,” 2001).
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In yet another historical contrast, The Times addresses the Cold War with
some depth, referencing it 10 times (see Table 4, p. 72).  Though perhaps not as 
evocative of struggle and suffering to a Briton as the Second World War, the 
Cold War nevertheless lasted decades, flared in a variety of contexts, and was 
waged in multiple forms across much of the world. Although the Cold War was 
largely a war of competing ideologies, much like the War on Terror would be, it 
was also a conflict of clear dividing lines and specific flash points, an icy detente 
rather than an all-out world conflict.  Even the Cuban Missile Crisis provided a 
difficult analogy at best, since diplomacy offered the best means to redevelop 
the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Triggering a global-thermo-nuclear war was not in either nation’s, or either 
system’s, best interest, and since the Cold War was largely a conflict of 
competing interests rather than a fight to the death, the hottest of flash points
was carefully averted.
The Times takes note of these differences, first remarking that making a 
direct comparison with the events of 1962 underestimates the challenges of a 
post-9/11 president:
[George W. Bush] has fewer obvious courses of action open to him than
did that other young and still untried President [John F. Kennedy] in 1962,
when he was confronted by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Again, as with Pearl 
Harbor, Kennedy had a known adversary to deal with.  (“Terror for All,” 
2001) 
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The focus The Times places on the known enemies of the Cold War is an issue the 
paper develops throughout the leading articles.  For The Times, the terror of the 
unknown is truly more terrifying than the known.  John Kennedy could ultimately
initiate a diplomatic discourse with Nikita Khrushchev and work through 
American-Soviet grievances.  Communication between the West and Osama 
bin Laden, on the other hand, happens exclusively through the press; in bin 
Laden’s case, after 9/11, that communication only happens through video or a 
written declaration, while he makes it perfectly clear in his repeated threats that
he does not desire formal diplomatic channels.
At the same time, bin Laden and many of his al-Qaeda followers are Cold 
War creations, men trained by the West during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, a fact not lost on The Times.  In the War on Terror, not “all and any
‘enemy of my enemy’ should be courted, let alone trusted,” as was standard
practice in building spheres-of-influence during the Cold War.  “The mistakes the 
West made in the 1980s in arming Afghans against the Soviet Union,” have to be 
avoided in this war, and the pragmatic decisions of alliance-building must be 
carefully measured against the long-term war aims (“Palimpsest,” 2001).  In this 
sense, the great number of Cold War references The Times provides operate not 
so much as a comparative, but as a warning not to conduct the War on Terror
the same way.
As an historical analogy to the War on Terror, even the first Gulf War,
appearing 16 times (see Table 4, p. 72 and Table 5, p. 74), waged by many of
the same players in nearly the same part of the world, does not quite measure 
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up.  In contrast to the post-9/11 endeavor, that conflict seemed as though it had
been fought during another, much more remote, time, when wars were still 
fought solely for territory and natural resources.  Iraq invaded Kuwait to blackmail 
the rest of the Arabian Peninsula to change the world’s petroleum values so that 
Iraq could more easily pay off its enormous war debt to the Persian Gulf states 
leftover from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.  In part, then, the conflict was fought
to stabilize the international petroleum market, hardly something evocative of 
the War on Terror.  On the other hand, the war was also fought to drive Saddam 
Hussein’s army from Kuwait and reestablish Kuwait’s lawful government,
something that did (remotely, at least) resemble the post-9/11 design to drive bin 
Laden and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and replace the Taleban with a 
governmental structure less obviously hostile to the rest of the world.
The most obvious similarity between the so-called Hundred Day War and 
the possibly endless War on Terror, according to the comment pages of The
Times, is the Western-spearheaded coalition that came together to force Iraqi
troops out of Kuwait. The Times assumes that the West will rally to a certain 
degree behind NATO’s Article 5, but garnering the support of a broader, and 
preferably Muslim, coalition is just as important as it was during the Gulf War.
Despite the fact that “[m]ost of the Muslim world still recoils instinctively from any
attack on a fellow Islamic nation,” the unprecedented threat from bin Laden in 
Afghanistan can sway reluctant Muslim states to back the Western coalition, at
least behind the scenes, since, “as in the Gulf War, common fears make 
common cause” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001).  Critical in this effort would be
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convincing potential, Muslim allies that the West is serious about punishing bin 
Laden for the 9/11 attacks, and is willing to take military action against his 
Afghan hosts to find him, if necessary. The Times notes “[t]hat was true in the
Gulf War; and the lesson then, which should be remembered now, is that the 
best defence is attack. So long as the Western allies were understood to be 
absolutely determined to deal with Saddam Hussein, they had Arab support.
When they wavered, so did Iraq's neighbours” (“With One Voice,” 2001).  Looking 
back toward the Gulf War for perspective, the advice The Times offers for the 
new war is clear:  shore up the coalition with a show of strength and determined 
resolve, because that is what the Middle East values.
For The Times, therefore, history provides the guidelines against which the 
War on Terror ought to be planned, and to a great extent, understood.  In its
comparison of the post-9/11 mode of war against the examples of war still most
accessible in collective Western memory, The Times takes great care to 
demonstrate that the War on Terror represents a conflict far different than 
anything the West has encountered. That assessment aligns The Times with Carl 
von Clausewitz, a figure The Times bears in mind as early as September 15th
(“Replies of Steel,” 2001).  Historically speaking, whereas Clausewitz had noted 
that “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting condition, and its own
peculiar preconceptions” (1976, p. 593), The Times, calling upon the spirit of 
Clausewitz, realized that the War on Terror represented a new kind of war with a 
new kind of enemy. Arguing for a counter-attack framed by historical context 
became a paramount concern for The Times on its editorial page. At first, the 
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11 Though The Times gives a good bit of attention to both the 1998 Embassy bombings in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, referencing them 6 times, and the attack on the USS Cole in 
2000, referencing it 3 times, the attention given to the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 in 
Lockerbie Scotland in 1988, the Berlin nightclub bombings of 1986, and the first World
Trade Center bombing all receive minimal coverage, with only 1 reference given to
each (see Table 4, p. 72).
question was what kind of war would the West fight?  Knowing that the West had
long responded to terrorism, even al-Qaeda terrorism, as a kind of “limited war,” 
responding to each new terrorist attack as though it were an individual event to
be answered individually in a long-running tit-for-tat, The Times recognized that
through the attacks of 9/11, al-Qaeda had effectively crossed the Rubicon.
In the past, the bombing of an airplane, a nightclub, or even an embassy
was countered with either a legal investigation and judicial trial or a quick, one-
time, military strike.  But no longer would this be a war in which each act of terror
was individual.  Instead of a handful or even hundreds of deaths, the 9/11 
attacks were certain to have murdered thousands in the air and on the ground.
New York City and Washington were not like Lockerbie, Berlin, Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam. This was not a relatively limited attack on an American warship
stationed in the Persian Gulf.  This attack was nothing like the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombings except that one of the targets had been the same.11
Collectively, the latest targets represented the military, political, and economic
nerve center of the most powerful nation in the world, and the targets had been 
carefully chosen, studied, and exploited. The casualties were almost completely
civilian, and the World Trade Center had lived up to its name; citizens of 115 
countries perished, mostly when the towers collapsed.  “This,” The Times
concluded, “was never an American catastrophe but always the world’s,” and 
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the necessary reply no doubt had to “be a war of attrition, costly, long and full of 
risk, against fanatics within the gates” (“With One Voice,” 2001).
Although “the new truths of a changed world [had] yet to be seen,” The 
Times was certain that this attack would “change the political landscape,” and 
that there was “no single stroke that [would] slay these invisible enemies, no one 
riposte that [would] ‘take out’ this threat” (“Terror for All,” 2001). The nature of
this attack demanded a full, war footing; “The aim,” The Times argued, “must not 
merely be to punish but to extinguish the threat” (“Terror for All,” 2001). After all,
Osama bin Laden had declared war on the West in 1996, calling on the pan-
Islamic ummah to fight against what he called the Zionist-Crusader alliance.
Policy, Clausewitz’s definition for the interests of the community, had just
become more “ambitious and vigorous,” thrusting this conflict towards an 
“absolute war” (1976, p. 606).
Since building momentum toward a war without end could be particularly
dangerous, The Times has set out to guide the West to “trace each action to an
adequate, compelling cause” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 578), knowing that not to 
consider carefully and thoroughly its war grievances, the West would surely court
disaster. The Times, noting the difficulty of declaring war when there was no 
state against which to declare it, understands the difficulties of declaring war on 
an international organization as opposed to a nation-state. This is precisely why
The Times goes to the lengths it does to retrace al-Qaeda attacks on US
Embassies, US warships, and even on the US mainland, as well as linking the 
attacks of 9/11 to the broader threat of terror rising from the Middle East against
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the West its cultural values.   Even so, taking into account the anti-war response
that “the right course . . . is unrelenting pursuit of the guilty through the courts, but 
through the courts only” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001), the issue here, The Times
argues, is not just a matter of the international law that has guided the Western 
concept of war since the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 (“The Old War,” 
2001), even though international, Islamic-based terrorism has been a world-wide 
concern since the 1972 Munich Olympics.
Instead, the issue is at heart an historical one, insofar as the precedents for 
a war like this one do exist in the scope of Western historical civilisation.  “In the 
longer sweep of history,” The Times argues, “war has taken multiple forms in a
bewildering range of circumstance,” often being “waged against people and 
causes, not jurisdictions of geography” (“The Old War,” 2001).  Citing the Roman 
response to the myriad raiders who troubled their shores, the ultimatums issued 
by various Mediterranean principalities against Islamic pirates in the medieval 
period, and even the response of American President Thomas Jefferson to the 
extortion and banditry of Barbary city-states of North Africa during the first
decade of the 19th century, The Times believes that “war is thus neither an 
inaccurate term nor a word without meaning in this hour” (“The Old War,” 2001).
At the same time, to limit the scope of the West’s response to 9/11 solely by what
the letter of international law specifically allows ignores the history of terrorists
who continue to raise the ante until a reply is made in kind:
Terror thrives on such ingenuous moralising. History teaches the opposite 
lesson. Precisely because terrorists crave publicity, unless they are 
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relentlessly pursued and disabled they will pile atrocity on atrocity until,
unchecked, terror rots the timbers on which civilised coexistence rests.
Failure to strike will be trumpeted as proof of impotence, or of fear, with 
the same effect. (“Replies of Steel,” 2001) 
For The Times, the historical precedent trumps the legal one, especially given the 
difficult concerns and absolute quality of the War on Terror, when a 
Clausewitzean planning of the “character and scope” of a war at its outset 
demands a formulation of tactics “on the basis of political probabilities” (1976, p.
584).  As a war like this one begins to take shape, “the clearer appear the 
connections between its separate actions, and the more imperative the need 
not to take the first step without considering the last” when taking into
consideration the course of action that is most likely to yield a favorable 
outcome (1976, p. 584).
The main caveats The Times foresees concern the visceral response to 
9/11 and the impulses that arise from it.  Ultimately, past choices cannot 
completely govern future action, though they can inform and help frame what
goals we construct from the circumstances that we encounter now.  
Understanding that, The Times takes these historical precedents as resources;
however, knowing how different the War on Terror will likely be from any other 
from the past, The Times also anticipates the need to consider those goals and
the means by which the West can achieve them very carefully. When 
Clausewitz (1976) warns that “the aim a belligerent adopts, and the resources he 
employs, must be governed by particular characteristics of his own position,” The
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Times agrees, arguing that since the West is strong, the War on Terror must be 
fought by demonstrating its strength. At the same time, The Times finds just as 
much wisdom in Clausewitz’s concerns that the belligerent and its resources must
“also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character,” when it 
warns that care must be taken in planning how to approach the Muslim world 
when conducting that fight.  Finally, as it describes the many fronts on which the 
War on Terror will be waged, The Times recalls the Clausewitzean advice that the 
agents of war and their places and styles of fighting “must always be governed 
by the general conclusions to be drawn from the nature of war itself” (p. 594). 
The danger, in this case, arises because the War on Terror is neither war 
against a single entity, nor even a single war. The Times reminds its readers that
“[h]owever deadly the enemy, its legions are invisible. No one is sure what states 
are behind them or how many heads the Hydra truly has. There is no prospect of 
decisive set-piece battles.”  As a result, “[a]gainst enemies that operate across
borders and melt into the shadows of anarchic or outlaw lands, coalitions are 
hard to mobilise and harder to sustain” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001). Given this,
defining the war, for the allies and for The Times, is difficult, but absolutely
necessary.  Having already set the historical framework for the war, in
developing the definition for the War on Terror, The Times considers four central 
questions: (1) How quickly should the West respond?  (2) What fronts should the 
West target?  (3) What roles do which allies have?  (4) What are the goals of 
each phase of the war?   
In terms of speed, The Times concludes that the counterattack must be 
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swift, but still deliberate, a lightning war of sorts waged with 21st-century
weaponry, including a much-proved intelligence apparatus, which the paper 
admits is easy to say but harder to do.  “Intelligence. . . has a limited shelf life,”
and “speed is important,” but at the same time, “precision matters too,” and 
“America would look weaker, not stronger, if it were to rush ahead with an ill-
aimed or ineffective counter-strike prompted mainly by the need to be seen to 
act” (“Speed not haste,” 2001). The Times applauds George W. Bush for not 
rushing immediately into war without carefully considering his targets, but also 
concludes that waiting too long invites “the temptation to treat this monstrosity
as a ‘one-off’” and other enemies, such as Iraq, can “seize the moment” 
(“Speed not haste,” 2001). The Times concludes that the Western response must
come sooner rather than later, but only after the proper targets are identified. 
Identifying those targets is the next step The Times advises. While “[t]he 
West could find itself simultaneously engaged in conventional and guerrilla 
wars,” particularly against the Taleban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, “[s]pecial 
forces operations that track down and kill individual terrorists will be more 
effective than hundreds of missile attacks” (“Speed not haste,” 2001).  Similarly,
since the targets of this war are also economic, careful action must be taken in
that front also, and “a form of economic cavalry” requires a “sustained,
international intervention” including tax cuts to increase private spending,
governmental support for the industries placed in jeopardy by the attacks,
reconstruction money for lower Manhattan, and a concerted effort by the 
international banking and energy supply worlds “to take whatever measures are 
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necessary” to ensure that “the collapse of the World Trade Centre” does not
bring about “the collapse of world trade” (“Back in Business,” 2001; “It’s the 
Economy, Still,” 2001). 
More disturbingly, many of the individual terrorists are already embedded 
in Western societies.  “In Hamburg, Paris and London, in Florida and Boston,” The
Times notes, “plotters of mass murder were able to exploit the frameworks of
freedom against freedom,” so there is “little gain in hunting down terrorists 
thousands of miles away if they are not relentlessly pursued at home, too” 
(“Terrorism at Home,” 2001).  All through the West, security needs strengthening,
from shoring up airport security, tightening domestic laws to prevent terrorists 
from so easily planning their attacks inside the soft, legal underbelly of their 
victims, placing the extradition of terror suspects on “fast-track,” and even,
perhaps, to adopting national identity cards.  But democracy must flourish if the 
West is to have something to fight for, and “[t]o extinguish all signs of normal 
political life would, at a time like this, be wrong.”  Nevertheless, internal 
squabbles must be limited, and “it would be foolish to criticise any party which 
chose to minimise potential conflict on the domestic front” (“United Home Front,” 
2001). 
Bolstering such a wide variety of globalized fronts requires allied help in a 
variety of contexts, and “[t]he US must decide early what help it needs, from 
whom, and for what purposes” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001).  Even though war 
plans are not finalized, The Times insists that “[t]he US is preparing, and mustering
allies in every quarter it finds them, even in Sudan and Cuba, for a new kind of 
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total war, one that takes into account all forms of human organisation from 
banking to intelligence, from weapons proliferation and organised crime to
poverty and its relief” (“Long War,” 2001).  China and Russia must at least 
acquiesce to allied plans.  Some central Asian states, like Uzbekistan, can 
provide bases of operation, while others, like Pakistan, can provide military
support simply by reinforcing security along their borders.  NATO and other 
Western allies that supply training, logistical support, and fly-over rights, can be 
just as valuable as allies like the UK, which will supply troop units on the ground.
Finally, as Tony Blair reminded the United Nations in 1998, every terrorist attack “is 
a reminder that terrorism should have no hiding place, no opportunity to raise 
funds, no let-up in our determination to bring its perpetrators to justice”
(“Terrorism at Home,” 2001).  Therefore, any nation that refuses to provide safe 
haven to terror groups, freezes terrorist funds, or identifies and captures the 
terrorists is an ally in this fight.
Given the multiple conditions of diplomacy, battle fronts, and planning 
that the War on Terror requires, the most difficult areas for The Times to define,
predictably, are the overall goals of each conflict falling under the terms of the 
war.  In the first year after 9/11, toppling the Taleban in Afghanistan and
capturing members of al-Qaeda are the most obvious military goals.  In looking 
back to adversaries who have had long histories of supporting terrorist
organizations, however, the potential long-term goals of removing Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq or finding ways to deal effectively with theocratic government in 
Iran are also parts of planning for the war that The Times recognizes.  While “[a]
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decade is the timeframe Washington is working to,” the first goal, The Times
argues, must be for the West to demonstrate a “determination to destroy the al-
Qaeda ‘academies of death’ and private army which bin Laden has built up in
Afghanistan” (“Long War,” 2001).  That goal is complicated by the Taleban,
whose “apparent inability to comprehend the enormity of the outrage that has 
been committed, or the deadly force of the express train that is in consequence 
bearing down upon their land,” reinforces “the intellectual and moral isolation of
this cruel and obscurantist regime” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001).  Even though the 
West mainly wants Osama bin Laden and his associates in al-Qaeda, they are 
nevertheless harbored by the Afghan Islamist government.  If the West truly wants 
to “strike at the center of gravity of the entire conflict,” then it must strike both al-
Qaeda and Taleban targets, making the Afghan conflict, in that way, what
Clausewitz would call a “single war” (1976, p. 596-597). 
Moving outwards from that center axis, however, is much more 
complicated because the war becomes not just a single “center of gravity,” but
“multiple centers,” something that Clausewitz warns happens only very
infrequently.  “[T]errorist cells that are believed to exist in 60 countries” will require 
a “marathon effort” to eradicate, particularly if those countries are not willing to
inoculate the cells on their own.  These war aims become even more difficult to 
measure when one considers that “[t]his is a war without end and a war that we 
can never be certain we have won” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001).  By the time 
that the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan—“Phase One”—is over and “Phase 
Two” is initiated, the conflict is headed toward Iraq, where the aims are not as
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clear, except for a design to stop its financial support of terrorist organizations in 
the Middle East and to rid Iraq of its so-called weapons of mass destruction once 
and for all, two goals leftover from the first war in the Gulf.  Of course, defining 
and accomplishing that goal remains a murky endeavor well after March of
2002, when The Times cites Vice-President Dick Cheney, who asserts that “[t]he 
notion of a plan for multiple pre-emptive missile strikes was. . . ‘a bit over the 
top’” (“Coalition Politics,” 2002).  By September, military intervention seems 
inevitable, but exactly how events would unfold is far from certain.
By defining the parameters of the War on Terror, The Times is able to follow 
through on its description of the historical scene of the war and the purposes for 
which it ought to be fought.  In effect, it relies on the history of other battles to 
delineate what the War on Terror will not be, and, also, what tactics to avoid.  
When introducing the key players, their goals, and the methods they will use to
achieve them, The Times uses Clausewitz’s historical theory of war to set a plot for
waging the war. This allows The Times to focus more clearly on what the war will 
become, who will participate and what means they will use, and what its 
ultimate goals will be. At this point, the audience has enough background 
information to understand the drama as it unfolds, and, leaning on the collective 
historical memory of the British people, The Times can begin to construct the 
dramatic stage that sets to action the main figures and themes of the War on 
Terror. 
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Historical Narrative and Iconic Memory
At the end of the first year, The Times senses that the world has changed 
dramatically as a result of the attacks of 9/11, but that the full extent of the 
changes are still in their infancy. The concern that The Times issued on 
September 12, 2001 still resonates one year on:  “The new truths of a changed 
world have yet to be seen” (“Terror for All,” 2001).  The one certainty, given the 
sometimes tumultuous first year, is that the “new truths” will have far-reaching 
effects that radically shift the way the West views its historical moment.  The sense 
of delayed impact, given the magnitude of the likely change, does not alter The
Times’ outlook, but simply reemphasizes the extraordinary rift 9/11 is likely to
create:
Much of what we have come to appreciate as the most powerful 
moments in history did not lead to the whole pattern of human activity
being overturned overnight. The impact in this case, as in so many others,
is on a scale beyond conventional comprehension. It will endure, in all
probability, for many decades to come (“One Year On,” 2002).
The post-9/11 historical narrative, in effect, is still very much in the process 
of being written, although The Times is certain it will emerge as a powerful,
pivotal figure in the ground of Western historical memory.  Nevertheless, a 
profound change in the way that the West views itself and its relationship to the 
rest of the world develops throughout the year. The challenge becomes can the 
West continue the struggle and disregard the impulse to move on, fighting the 
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sense of inertia that comes to characterize the War on Terror after the major 
conflict in Afghanistan ends. The Times deeply believes that Afghanistan is but 
the first phase of a new war that is ultimately a battle for the survival of Western 
civilisation against an uncivilized horde of fanatics wishing to engulf the world in
a dark age of fear. 
In that sense, The Times fully expects the terror blitz to continue, and that 
this war will be as vital a struggle as the British people have seen since the 
Second World War. Over and over again through the course of the year, the 
themes emerging in its commentary echo the exhortations delivered by Churchill 
in 1940 after the fall of France, when the United Kingdom was the only nation 
standing between Hitler and European domination.
In content, figures, and themes, The Times echoes the program Churchill 
develops in his speech to Parliament on 18th of June.  Bungay (2001, ¶ 8)
identifies five “propositions” driving that speech:
(1) We face a monstrous evil which is a threat to the whole world.
(2) If we can stand up to it, we will save not only ourselves, but the whole 
of mankind.
(3) Our ultimate goal must be victory, for this is an evil so virulent that it 
must be utterly extinguished.
(4) The road to victory will be long and hard, and involve much pain and 
sorrow . . .
(5) . . . but if we support each other and stick together, we can do it.
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The Times picks up these propositions and translates them for the post-9/11 world,
in a case of Thelen’s (1989) and Nora’s (1996a; 1996b) description of reframing 
history to fit current circumstances.  Item (1), with its focus on a monstrous evil
that threatens the world, anticipates the figural and thematic portrayal of the 
War on Terror as a fight between the civilized and uncivilized worlds, one 
respectful of justice, freedom, and human life, and the other caught in the 
“growing grip of Islamic extremism” with “conspirators” who commit “monstrous 
acts” (“Pakistan’s Choice,” 2001; “With One Voice,” 2001).  Item (2) introduces 
the theme of the West’s duty to engage fiercely and directly with the terrorists 
instead of attempting to appease them, “because at stake are the lives and 
livelihoods of all” (“Another Front,” 2001). The notion of “an evil so virulent” in
item (3) reflects the tenor of casting the War on Terror as a new kind of war 
against a new kind of enemy, since the terrorists are little more than “fanatics 
preaching hate,” who use mass murder as a weapon to “rip apart the fabric of
civilised society” and “target . . . the future of everyman” (“First Things First,” 
2001).  New War/New Kind of Enemy, along with the content category, This Is a
Long World War Without Borders, also emerge as an echo of  Churchill’s 
proposition (4), envisioning a “vastly. . . ambitious campaign, waged the world 
over” in a “new kind of total war” (“Long War,” 2001).  Finally, item (5) with its 
exhortation to “stick together” invokes the sentiment of the content category,
With One Voice, that Le Monde first published and The Times echoed:  “We are 
all Americans”—all of the “old rivalries have been buried” (“Still the Enemy,” 
2001). 
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In much the same way, Churchill’s final refrain could just as easily be 
spoken to a new generation across the West, something, again, picked up by
The Times, particularly in its construction of major themes:
What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that
the battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the 
survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and 
the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and 
might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he 
will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to 
him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward 
into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including
the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink 
into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more 
protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace 
ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and 
its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was 
their finest hour” (1940, ¶ 21).
Here it is possible to see all five of The Times’ themes for 9/11 working in concert 
with themes from times past.  Civilised/Uncivilised emerges beginning with “Upon 
this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization.”  Visible/Shadowy recalls 
the contrast between “broad, sunlit uplands” and a “sinister Dark Age,” lit by
“perverted science.”  Before/After is marked by Churchill’s staging of the “battle 
of Britain,” on which everything will depend.  New War/New Kind of Enemy
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appears as “the whole fury and might of the enemy” that threatens not just the 
British Empire, but British life and institutions, as well.  Finally, Duty/Appeasement 
becomes the coda, as Churchill urges his nation to “brace ourselves to our 
duties,” and “bear ourselves” in this, the moment forever that will be known as 
“their finest hour.” 
In this organization of themes, The Times links the British present indelibly
with its past, in what Nora (1996b) might call “the solidarity of memory with the 
present” (p. 634). By doing so, The Times highlights the remarkable changes 9/11 
has wrought, since “the more deeply the sense of history permeates society, the 
more widespread the perception of change, the more uncertain we have 
become of the future and of the means of predicting its general timeline” (p. 
634).  Precisely because the West is so shaken after 9/11, it reaches into the past
to establish some sense of certainty in the present.
But the object of the The Times’ reach is important.  Reaching for 
Churchill’s speech of the 18th of June, 1940 is not exactly to reach for a moment 
of calm or surety.  At that moment in time, “the battle of Britain is about to 
begin,” a battle that surely would have crushed a nation less resolved to endure 
anything to survive.  The United States is a year and a half away from entering 
the War, the Soviets are still allied with the Nazis, help seems to come from few 
quarters, and time is fleeting.  In that moment, the British “brace” is one of a
nation that is in the midst of becoming sure-footed.  The Prime Minister, in his
address, rallies his people and instills them with the sense that they can survive 
this, that they “can stand up” to the fight, and “the life of the world may move 
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forward into broad, sunlit uplands.”  By choosing this moment, The Times clearly 
understands its power in the British cultural consciousness—1940 represents the 
nation in its darkest, but finest, hour.
Across the Atlantic in New York, the same story seems to be unfolding.
Even while “[w]e still see the bodies pressed against skyscraper windows or 
caught in obscene free-fall,” we encounter “humanitarianism at its most epic
and fundamental” (“Dig Deep,” 2001). The Times, looking on from a distance,
finds the drama unfolding particularly evocative.  Believing that “US will fight 
back in defence of [its] dream” (“Terror for All,” 2001), The Times is certain that
New York’s self-described “moment of supreme national horror” (“Heroes Amid
the Horror,” 2001), will only spur the US to respond decisively, rather than to
retreat.  Once Mayor Rudolph Giuliani emerges as a Churchillian figure,
especially in the view of The New York Times, declaring that New York and the 
rest of America “would emerge better and stronger” and “would never bow to
mere terrorism” (“Mayor of the Moment,” 2001), the picture London develops
taps into a view of the past broadly understood and recognized, and therefore 
carries particular salience.
In the most obvious sense, an historical analogy like this one appeals to 
the audience of readers because Churchill’s speech defines “what it has meant
to be British for the two generations after the one which [first] heard it. . . and 
perhaps, now, to a new generation facing another mortal foe” (Bungay, 2001, ¶
9). By introducing this historical metaphor in its thematic elements, The Times
appeals to a culturally-recognized social construction of history—this is how the 
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British are supposed to behave when their very survival is threatened.  Positing a 
discussion of Blitz-era Britain outlines the British role in the new war by
appropriating an historical drama readers clearly understand with a problem far 
less ordered.  Relying on the historical metaphor of the Blitz provides an instant 
means for British readers to understand what is at stake, what dialogue they
ought to be having with the Americans and the rest of the world, and why they
should behave this way. 
At the same time, by choosing this tack, The Times accepts and rejects 
other metaphors that can easily be applied to the current situation.  By asserting 
that this conflict is Churchillian, The Times invokes the special relationship; just as 
the Americans came to the aid of the British during the Second World War, the 
British must stand shoulder to shoulder with the Americans in this war. By
declaring that it is part of the British duty to rebuff these modern-day terrorists,
The Times rebuffs the great sin of Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 deal with the Nazis,
the “peace in our time” rhetoric, that now pleads for a negotiated settlement 
with bin Laden, potentially sacrificing whole nations on the altar of pan-Islamism.
Invoking “their finest hour,” The Times tells the British people that a similar kind of 
war has just begun, one in which there will be many casualties, often civilian,
and one in which there can be no serious negotiation with opposing parties until 
absolute victory is won.
The close relationship that The Times develops between 1940 and 2001
links the most commemorative aspects of British (and Western) behavior during 
the Second World War to what it expects will come to identify Western behavior 
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12 Pennebaker and Banasik (1997) make this argument, noting that we most remember 
events that change how we live, which is why we remember World War II more than the 
Korean Conflict or Vietnam more than the first Gulf War.
after 9/11. By tapping into a collective memory, important aspects of that 
memory are likely to be reshaped again.  It is as though The Times injects the 
memory back upon us, so that we are part of the experience of both 9/11 and 
the Blitz. We are in both places at once, so to speak, since the memory of 
“being there” in 1940 merges with the experience of “being there” in 2001.  The 
conversation The Times starts with the past by reintroducing the nightmare of the 
Battle of Britain transforms what kind of conversation about 9/11 we can have.
Our historical prejudice limits the dialogue by framing our understanding of 
events so that the conversation, the “being with others,” is most inclusive of those
who share the same collective memory, and in this case, the same fears and 
drives. World War II significantly reshaped the West’s culture and beliefs, and by
incorporating the memory of it into the contemporary discussion of 9/11, its 
history continues to shape culture and beliefs.12
The thematic structure that The Times develops over the course of the 
year, then, is one devoted to organizing 9/11 and its aftermath into a frame that
the public can relate to and readily understand. The Times cites Eliot’s
Wasteland when describing the Western reaction to what it sees unfolding:
“Human kind / Cannot bear very much reality.” The magnitude of the event itself 
encourages disbelief in the West; things like this just do not happen in a city like
New York. Before the West can confront the challenges of 9/11, it first has to
overcome the shock of seeing New York explode in flames.  For this reason, it 
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becomes extremely important to absorb “the spectacle of the towers of the 
civilised world plummeting to the earth” (“Dig Deep,” 2001).  It has to work out, if
The Times is correct, a response that is intrinsically “human.” We have to find a 
way to work the event into our narratives of time and history, of making it fit with 
the language we possess for framing an experience whose cost seems so great.
Finding an analogy that is readily translatable is paramount to shaping a 
reasonable response. When The Times reaches for the analogy of the Battle of 
Britain, it is an easy story to translate because it is already a story the British know 
intimately.
Within the overall structure, each individual theme develops with a 
counterpart, historical analogy that the audience recognizes, and allows it entry
into the meaning-making conversation about 9/11.  Civilised/Uncivilised and 
Duty/Appeasement, in particular, make sense because they resonate most
clearly with their analogical counterparts from the Second World War. These two 
themes anchor the other three, because in Before/After, New War/New Kind of 
Enemy, and Visible/Shadowy, part of what the West has to understand is 
something that is not obvious—either something new or something hard to see.
Before/After takes on extra meaning because after 9/11 the Uncivilised is
commonplace. New War/New Kind of Enemy stands out when placed against
an Uncivilised enemy with whom Appeasement is unacceptable.
Visible/Shadowy becomes clearer once the West’s Duty to defend democratic,
Civilised society from those who cast a spectre over the West crystallizes.
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The Times appropriates the past in what Frijda (1997) would call an 
attempt to define the West’s new historical position so that current activities are 
given meaning.  Giving orientation to a present event in this way also begins to 
construct an event’s narrative space, as though offering up a kind of ground
against which to build the figures of a story.  The language of the narrative 
transforms into symbolic action echoing a plot’s development, an historical 
model against which to hold ourselves.
In its appropriation of such a culturally-salient historical past, The Times
revives the acts of that past’s special drama.  Sarbin (1993) suggests that we 
dramatize new action insofar as behavior can then be thought of as acting out 
specific roles in a dramatic construction infused with historical predecessors 
through analogy.  Once the analogy is made, the preferred response, in this
case, to crisis, is implicit.  Because the symbolic action preferred is so widely
admired, not just in the UK, but throughout the West, the symbol opens the 
action to include the participation of the audience in its development.
Bungay (2001) notes that the end of Churchill’s 1940 speech is an
“inverted epitaphios” in the sense that Churchill anticipates the future 
commemoration of the battle of Britain. What The Times does after 9/11 is much 
the same. Just as Churchill, in his commission of Olivier, lionizes “we happy few,” 
suggesting that by standing firm against the Nazis the British people will be 
worthy of their ancestry to “Harry the King, Bedford and Exeter,” The Times, in
commemorating the honor of a generation twice removed from our own, asserts 
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that the historical present is irrefutably linked to the lonely days of 1940, and by
association, those of 1415.
Language As Symbolic Action
On September 12th, The Times reminds its readers that “[v]ery few events,
however dramatic, change the political landscape. This will” (“Terror for All,” 
2001).  The morning of September 11th is already an iconic moment in The Times’ 
view, aligned with nation-changing events of the past.  Across the Atlantic, The
New York Times declares that the day was “one of those moments in which 
history splits, and we define the world as ‘before’ and ‘after,’” and that now, in 
this new world, we live on “other side of history's rift” (“The War in America,” 
2001).  The effect is dramatic, and the changes 9/11 drives in the social and 
political landscapes of the West resonate with the force of an urban earthquake.
To make sense of the event, both papers begin a memory-shaping 
conversation that invests the audience in the dramatic staging of 9/11.  If one 
takes into consideration the pentadic elements Burke (1969) describes as 
necessary to create a dramatic rendering of any event in language—scene,
act, agent, agency, and purpose—one finds that both papers strive to shape 
the events into a configuration the audience can readily understand, a 
structured narrative of time.  In New York, the conversation takes the shape of 
myth (Lule, 2002; Pollio, et al., In Press), specifically a tragic epic.  In London,
however, the conversation which emerges is a political and historical drama.  In 
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both cases, the discussion assumes a narrative bent, giving to 9/11 the rhetorical 
frame of a story still in the process of unfolding.
Bitzer (1992) notes that “rhetoric is a mode of altering reality . . . by the 
creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought
and action . . . [so] that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that
it becomes mediator of change” (p. 4). Ricoeur (1984) and Neisser (1996) also 
argue that writers of highly skilled language, such as what appears on an 
editorial page, have a basic knowledge of narrative conventions, or what 
knowledge an audience requires to enter into the public dialogue concerning 
an event.  Added to this is Bakhtin’s (1986) assurance that “genres of complex
cultural communication” are drafted with the “actively responsive 
understanding with delayed action” of an audience (p. 69).  Combined, a basic 
knowledge of narrative conventions added to an event’s exigence and an 
audience willing to participate create an ideal atmosphere in which to construct 
a landscape for argument, a mode in which shared language is oriented toward
a specific purpose.
In the case of 9/11, the audience is certainly actively responsive, since 
people throughout the West are suddenly forced into vigilance against the 
unknown after that New York morning.  In the same way, the exigence of the 
situation is obvious.  How the West should respond to the terrorist attacks 
becomes a focal point around which much of Western political conversation 
revolves for the following year after the attacks. To a great extent, the content 
categories (see Figure 2, p. 60) of this project describe how The Times
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(and to a great extent, the kinds of exigencies which concerned their fellow 
Westerners, wherever they live).  September 11
approached that central concern, showing the pattern of exigencies that
concerned the people and government of the United Kingdom after September 
11th
th is The Day That Changed the
Modern World.  It is that moment at which the West stood as one and said, With
One Voice: We Are All Americans.  In the days immediately following, once the 
smoke, dust, and debris begin to clear and the West gains a sense of who is 
responsible for the attacks, it appears that whatever the answer, This Is a Long 
World War Without Borders, fought against Osama bin Laden’s Spectre, using
Intelligent Intelligence as the preferred weapon of choice.  Finally, as the year
rolls on, the question of what role each nation has comes into play—for The
Times, what Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the US really means, and what
are the Implications for the UK.
Finally, these patterns of exigencies provide the sparks for a narrative
conversation that brings the audience to the rhetorical theatre of the editorial 
page.  In setting the stage, The Times must put in order the dramatistic elements 
necessary to draw up a proper staging. To a great extent, the pentadic purpose 
is captured by the historical referencing and the themes that orient and justify
the case for war. The purpose emerges also in the figural elements, particularly
in the figural categories Civilised World, with 96 total figures, and Change and 
Time, with 55 (see Table 6, p. 78), which address concerns similar to the themes of 
Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After. The Times describes the great change 
9/11 has wrought when it declares, “The world divides after this tremendous 
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event into two camps, with no possibility of neutrality, no middle way, between 
them” (“With One Voice,” 2001).  In this line, The Times links its notion of what 
constitutes “civilised” to a companion notion of “time,” as though 9/11
symbolizes a stark demarcation point.  To be on the side of the terrorists after 
9/11 is to be part of the “uncivilised camp.”  Terrorism is no longer a method 
about which the West can justify its “neutrality” and “no middle way” can be 
forged “where bigotry, fanaticism and religious hatreds. . . sit too easily alongside 
the gentler arts of reason,” deep in the heart of the Islamist world (“Still the 
Enemy,” 2001). The Times describes the stakes and dangers most clearly when it 
warns,
[b]ut the reality is that America is at war, and the enemy has to be killed 
or be captured. Host states have to be forced to end support for terrorism.
Appeasement will only bring more death. With a few voices already being 
raised in Britain against America, the West must remain united. A war will 
inevitably provoke retaliation, maybe from suicide bombers attacking
Britain. We must all fear their search for weapons of mass destruction.
(“This Is a World War,” 2001)
The dangers, it is clear, are all around, but the purpose of the War on Terror is 
unambiguous:  “the enemy has to be killed or be captured” in “the 
abomination’s wake” (“Dig Deep,” 2001).
The Times draws the contrast even more starkly as it discusses the purpose 
for the war in terms of its great irony.  In Taleban-run Afghanistation, “[a]t the 
chaotic heart of a primitive, terror-ridden, travesty of a state, bin Laden runs a 
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small but well-oiled armed machine” (“Against Evil,” 2001). As a result, the 
Taleban is willing to “protect bin Laden . . . not only because he is their banker,
but because they share his enmity” to the civilised world.  Because the Taleban 
and bin Laden would rather let innocent Muslims, especially Afghans, die 
needlessly, “[t]heir stance demonstrates the utter necessity of this unwelcome 
war” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001). In a case like this, the most absurd irony becomes 
shockingly suitable: “there is one truism when faced by such an enemy: the 
hawks are the true peacemakers” (“This Is a World War,” 2001).  One only needs 
to recall what New Yorkers experienced, when so many fire-shrouded victims 
plunged to their deaths that New York schoolchildren exclaimed to their
teachers, “the birds are on fire” (“’The Birds Are on Fire,” 2001), to understand 
that 9/11 has upended “the glorious mundanity” (“Dig Deep,” 2001) of a life that 
we understood, “turn[ing] it upside down,” (“Terrorism at Home,” 2001). 
Furthermore, the terrorists have usurped what the West holds most 
precious. The Times announces that “[i]n Hamburg, Paris and London, in Florida 
and Boston, plotters of mass murder were able to exploit the frameworks of 
freedom against freedom,” so that in the wake of 9/11, it is clear that “the West's
most cherished values and legal traditions gave evil abundant opportunity”
(“Terrorism at Home,” 2001).  These “mega-terrorists” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001)
represent “an enemy shorn of scruples,” who are “sworn to shred the fabric of 
freedom, to render civilised existence impossible” (“Back on the Ground,” 2001).
This more figural argument, coupled with the thematic structure,
underpins the purpose of The Times’ drama.  The War on Terror is a war of 
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“[f]anaticism versus freedom” (“Who Defends Britain?,” 2001), in which freedom
will “[take] up cudgels against fear” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001).  Those severe 
contrasts, which resemble only too frighteningly the stark realities of the Second 
World War, supply This Long World War Without Borders with a noble purpose,
one worth fighting for now just as much, if not more, as it was 60 years before. 
If the West needed more incentive to begin the struggle, The Times needs 
only to remind it of the scene of the first attack in this new kind of war.  In this
Burkeian element, the figural categories of Terrain, Natural Disaster, and Vision 
and Shadow (the latter of which also sets up the scene-act ratio), with 18, 10,
and 43 figures, respectively, best describe the setting of the various theatres of 
the War on Terror.  For the opening act, the attacks of 9/11 themselves provide 
the startling images necessary to provide the descriptive backdrops. The New
York Times mournfully remarks that by mid-morning on September 11th, “Lower
Manhattan had become an ashen shell of itself, all but a Pompeii under the 
impact” (“The War Against America,” 2001).  The Times of London, meanwhile,
takes a similar view of the scene, describing New Yorkers as having “suffered an 
urban avalanche” (“Terror for All,” 2001).  Just hours after the towers collapsed,
“on the still unstable streets of Lower Manhattan,” New York City workers, “the 
masked and dust-caked, bone tired, devoted crews,” were already busy “sifting 
the rubble mountain,” quickly coming to the realization while working at the
enormous pile that “each survivor is a reminder of how very many have been 
crushed or burnt to death” (“With One Voice,” 2001). The world economy is 
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reeling, with governments hastily working to “cushion” their financial systems from 
“the aftershocks” of the man-made rumble on 9/11 (“Back in Business,” 2001). 
After the initial attacks and into the second and third acts marking the 
beginning and ending of the war in Afghanistan, still, “[m]uch of everyday
human activity has ground to a halt, obscured by a noxious covering of dust and 
ashes” (“Tunnel Vision,” 2001).  By November, the earthquake at Ground Zero is 
replaced with another scene of potential natural disaster in the making, as the 
world wonders if “the spokes of the American umbrella are strong enough to 
withstand the storm” (“The Blair Shuttle,” 2001).
During these crucial second and third acts, the “political terrain” of the 
War on Terror is “treacherous” (“Terror for All,” 2001), with nations such as Pakistan 
standing in a “grim political position,” (“Pakistan’s Choice,” 2001), like “perilously
unstable launching pad[s]” (“Long War,” 2001).  “Pockets” of “Pashtun 
heartlands” scatter throughout “the treacherous Afghan wastes” (“Back on the 
Ground,” 2001), so that the “countryside is alive with Afghan fighters” (“First
Things First,” 2001). As if these conditions did not make the fighting difficult 
enough, bin Laden’s “legions are invisible,” and “melt into the shadows of
anarchic or outlaw lands” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001).  Back home, a “malaise” is
“hanging over Western societies,” which hover under the “spectre of nuclear 
terrorism” (“Nuclear Network,” 2001).  By the end of the year, the world
landscape is in much the same place. New acts have yet to open, and 
throughout the world, the scene is much the same.
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Since the purpose of the drama is largely developed in the themes,
content categories and historical references that The Times develops, the figural 
domains may not seem particularly extraordinary.  The scenes that The Times sets,
correspondingly, are so visually metaphorical that the density in which they
emerge in figural categories is hardly surprising. With the purpose and scene set,
however, the dramatic rendering that The Times undertakes becomes a bit
trickier to isolate.  In developing a cast of characters, The Times relies on the real 
agents of action.  But beyond the predictable political and religious leaders on 
either side of the fighting, countries, cities, buildings, and even specific industries 
become personified in their own right and become their own character studies.
At the same time, these “characters” that emerge, noted in the 74 figures that
appear in the eponomously named figural category, are intricately interwoven
with plot elements of act and agency, providing a narrative core for the rising 
action.
Baydala (2003) argues that in the weaving together of self-referencing
“discursive fragments” like these, a story emerges coherent and whole. The
Times, then, in connecting the various parts of its commentary, along with
scripting elements that point towards their narrative being a dramatic one, is 
crafting the events of 9/11 into a functional story, and not just a simple recording
of events. The key, however, lies in the drafting of characters, the descriptions of 
the actions they take, and agencies they adopt to undertake those actions.
The Times crafts its characters by focusing on their immediate responses,
and the possibilities for action developing in these responses to 9/11. After 9/11,
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the “flexing” of America’s vast “muscle” begins (“Replies of Steel,” 2001) and 
“the West plans its retaliation” (“United Home Front,” 2001).  If “the Kremlin’s 
suspicions of NATO designs” can be surmounted (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001) and 
“Pakistan’s indulgence of the Taleban” ends (“Pakistan’s Choice,” 2001),
“America’s diplomatic footwork” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001) will be rewarded, as 
will Great Britain’s, since it is firmly “standing shoulder to shoulder” with the 
Americans (“Terror for All,” 2001).  Washington is “gleaning intelligence” (“Prime 
Suspect,” 2001) while “Britain girds against the present danger” (“Back on the 
Ground,” 2001) and “Western governments appreciate the dangers they face” 
(“It’s the Economy, Still,” 2001).
These immediate responses shift once the thrust towards war begins to
take shape.  While the initial responses describe a broad range of characters in
play, after the shift, the descriptions turn to demonstrate which of these 
characters are most ready to act.  In a great sense, these figures are inward-
looking, as though questioning the will of the main players to act, and which 
ones are readying themselves. When it becomes clear that France has yet “to 
fall into line” as the likely “third musketeer,” Britain finds itself “standing in a line of 
only two abreast” (“Back on the Ground,” 2001), but nevertheless shows a “deft 
hand and a resolute eye” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001), even though it is “a 
country alive with troubled and legitimate questions” (“Back on the Ground,” 
2001).  As the eve of war arrives, the “world [is] standing edgily on the brink” (“It 
Won’t Be Quick,” 2001), “America is crouched,” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,”
2001), and “Britain must rise to the challenge” (“Tough on Camera,” 2001). 
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Finally, the view shifts from the West to its (Burkeian) counter-agents in the 
Muslim world.  Rather importantly, an interesting collection of terministic screens 
develops in this set of description insofar as The Times clearly sees the Taleban, in
particular, as a kind of extended farcical joke, since none of its reactions to the 
demands of the West seem to have any basis whatsoever in reality.  As the 
Muslim world “recoils instinctively” from an attack on a “fellow” (“Layer Upon 
Layer,” 2001), the “Taleban hurl defiance one day” and “plead ignorance of
Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts the next” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,” 2001),
only finally to “publicly [slam] the door” on the West, who now must work to 
“prise it open again” (“Against Evil,” 2001).  Finally, the Islamist enemy becomes 
something not quite human, a chimera of sorts. The Times’ observation leads it to
believe that al-Qaeda is a monster that cannot be truly defeated until all of its 
myriad incarnations are defeated.  Behind this screen, al-Qaeda morphs into a 
“terrorist Hydra” (“Long War,” 2001) of “Jackal cunning” (“Intelligent 
Intelligence,” 2001), with “tentacles everywhere,” although the West does not 
yet know “how many heads the Hydra truly has” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001).
As The Times describes its characters, it continues to develop the 
terministic screens through which it understands the War on Terror to be a 
conflict of Civilised and Uncivilised. A civilised democracy responds to an attack 
like 9/11 with a kind of righteous might (as in the description of the United States)
and with a legitimate questioning of what the war’s aims ought to be and how 
best to achieve them (as in the description of the United Kingdom).  But the 
converse, as seen in the descriptions of the Taleban and al-Qaeda, portray an 
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illegitimate, farcical response to a truly monstrous act.  Given this picture, the 
contrast between the civilised West and the uncivilised terrorists could not be 
clearer.
With the characters dramatized, plot action is put into form.  In terms of
the pentadic elements of act and agency, The Times deals with its largest 
numbers of figural forms, with five categories—Nautical, Medicine, Games,
Rooting Out and Closing In, and Science and Engineering—combining as both 
act and agency. As a result of some of these connections, act and agency are 
also perhaps the most difficult to set apart cleanly.  Perhaps the best way to note 
the difference is that when The Times is describing an act, the action implied is 
clear; when it mentions agency, The Times describes the means or nature of the 
action.
For perhaps the most illustrative example of the way act and agency
combine, the Nautical figural category, with 21 figures, clearly demonstrates 
both, as well as linking up with the purpose-laden theme, Duty/Appeasement.
To a certain extent, act and agency combine so easily in this category because 
the theme of Duty/Appeasement that The Times develops comes through quite 
forcefully.  As might be expected for an island nation that has for so long looked 
to its Royal Navy for the protection and expansion of its interests, duty, as a 
figural as well as a thematic notion, is both something to be done (as in “doing
one’s duty”), but also is an ideal to guide action (as in “abiding by one’s duty”).   
After the “turbulence” of the 9/11 attacks (“Terror for All,” 2001), reservists 
are “called to the colours” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001), while “[a]nger and anguish 
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are more likely to mount than subside” (“With One Voice,” 2001).  Because 
“terror rots the timbers on which civilised coexistence rests” (“Replies of Steel,”
2001), when responding to the attacks, it is “a time for steady nerves and precise 
actions” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001). As the momentum for the war in
Afghanistan builds, the “US will not fire more than a warning shot or two” 
(“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,” 2001), something diplomats must make clear while 
“shoring up the American-led alliance” (“Just the Beginning,” 2001) to “stiffen the 
response” of allies (“Tough on Camera,” 2001) as they prepare for “the long 
haul” (“Against Evil,” 2001; “The Defeatist Chorus,” 2001).  Recognizing that
“security breaches threaten every citizen’s safety,” a “wave of emergency
legislation” (“Airport Insecurity,” 2001) is passed, while at the same time 
America’s and the West’s “attempt to weather” the ongoing danger is put into
doubt (“From New York Skies,” 2001). Praise is given to Tony Blair, who takes “no 
more than minutes to see his duty” and proves early on that “his course was
fixed” (“A Man Alone,” 2001). At the end of the year, the 9/11 event still certainly
could “carry clout,” but al-Qaeda is likely “in a state of disrepair” (“Security
Matters,” 2002).
Also combining act and agency, though for slightly different reasons, is
Science and Engineering, with 43 figures, which links the acts of channeling 
momentum or energy and building or tearing down structures with the effects 
those acts have.  If the Nautical category helps to define the screens through 
which to add more layers of understanding to the Duty/Appeasement theme,
Science and Engineering points toward the myriad means by which the West 
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needs to fight a New War against a New Kind of Enemy that in few ways
operates by the traditional rules of warfare.  By attacking in the way it did on 
9/11, for example, al-Qaeda, who “engineered an act of mass murder” (“First
Things First,” 2001), struck like a “true bolt from the blue, aimed to humble the 
heart of the nation” (“Terror for All,” 2001).  The attacks are so remarkable that in 
“the scale of the confusion” (“Intelligent Intelligence,” 2002) words and images 
are “scorched onto the collective consciousness” (“Dig Deep,” 2001).  Because 
of the “gravity of the situation” (“The OId War,” 2001), the West must “galvanise
public opinion” (“Tough on Camera,” 2001) and begin to neutralize the
“corrosive political corruption” of Middle Eastern regimes (“With One Voice,” 
2001), while not “pouring fuel on the flames of Islamic fundamentalism” (“It Won’t 
Be Quick,” 2001). As the West builds “diplomatic momentum,” Tony Blair, in
particular, has value as a “conduit,” even as a “lightning conductor” (“The Blair 
Shuttle,” 2001), while the West’s “coalition-building” drive (“The Defeatist 
Chorus,” 2001) erects multiple “layers of global support,” like bricks, “layer upon 
layer” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001).  Once the war in Afghanistan begins, troops 
and intelligence services must begin “dismantling” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,”
2001) bin Laden’s “apparatus of terror” (“Intelligence Needed,” 2001). 
Like Science and Engineering, 48 Medicine figures continue to define the 
terms of New War/New Kind of Enemy, appearing as surgical means for the West
to conduct its activities. At the same time, figures of Medicine appear as the 
side-effects the 9/11 attacks have brought upon the West, and therefore further
describe how a Civilised society must react to an Uncivilised terror.  For example,
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as part of the War on Terror, the West needs to approach the long struggle 
ahead with a surgeon’s eye, and apply “constant pressure to alleviate the root
causes of terrorism” (“This Is a World War,” 2001), while avoiding “self-inflicted 
mistakes” (“Back in Business,” 2001) and “political headaches” (“United Home 
Front,” 2001).  In the “desire to restore life” (“Dig Deep,” 2001) to a “stricken” New 
York and “revive” some of its “bruised zest and gusto” (“Rock Solidarity,” 2001),
America must also take care of the “economic victims of terrorism” (“Back in
Business,” 2001) and not ignore the “psychological blow struck by the terrorists” 
(“It’s the Economy, Still,” 2001).  Finally, in the heat of the battle to “eliminate the 
scourge of terrorism”, the US and its allies must conduct “surgical strikes” (“Long
War,” 2001), and mind “the festering troubles of the Middle East” (“Layer Upon
Layer,” 2001).  But the allies, knowing that “as the tourniquet tightens it begins to 
pinch,” must be willing to “fray more nerves” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,” 2001) 
and “starve transnational networks of power” (“A Man Alone,” 2001).  Only by
taking initiative can the West “penetrate Islamic cells” (“Intelligent Intelligence,”
2001) and “eradicat[e] the menace” of suspect regimes, even in Iraq (“A Man 
Alone,” 2001).
Rooting Out and Closing In, meanwhile, with 18 figures, focuses on the 
notion of tracking down and surrounding al-Qaeda, particularly in Afghanistan.
These figures particularly fit into the New War/New Kind of Enemy theme,
especially in light of the view Bush takes, promising to “smoke out” the terrorists.
In the rush to “cut off any room for manoeuvre” that terrorists have (“Pakistan’s
Choice,” 2001), the allies will “hunt” them and “track down” any accomplices 
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(“Speed Not Haste,” 2001), while building a “diplomatic fence around 
Afghanistan” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001). As the UK “join[s] the hunt” (“Who 
Defends Britain?,” 2001), the “encirclement of Afghanistan” is about to begin
(“War of Nerves,” 2001), while bin Laden “hole[s] up” in his “hideout” (“Just the 
Beginning,” 2001). After the conflict ends, the ultimate dual missions of “root[ing]
out the terrorists in our midst” (“Tough on Camera,” 2001) and “root[ing] out
regimes” that support terror continue (“A World Transformed,” 2002). As 
terministic screens, this category in a sense continues to describe the enemy as 
something not quite civilised, or even human, since it lives underground and 
becomes the object of a hunt. At the same time, the screens that develop the 
notion of “fencing in” or “encircling” mark the enemy as something that must be 
caged for there to be any chance to tame it.
Finally, in the 44-figure Games category, The Times plays upon the 
metaphor of British sport, particularly gambling metaphors of card playing and 
horse racing, though other metaphorical terms also appear. To a great extent,
the games brought into play to create this category’s screens are legendary
gambler’s sport, reinforcing the sense that many of the decisions made by
commanding officers when fighting an enemy like al-Qaeda will be hard 
gambles. Other metaphors developed here are games that require complex 
strategy and long periods of time.  Given these guidelines, The Times notes that
“[h]owever fluid the chessboard now” (“Palimpsest,” 2001), it will take a 
“marathon effort” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001) to win the war. Tony Blair has
shown a sound ability to “raise his game” in a crisis (“With One Voice,” 2001),
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while leaders of other, long-suspect regimes are busy “speculating” on the 
outcome of the war (“Tunnel Vision,” 2001).  Even though the West must “play by
the book” and respect civil liberties at home (“Terrorism at Home,” 2001), there is
“no neutral ground” in this fight (“A World Transformed,” 2002), so the West must
“not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001).  Very
little will “stay America’s hand” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001), though some allies show 
a “reluctance to stake everything” on the war’s outcome, sensing that the 
course will be “frustratingly hard to call” (“The Defeatist Chorus,” 2001).  Even 
though “overseas tip-offs” are invaluable (“Intelligence Needed,” 2001), ignoring 
problems at home while obsessively following the trails of foreign intelligence will
no doubt snatch “defeat from the jaws of any military victory the free world
won” (“It’s the Economy, Still,” 2001).
What these figurative acts and agencies do is describe the broad array of 
tactics and aptitudes fighting the War on Terror requires.  The ideal footsoldiers 
must possess the dexterity and ability to develop and execute strategy of the 
best athlete coupled with the skill of a surgeon and the understanding of human 
behavior that a psychologist practices. They must be able to hunt the enemy
down and build structures to hold the enemy once caught, and still be able to 
help rebuild and bolster the security apparatus of the West. At the same time,
these ideal soldiers must maintain a deep, abiding sense of duty, not unlike a
naval officer, and possess a singular capacity to fulfill it.
In this way, the figuring of act and agency also sets into motion the driving
elements in the drama.  The War on Terror is a risky gamble, in which chance will
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play a tremendous part in the successes and failures of the Allies.  It is also a 
conflict that demands high levels of skill and surgical precision, particularly in
military engagements that unfortunately occur in highly-populated areas.  The 
war will place a great burden on the need for speed and quick, but calculated,
reactions, combined with a clear understanding of how coalitions are put
together as well as how they are broken.  In the search for bin Laden and al-
Qaeda, the West can only be successful if it ruthlessly hunts the terrorists, rooting 
them out wherever they hide.
At its core, this conflict is a competition of psychological warfare.   In one 
sense, the war is a matter of duty—the duty the West has to the rest of the world,
to its own institutions, and to its vision of the future.  But even if its intentions are 
completely honorable, the great struggle of the War on Terror will be the West’s 
ability to translate its own sense of duty for the rest of the world, and particularly
the people of the Middle East.  Just as Lakoff describes the events of 9/11 
reaching in and changing the brains of westerners, The Times believes that the 
West, as part of its post-9/11 aim, must approach the rest of the world in much 
the same way.
On the one-year anniversary, The Times takes note that the “serious
legacy of September 11 rests instead in three theatres. These are America's 
relationship with the rest of the world; Islam's attitude towards the remainder of 
humanity; and the central structure of the international system itself” “(One Year 
On,” 2002).  As The Times carefully analyzes the changes already evident in these 
three “theatres,” the conclusions it comes to demonstrate its belief that the 
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13 The Times cites the American historian, Richard Hofstadter, for this observation. 
As for Islam’s attitude, The Times concludes that “Islam would 
be well served by a revolution in thinking,” citing the West’s Renaissance and 
Enlightenment as models for how such a revolution should evolve.  In other 
words, Islam must be willing to meet the West on equal terms, particularly in terms 
of the dangers of mixing radical religion with repressive politics.  Finally, and 
perhaps most threateningly, The Times reckons that though 9/11 has not
particularly changed our understanding of a nation-state, “the character of 
what is a threat to the nation-state has undeniably evolved.”  In that sense, the 
age of terror requires a greater level of international cooperation than ever 
before if nation-states are to feel truly safe again.
traditional ways in which people think about the world have to change.  In the 
first place, Americans must realize that it is their “country's destiny ‘not to have an 
ideology but to be one,”’ and that they must be willing to lead the world even in 
times of relative peace and prosperity as opposed to shrinking behind a curtain 
of isolationism.13
Of course, The Times does not choose the metaphor of three “theatres” 
carelessly.  All throughout the year, The Times carefully includes figures of
Literature, Language, and Drama, taking one step beyond the Burkeian notions
of dramatizing language and often figuring the acts and actors of these three
theatres in striking ways. The Times no doubt first sees George W. Bush as a kind
of Prince Hal, the son of a former President with a history of carousing and being 
not particularly interested in the work of domestic or foreign policy.  In “this
world-spanning task of persuasion,” Bush appears to require the sound support of 
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his own Exeters, advisors more qualified than he to guide his country at such a
difficult hour, who can be found among his cabinet and foreign leaders like the 
Prime Minister, many of whom had served their governments in other difficult 
moments.  At the same time, “the President uses words like pieces of wood. Time 
and again he has striven to match the occasion, to comfort, inspire, to 
intimidate” and has “fallen flat.”  As a result, “his language poses a genuine 
problem of leadership” (“With One Voice,” 2001).
George W. Bush’s strength in language to this point has largely been in the 
speech of the commoner.  He speaks the language, in a sense, of baseball and 
the Wild West, and to a great extent, is more likely to trade in Falstaff’s brand of
“quips” and “quiddities” (1957a, 1.2.45) and Texas tall tales than in the stuff of
sweeping, political rhetoric.  He appears to lack “Hobbes's ‘common power to 
keep men in awe’,” and in that sense may very well be unable to bear “the 
burden of being the leader of the free world.”  Nevertheless, he is likely to be the 
leading “actor in the drama whose first act is unfolding” (“With One Voice,”
2001). 
By the end of the first week, however, The Times has notably changed its 
assessment.  The already highly-effective metaphor of the Hydra comes to carry
a second layer of meaning when one recalls that Shakespeare’s Archbishop of 
Canterbury says early in the first act of his new King, “never Hydra-headed
willfulness/ So soon did lose his seat, and all at once,/ As in this king” (1957b,
1.1.35-37). Almost overnight, The Times gains a new-found confidence in the
untested President after watching him muster brilliant moments at the National 
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Cathedral, Ground Zero in New York, and later at Camp David. The now-
transformed Bush “has found his voice and hit his stride” (“The Old War,” 2001),
the way Prince Hal at his father’s deathbed, and in battle against Hotspur,
makes the leap to becoming Henry the King.
Offering his own “Non Nobis” and “Te Deum” in respect for “all holy rites” 
(1957b, 4.8.117-118), the coda of Bush’s remarks at the National Cathedral,
reminiscent of Romans 8:38-39—“[a]s we have been assured, neither death nor 
life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to
come, nor height nor depth, can separate us from God's love” (2001, ¶ 20)—
echoes Shakespeare’s careful situating of King Henry as a sure, but humble,
Christian king. As Americans come to know the names of those who died trying 
to save the lives of others in the air or on the ground, Bush assures the country,
“[w]e will read all these names. We will linger over them, and learn their stories,
and many Americans will weep” (¶ 5).  Bush no doubt catches The Times’ 
attention in part because he sounds so much like King Henry, as he assures his 
men, “Then shall our names,/ familiar in his mouth as household words/ . . .  Be in 
their flowing cups freshly rememb’red” (1957b, 4.3.51-55), especially when 
juxtaposed with the image of the President standing on the ruins of the World
Trade Centre, rallying the country, promising that the slaughter of innocents will 
be avenged. And as Bush speaks of the importance of unity, honor, a 
“responsibility to history . . . to rid the world of evil” (¶ 7), and that “the
commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time” (¶ 18), his words ring 
nearly the same notes that Churchill had in 1940.  By the following Monday
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morning, at the beginning of the second week of the post-9/11 era, The Times is
convinced Bush has shown that “he has the character to rise to the challenge of
now serving as a war leader” (“The Old War,” 2001).
Figurally speaking, The Times’ dramatic awareness continues even after 
the basic dramaturgy of world leaders is set. A steep drop in stock prices 
“upstage[s]” the reopening of the New York Stock Exchange (“Back in Business,” 
2001), while memories of that Tuesday morning are continually “replayed in
flashback” (“Dig Deep,” 2001).  Pakistan is “uncomfortably in the frame” (“Long 
War,” 2001) as the Taleban is “playing out a deadly farce” (“Prime Suspect,” 
2001).  The focus on the importance of what lines are spoken on stage continues 
since in the Middle East “careless language costs lives.”  What the West really
needs is “a palimpsest, a political, military and intelligence-sharing script that is 
constantly rewritten” (“Palimpsest,” 2001).  Crucial operations happen “off-
screen” as the West begins to “hone the rhetoric of readiness” (“Another Front,” 
2001).  Once Afghanistan is under control, the British forces, better prepared to
be peacekeepers than the Americans, “have a new role to play” (“The Defeatist 
Chorus,” 2001) and take “centre stage” (“First Things First,”2001), while Tony Blair 
finds himself in the position of Bedford or Gloucester, “best placed to whisper 
words in the right ears” (“The Old War,” 2001). 
Shakespeare’s Henry declares himself “no tyrant, but a Christian king” 
(1957b, 1.2.241), and once an English right to war is settled, soon “all the youth of
England are on fire/. . . Now thrive the armorers, and honor’s thought/ Reigns 
solely in the breast of every man/ . . . Following the mirror of all Christian kings” 
163 
(1957b, 2.1.1-6).  The same sentiment rings true in 2001, particularly after the 
weekend The Times believes marks Bush as a man capable of leading the world 
through a troubled time.  From that point forward, The Times pens its international 
drama as the story of a civilised, Christian West against an enemy “ruthlessly
contemptuous of life” (“A World Transformed,” 2001).  By choosing literary and
historical allusions that resonate deeply within British culture, The Times aligns the 
actions of the post-9/11 world with remembrances of war, framing the 
audience’s understanding of events by tapping into its collective memory. By
connecting 9/11 to the Blitz and its aftermath to Shakespeare’s rendering of the 
Battle of Agincourt, The Times weaves the three events and their leaders 
together, scripting a way for the British people to understand what this new
tragedy means as well as how important it will be in shaping the future of their 
civilisation and institutions and their “special relationship” with the people of the 
United States.  “In its anguish,” a “hobbled” America which “seemed to stand so 
very nearly alone,” will find in its best and closest ally “respect, honour and offers 
of help,” an “instinctive. . . coming together in solidarity with the dead” (“Still the 
Enemy,” 2001).  Having found itself nearly alone in the dark days of the past, The
Times reminds its readers that only by standing shoulder to shoulder will the British 
and Americans be able to “defend civil order against enemies within the gates” 
(“A World Transformed,” 2002).
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Never Before Has the World Felt Itself to Be Such a Global Village 
Chapter 5: Conclusions 
General Conclusions
Perhaps the most instructive way to begin a discussion about the general 
conclusions I draw from this project is to take a step back to my research
questions and reconsider them in light of the results derived. The first question—
(1) How does language act as both symbolic action and collective therapy in 
these leading articles and how are those two functions interrelated?—seems to 
require a slight reframing in light of results. When I first considered this question, I 
already had many of the results from The New York Times project to consider.  
The 20 reflective editorials from The New York Times are undoubtedly concerned 
with helping the city to heal after the horrors of the 9/11 attacks.  With their focus
on anniversaries, holidays, and moments of symbolic, funeral ritual, the reflective
editorials sought to provide frames of meaning for the collective grief and 
trauma of the people of New York.
My initial expectation for The Times of London, therefore, was that the 
paper would try to do some of the same things. To an extent, The Times does just
that, in the sense that some anniversaries and holidays are covered, and the 
British people, who themselves were mourning the deaths of many of their 
countrymen at the World Trade Centre, suffered their own grief.  But, the primary
grief for Londoners, I would argue, was that watching 9/11 unfold across the 
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Atlantic in a city that in many ways is London’s partner and sister, reminded them 
only too sharply of catastrophic events of London’s relatively recent past,
particularly the terror of the Blitz.  In that sense, using its leading articles as a 
realm for collective therapy was not really the aim of The Times. 
Using language as symbolic action, however, was quite clearly an aim.
The language of The Times, in a great sense, came to frame the narrative means
for understanding the events of 9/11 and its aftermath.  In leading articles The 
Times produced in the year following 9/11, action-made-symbolic provided a 
dramatic foundation for explaining the various roles of the main actors and acts
of 9/11.  If by “collective therapy” one assumes a way to help a group of people 
come to make sense of a traumatic event, then certainly, language as symbolic
action, it would seem, provides a means for The Times to accomplish just that.  If,
however, “collective therapy” takes on a more traditionally psychological 
connotation, as it does in The New York Times, then what the leading articles of 
The Times of London do is not really collective therapy, and The Times does not
particularly make the connection that The New York Times does so well.
This conclusion, nevertheless, leads directly to the second research 
question:  (2) How do metaphor, memory, and narrative intersect to create 
meaning?  Taking the dramatic form that develops through language as 
symbolic action that The Times brings into play as a starting point, at least one of 
the ways in which figural terms, historical memory, and dramatic, narrative 
structure intersect is by providing frames of meaning for understanding traumatic 
events that translate easily into British culture.  For instance, the sparkling points at
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which civilisation emerges as a thematic anchor, a metaphorical term, and an 
historical analogy give the ground of time and history perspective by providing a 
profound figure that stands out to an audience struggling to understand the 
events of 9/11.  It calls upon, for example, the collective memory of the Blitz, the
iconic Churchill and Henry V, the figural understanding of what constitutes 
civilised versus uncivilised society, and finally, the Shakespearean portrayal of the 
greatest moments in the coming of age of a great king to structure the post-9/11 
world in a way that the United Kingdom can easily interpret.  In these 
intersections, The Times typifies the ways in which historical, rhetorical, and
psychological themes converge when the need to build frames of meaning from 
tragic events demand it. 
Limitations
In a study that generates as much data as this one, one of the limitations 
will always be the choices made in order to make the data manageable.  In the 
first place, whittling down 45 leading articles from 251 possible leaders that were 
earmarked to rate for relevance was an exercise in discovering what different
kinds of readers see.  In those early ratings, five readers determined which 
articles were relevant, and among those five readers, two factions emerged.  
Two clearly read articles concerning 9/11 and the resulting war in a relatively
narrow way.  By that, either an article was obviously and clearly related to 9/11 
and the war in Afghanistan, or it was something else entirely.  During the second 
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half of the year, therefore, when the war in Afghanistan effectively ends, the 
number of relevant articles drops dramatically. Two others, meanwhile,
conceptualized 9/11 and the resulting War on Terror as a far broader endeavor,
and viewed relevant articles quite differently. 
For instance, a leader from 27 December, 2001, “The Mosque As Beacon,”
deals with more understated questions of the cultural and psychological aspects 
of the role of the mosque in the West as a potential bridge to peace or as a 
potential breeding ground for home-grown terrorists. The two readers who read 
more broadly rated this leading article quite highly, while the two who viewed 
the issues of 9/11 more narrowly found it to be largely irrelevant.  The last reader,
who was generally the wild-card in the rating process, agreed with the latter 
group, and therefore this particular article fell beneath the threshold for selecting 
relevant articles.  In light of the London bombings of the 7th of July, 2005,
however, a leader like this one clearly takes on a different level of importance.
In any event, I believe that rating articles as relevant with a broader eye towards 
what constituted a relevant article would have resulted in a steadier rate of 
overall output of articles, a rate that would have more closely resembled the 
data coming from The New York Times, which this study views, more than any
other papers involved in the study, as containing the most similar stylistic and 
thematic links to The Times of London. 
At the same time, the terror of the 7/7 bombings suggested an interesting 
counterpoint to the original set of articles.  The temptation was to add the first
few weeks of leaders that appeared after 7/7 to this study, to gauge how the
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views from London have really changed since September, 2001.  In part, this
possibility was influenced by the data we saw coming from El Mundo after the 
11-M attacks of 2004 in Madrid in which the initial response was remarkably
similar to the response in New York.  In our early looks at The Times after the 
attacks of 7/7, this trend seemed to hold true—7/7 became Britain’s 9/11. As
such, being able to track that data would have likely proved extremely
interesting as to how Western attitudes have held in the years and struggles since 
9/11.
Finally, in ordering agreement of salient figures, the data suggested that 
as the size of a leading article increased, the likelihood of finding salient figures 
decreased.  Many of those longer articles, however, are ripe with brilliant figural 
language.  The hypothesis, therefore, is that a longer article simply offered more 
possibilities of salient figures.  More possibilities, then, yielded a lower level of 
figures on which raters agreed, simply because there were so many options from 
which to choose. As suggested in explaining this data in Chapter 3, the rate of
output for salient figures would likely have remained steadier had we raised the 
number figures that raters could select as salient. At the same time, my
hypothesis is that the total body of salient figures likely would have included 
more data describing the tests of fighting the psychologically and culturally-
challenging War on Terror, the part of the War that, most likely, we will fight for 
the longest time.
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Suggestions for Future Research
The most obvious places to begin research rest in the cross-cultural nature 
of the larger project. Comparative studies detailing the contrasts of The Times
with other papers in the project would be highly informative, particularly with 
regard to the deeply-embedded literary and historical metaphors that appear 
to drive British culture. Do other papers demonstrate this kind of model, and if so,
what do their models look like?  As I have worked through The Times, I have
constantly compared it, with our American team leader, Howard Pollio, to The 
New York Times, The Washington Post, and El Mundo, all of which I helped to 
rate, and also, in conversation with our Bulgarian partner, Tolya Stoitsova, with
what she has learned from Sega and Izvestia.  So far, we have run into very
specific kinds of styles for each paper though some of these styles intersect,
specifically, a highly literary style shared by The New York Times and The Times of
London, and across Europe, some similarities in terms of how history is treated. 
As a group, all of the European papers appear to place a far greater 
emphasis than the American papers do on 9/11’s place in the larger historical 
ground of Western civilisation.  How that history develops varies quite a bit from 
culture to culture, but particularly between continental Europe, which depends 
greatly on history from before the Second World War to frame 9/11, and the 
United Kingdom, which obviously places a great deal of emphasis on World War 
II and the post-war world. The relationship between The New York Times and The
Times of London, however, is most striking because of each paper’s
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dependence on complex rhetorical styles through which to present its views, as
well as the similarity of themes and content which develop therein.  Originally,
this project was to include that comparison, but it simply became too unwieldy
to cover adequately.
Finally, it would be very interesting, I believe, to develop the stark contrast 
that exists between the data from The Times and The Washington Post, which,
oddly, might be the least rhetorical and least historical of any of the other 
papers.  Given the “special relationship,” that contrast seems extraordinary, as 
though one capital views 9/11 solely as a matter of contemporary politics, while 
the other sees it as a figure in the long ground of history.  That striking difference 
begs the question how much weight does being the cultural capital of a 
country, as well as its political capital, place on a paper’s outlook on the world?  
At least in the case of 9/11, it would appear that whatever city is the cultural 
capital of a country—London in the UK, New York City in the States—is likely to 
develop the more resonant rhetorical themes. That notion, given the ongoing 
War on Terror which seems to become ever more complex, is a fascinating one 
to explore.  To that end, the better question might be what defines and drives a 
nation, its politics or its cultural history?  The answer to that question has 
implications across the political, social, and cultural spectrum, across the world,
and therefore, in it, we would likely find our best means of understanding each 
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reflecting regime's delight a footing with Tel Aviv trying out JFK's shoes 
no single stroke will slay invisible enemies extinguish the threat brought to justice 
treacherous political terrain trying Kennedy's shoes  treacherous political terrain 
2 2 
Still the Enemy Still the enemy Still the enemy 




P P P 
pavement carpeted with flowers stirred/hobble American power pavement carpeted with flowers 
hatreds sit alongside/gentler arts recall, shuddering  old rivalries have been buried 
rivalries buried/Parisian sniping banished "We are all Americans" no melting into the shadows 
appalling assaults attack upon all vigilantly contain spreading terror   fuzzy western policies 
no melting into shadows/shroud preparations melting into the shadows/shroud American failure of understanding 
Schadenfreude  driven to stone age his existence proclaims 
terrorism could hobble American power muddied/fuzzy policies jockeying for influence 
demand Kabul yield up bin Laden, dead or alive miscalculation muddied the Palestinian waters 
Taleban break-out jockeying idea has grown 
instinctive global solidarity with dead popular Schadenfreude hobble American power 
nurture the sympathy stamp out sit too easily among gentler arts of reason 
Tuesday's outrage Washington isolationism sloppy intelligence 
popular revulsion asset of incalculable 
importance looking other way giant that seeks to go about business 
we are all Americans hatreds sit alongside gentler arts of reason popular Schadenfreude 
disavowed terrorist has no hiding place Sloppy intelligence exemplary riposte 
3 3 
With one voice With one voice With one voice 
14-Sep-01  14-Sep-01 
9/14/2001 
P P P 
sifting the rubble mountain dust-caked rubble mountain 
masked, dust-caked, bone tired, devoted crews sifting rubble mountain  each survivor is a reminder 
anger/anguish more likely to mount than subside clean houses of terrorist taint/purge terror   anger and anguish like to mount 
183 
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inspired by zealotry of clerics holding sway face Taleban was nurtured 
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live with anarchy across border revealed preaching a message of hate 
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cut off room for manoeuvre in 
growing grip of Islamic extremism holding sway negotiations 
cut off any room for manoevre preaching message of hate run into a wall of obscurantist militancy 
run into wall of obscurantist militancy growing grip of Islamic extremism hand over bin Laden 
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America's reach needs to be equally long invisible legions legions are invisible 
legions are invisible Hydra heads how many heads the Hydra has 
how many heads the Hydra has melt into shadows  melt into the shadow 
decisive set-piece battles hunted down networks are to be hunted down 
melt intro shadows of anarchic or outlaw lands first flush fades Pentagon readies its plans 
murderous networks hunted down temptation intelligence has a limited shelf life 
flush of horrified sympathy patient intelligence terrorist networks regroup trail goes cold 
members have little real appetite for a 
treat this monstrosity as a one-off muttering will grow louder war 
as networks regroup trail may go cold produce uproar/splits  Iraq could seize the moment 
little real appetite for war appetite for war Kremlin suspicions 
conflict fought with all weapons, blackmail concentrated targets assailants have tentacles everywhere 
lay solid diplomatic and military 
stateless terror track down foundations 
Kremlin suspicions of Nato designs tentacles everywhere terror has no hiding place 
West should deal direct with Russia's neighbours scourge first flush fades 
Islamist assailants have tentacles everywhere outmatch track down 
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back in business upstaged ceremony was promptly upstaged 
expected collapse triggered cut interest rates 
fade away into outright recession robust efforts growth could fade into outright recession 
prolonged slump testing deliberate assault on a symbol of nation 
big boost fade economic victims of terrorism 
free market principles being placed to one side slump economic cavalry 
deliberate assault on symbol of nation plainly determined  British economy cushioned by aftershocks 
self-inflicted mistakes big boost make or break sentiment in the markets  
form of economic cavalry formula  damaged triggered 
cushioned from aftershocks inspire recovery robust efforts of Fed. Reserve Board 
take time off from pursuing personality cult deliberate assault on a symbol next few months will be testing 
make or break sentiment in markets irrational formula required to inspire recovery 
limit damage triggered by last week's atrocities economic victims of terrorism strong case for conventional … principles 
save S&L industry from self-inflicted 
decent taste than hard economics economic cavalry mistakes 
upstaged  cushioned from aftershocks 
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the nation's life recovering air traffic recovering some of its position 
fell sharply in value nation's life in the nation's life 
stepped up their own vigilance desperate to reassure stepped up their own vigilance 
laxity of the past stepped up vigilance  El Al has long set the example 
old habits lax procedures beyond immediate steps toward changes 
stopping kamikaze terrorists become used to kamikaze terrorists 
plane as bomb global agreement using a plane as a bomb 
chemical sniffer to detect explosives using plane as bomb  chemical "sniffer" 
check in a bomb amid confusion fell sharply 
trust in baggage reconciliation fell sharply  old habits are hard to change 
false assumption old habits hard to change airlines will object 
complying with hijackers' demands higher standards  lax procedures 
suicide terrorists El Al set example safety enforced by global agreement 
recovering some of its position look beyond immediate steps pilots may need to be armed 
immediate steps kamikaze terrorists higher standards 
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triumphalist bile fills airwaves sifted evidence is sifted 
evidence is sifted terrible truth  clearer the terrible truth becomes 
clearer the terrible truth becomes clearer exploit frameworks of freedom 
plotters of mass murder exploit frameworks of freedom values and traditions gave evil opportunity 
exploit frameworks of freedom against freedom gave evil abundant opportunity strong grounds to suspect 
nature of clandestine networks puzzle puzzle was not pieced together 
puzzle not pieced together deadly inside knowledge financial markets turn upside down 
tumble with bombed towers turn upside down courtesy of civil liberties 
sleepers ready to strike circulate enemy within the gate 
enemy within gate "sleepers" authorities must play by the book 
little gain in hunting down terrorists enemy within gate British book has long needed rewriting 
their ilk play by the book  terrorism should have no hiding place 
alert to menace triumphalist bile police fight shy of arresting people 
no scruples about using law against law nation's distaste  triumphalistic bile fills the airwaves 
terrorism should have no hiding place resorting fast-track extradition procedures 
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human kind cannot bear very much reality glorious mundanity of life towers of the civilised  
spectacle of towers of civilised world plummeting towers of civilised world  images scorched onto consciousness 
unbearable in the reality of last week plummeting newly insomniac world 
scorched into collective consciousness dig deep into pockets  their slaughter itself used as a weapon 
scorched onto consciousness/replayed 
replayed in flashback to newly insomniac world flashback global village 
bodies pressed against skyscraper windows abomination's wake scaling those fatal monoliths 
caught in obscene free-fall/world waits for dust 
settling newly insomniac world/unbearable desire to restore life to their city 
caught in free-fall/world waits for dust to 
world felt itself to be global village/terror is leveller settle friends can dig deep into their pockets 
poignant simplicity of so many valedictions learning abomination's wake 
abomination's wake slaughter used as weapon terrorism is a leveller 
gave up lives scaling fatal monoliths poignant simplicity  glorious mundanity of life New Yorkers lost 
humanitarianism at its most epic terrorism is a leveller/global village worlds waits for dust to settle 
desire to restore life to city scaling fatal monoliths/rubble bear this sort of reality 
glorious mundanity epic/fundamental spirit reflected all over New York 
Americans continue to dig through rubble restore life to city/assuage feelings assuage [world's] feeling of grief 
13 13 
United home front United home front United home front 
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9/20/2001 
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democracy's best retaliation against terror to 
thrive suspend domestic politics  democracy's retaliation is to thrive 
Stars and Stripes on the wrecked side of Pentagon dug from dust democracy itself is under attack 
democracy itself under attack extinguish signs West plans its retaliation 
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dug from dust measure of restraint extinguish all signs of normal political life 
West plans retaliation best part of week circumstances demand 
extinguish all signs of normal political life political headaches political headaches 
slip into rebellion from one wing slip into rebellion  conference is an important platform 
crude anti-gov't tactics from the other crude anti-Government tactics from one wing of the party 
labour left threatening rebellion break guarantee of support lost the stomach for the fight 
temporarily lost stomach for fight appear statesmanlike political jousting 
opportunity for dissent lost the stomach for the fight  conflict on the domestic front 
hearts of public and politician lose little sleep conference is likely to slip into rebellion 
political jousting hearts of public/politician  hearts of public and politician 
lose little sleep political jousting normal political life 
appear statesmanlike normal political life New Yorkers dug from the dust 
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It's the economy, still It's the economy, still It's the economy, still 
20-Sep-01  20-Sep-01 
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avoidance of serious economic slump emblazoned words economic ruin 
crisis bringing economic ruin to millions a real war real war rooms 
snatched defeat from jaws of any military victory vital terrible blow to the global capitalist system 
triumph for those out to destroy slump snatched defeat from jaws of military 
economic slowdown not confined to US terrible blow psychological blow struck by the terrorists 
governments appreciate dangers they 
psychological blow struck by terrorists jaws of military victory face 
gov'ts appreciate danger they face dramatic fall vital that stability pact not sterility pact 
join the international drive to avert a 
initial hesitancy of European Central Bank psychological blow struck by terrorists slump 
Stability Pact not allowed to become sterility pact appreciate danger they face economic slump 
join int'l drive to avert slump extraordinary measures far from their minds 
collapse of world trade would bring satisfaction early moves  set against the pessimistic news 
so-called war room/real war sensible response to serious events overcome by political pressure 
free world won build military coalition effect felt on the east coast 
terrible blow international drive build a military coalition 
helped economy to recover collapse collapse of world trade 
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Long war Long war Long war 
20-Sep-01  20-Sep-01 
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mobilisation gathering pace gathering pace time is fast running out for the Taleban 
White House's brusque insistence White House's brusque insistence White House's brusque insistence 
bin Laden's Afghan lairs terrorist Hydra bin Laden's Afghan lairs 
mustering allies in every quarter necessary intelligence classic war fighting play occasional role 
foretaste only of vastly more ambitious campaign bin Laden's Afghan lairs terrorism's underground forces 
waged world over mission impossible shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought 
shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought Achilles' heel surgical strikes 
willingness to stay same long course world is utterly changed electronic battlefield 
siding with civilised world lesser risk shed post-Vietnam habits of thought  uncomfortably in the frame of Pakistan 
deter American in determination to destroy surgical strikes  Pakistan is launching pad for operations  
al-Qaeda academies of death electronic battlefield  al-Qaeda "academies of death" 
alien power within fractured, factious state in the frame  mission impossible terrain and history imply 
caught by Achilles' heel stark necessity caught by his Achilles’ hill 
guile and gold as much as with force rightly calculates  terrorist Hydra 
test of strength against terrorist Hydra perilously unstable launching pad  gathering pace 
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Prime suspect: The Taleban are playing out a deadly 
farce Prime suspect. Prime suspect. 
21-Sep-01  21-Sep-01 
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first step down very long road marathon ahead marathon ahead 
utter necessity of this unwelcome war freedom takes up cudgels against fear freedom takes up cudgels against fear 
Taleban playing out deadly farce words set against backdrop  silence surrounds 
freedom takes up cudgels against fear imminent military riposte words set against the backdrop 
marathon ahead carnage visited on America speed far outstrips allied response 
silence surrounds all military detail utter necessity of unwelcome war first step down a very long road 
riposte to carnage visited on America a settled decision/made plain Taleban are playing out a farce 
no diplomatic or covert avenue being neglected gleaning intelligence time in hand and bargains to be struck 
deadly force of express train bearing 
speed far outstrips allied response to Iraq never until now down 
first step down very long road multi-faceted  stay America's hand 
deadly force of express train bearing down first step down long road Taleban would buy time 
takes no measure of this momentum playing out a farce  because he is their banker 
under cover of grand Shura of clerics intellectual/moral isolation military riposte 
time in hand/bargains to be struck express train bearing down upon  Washington is gleaning intelligence 
no diplomatic or cover avenue is 
comprehend enormity of outrage stay America's hand  neglected 
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Back on the ground Back on the ground Back on the ground 




P P P 
Britain girds against present danger lifted fatigue  enemy shorn of scruples 
sworn to shred fabric of freedom voiced no shadow of doubt voiced no shadow of doubt 
enemy shorn of scruples enemy shorn of scruples shred the fabric of freedom 
country alive with troubled and legitimate 
questions  shred fabric of freedom country alive with questions 
treacherous Afghan wastes on far side of world "sleepers" in bin Laden's shadowy al-Qaeda tumbling into the front line of a war 
shadowy al-Qaeda Britain girds against danger standing "shoulder to shoulder" with US 
lifted Blair's fatigue nation understandably nervous  Britain standing in line of only two abreast 
not marching but tumbling into front line of war tumbling into front line France most likely third musketeer 
standing shoulder to shoulder airwaves filled since 9/11 take the high ground abroad 
Britain standing in line of only two abreast grand emergency low road Government continues to tread 
Nato's all for one and one for all pledge brace against grave menace Britain girds against the present danger 
most likely third musketeer/France not in line fall into line lifted Bair's fatigue 
rhetoric rallying world against common enemy what happened to rhetoric - rallying world  commit British arms 
high ground abroad/low road tread at 
take high ground abroad/low road at home home France has yet to fall into line 
treacherous Afghan wastes on far side of "sleepers" in bin Laden's shadowy al-
no shadow of doubt world Qaeda 
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It won't be quick It won't be quick It won't be quick 
23-Sep-01  23-Sep-01 
9/24/2001 
P P P 
pouring fuel on flames of Islamic fundamentalism calibrating / measured response  world standing on the brink of war 
world standing edgily at brink of war world standing edgily on brink of war struck at the heart of America 
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choosing war-hardened veterans bolstered by speed/scale in the heat of battle 
US mission=our moment pouring fuel on flames of fundamentalism Germany not involved in "adventures" 
struck heart signaled new era  defeat on its doorstep 
alliances suffer stresses/strains in heat of battle struck heart of America Hussein keep his head down 
find excuses otherwise occupied when bullets fly mission Palestine’s hotheads 
Britain has shown deft hand/resolute eye when bullets start to fly battle for world opinion 
time for steady nerves/precise action deft hand & resolute eye new kind of war 
marathon effort to rid world of terrorist cells unprecedented scale  new kind of enemy 
pale compared to these mega-terrorists unsettled markets  marathon effort 
fighting new kind of war/new kind of enemy terrorist infrastructure  time for steady nerves 
provoking backlash in rest of Islamic world ethnically linked fundamentalism pouring fuel on flames of fundamentalism 
Pakistan survive unscathed the defeat on 
doorstep  battle for world opinion Iran's overtures to the west 
battle for world opinion mega-terrorists warning voices already being sounded 
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Layer upon layer Layer upon layer Layer upon layer 
24-Sep-01  24-Sep-01 
9/24/2001 
D P D 
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place layers of global support on Nato core diplomatic fence  diplomatic fence  
states not normally even on speaking terms diplomatic footwork  diplomatic footwork  
elimination of scourge of terrorism heterodox coalition  Gulf states promised to "stand by" US 
place layers of global support on Nato 
heterodox coalition scourge of terrorism core 
channel of communication too long clogged whip up opposition  whip up opposition  
this outer layer layers of global support won "shoulder-to-shoulder" backing 
tackling root cause of extremism "shoulder-to-shoulder" backing  channel of communication clogged 
opens up clogged channel of 
include all who volunteer for American terms communication endorsement from this outer layer 
festering troubles of Middle East outer layer root cause of extremism 
common fears make common cause recoils instinctively recoils instinctively 
Muslim recoils instinctively from attack on fellow common fears make common cause festering troubles 
won shoulder to shoulder backing tackling tackling 
diplomatic fence around Afghanistan root cause  lifting of sanctions 
layer upon layer festering troubles assemble a heterodox coalition 
allow governments to voice anything but 
America's diplomatic footwork grand coalition against terrorism caution 
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Palimpsest Palimpsest Palimpsest 
26-Sep-01  26-Sep-01 
9/26/2001 
P P D 
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disgusted retreat from medieval theocracy contribution countries to stand against menace 
close gaps in unconventional common 
however fluid the chessboard now balance front 
careless language costs lives close gaps in unconventional common front "enemy of my enemy" should be courted 
common aims shift in long campaign 
set to side Russia's anxieties about US penetration courted ahead 
shared outrage pragmatic layering  script that is constantly rewritten 
Putin kept Washington waiting palimpsest palimpsest 
ask countries to stand against terrorist menace script starved of funds 
balance that US and UK must strike starved of funds Iran is also a shelter 
close gaps in this unconventional common front careless language Iran is a bankroller 
enemy of my enemy should be courted set aside anxieties  Iran, bracketing it with Britain 
pragmatic layering of decisions co-operate 
flexibly  American penetration  "breed terrorism" 
shift in the course of long campaign ahead deftly handled political spectrum 
palimpsest medieval theocracy however fluid the chessboard 
intelligence-sharing script constantly rewritten shared outrage across political spectrum careless language 
some Western quarters fluid chessboard  deftly handled on both sides 
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Crouch, spring, crouch Crouch, spring, crouch Crouch, spring, crouch 
28-Sep-01 
9/28/2001 
D D P 
elusive identikit of terror filling out tourniquet tightens/begins to pinch pockets of its heartlands in the south 
as tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch hurl defiance  time to fray more nerves 
Taleban hurl defiance one day pockets of Pashtun heartlands  will not change to fit coalitions 
pockets of its Pashtun heartlands fray nerves financial loopholes 
Pentagon expects time to fray more nerves rugged weapons not fire more than warning shot or two 
giving Taleban chance to recant sharp memories sharp memories 
selecting targets by committee close cells & loopholes identikit of terror 
close down terrorist cells/loopholes warning shot military plane 
US will not fire more than warning shot or two elusive identikit of terror  America is crouched 
Washington's thinking anything but conventional filling out waiting game like no other 
as the tourniquet tightens it begins to 
Taleban's time for reflection may be brief deliver up  pinch 
strike designed to concentrate minds dismantling rugged soviet-era weapons 
moment intelligence coalesces will be swift spring crouched coalition-building 
America is crouched waiting game deliver up bin Laden 
waiting game like no other intelligence coalesces dismantling al-Qaeda operation 
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P P P 
evidence emerging of cells and agents, sleepers entrenched evidence is emerging 
funding Jackal cunning/slipped between aliases  emerging evidence apparatus of terror 
mask terrible conspiracy of destruction apparatus of terror Jackal cunning 
new war demands new weapons becoming clear slipped between aliases, etc. 
intelligence by far most deadly slipped between  scraps of information  
vital pooling of information growing aghast overseas tip-offs 
hindsight underlines blame mask political pressure 
too blithe an assurance suspicious patterns  crack down on money laundering 
sheltered in London overlapping hindsight underlines blame 
myriad scraps of info sheltered pressure must now tilt 
scale of terrorists' ambitions scraps of information  vital pooling of information 
Islamist terrorist networks more entrenched scale of ambitions intelligence most deadly (new weapon) 
crack down on organized crime ringing the venue in the face of repeated warnings 
overseas tip-offs swifter and tighter coordination publics growing aghast 
closing G8 airspace/ringing venue intelligence is deadly new weapon freedoms used to mask conspiracy 
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Tough on Camera Tough on Camera Tough on Camera 
29-Sep-01 
9/29/2001 
P P P 
Britain must rise to challenge glaring contrast galvanise public opinion 
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crack down on those preaching extremist hatred galvanise public opinion  Britain must rise to the challenge 
uncover network that made London terrorist 
haven  stiffen response using the law to crack down 
root out terrorists in our midst preaching extremist hatred preaching extremist hatred 
heart of conspiracy crack down London terrorist haven of Western world 
end cynical exploitation of right of repeated 
appeal uncover network  root out the terrorists 
promised fast-track expedition London as terrorist haven of West at the heart of the conspiracy 
American fury at Dickensian pace root out Dickensian pace of British justice 
spin their cases out at least as long as Pinochet cynical exploitation believed to head bin Laden's organisation 
confident of confounding swift deportation Dickensian pace of British justice can spin their cases 
silencing those who incite boys from Birmingham hostile climate Europe's solidarity with US melts 
Europe's solidarity with US melts into nothing spin cases reluctant to stir resentment 
pussyfooting of prosecutors solidarity melts  blacken the name of Islam 
terrorism thrives on propaganda pussyfooting Terrorism thrives on propaganda 
blacken the name of all Islam blacken Islam stiffen response 
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Who defends Britain? Who defends Britain? Who defends Britain? 
30-Sep-01  30-Sep-01 
9/30/2001 
P P P 
tragic side effect of assault on America joined the hunt side effect of the assault on America 
frontline target for retaliation fanaticism versus freedom  joined hunt for bin Laden 
fanaticism vs. freedom uneven at best of times uneven contest  fight alongside the US 
exploit every loophole in statute book need for vigilance turf warfare between the security services 
vague talk vague talk slow business in the courts 
slow business in courts turf warfare exploit every loophole in the statute book 
habit of muddling through muddling Whitehall's wobbles 
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Whitehall's wobbles matched  smacks of bureaucratic fudge 
nervousness of British airlines wobbles remove recklessly such underpinning 
latest Whitehall wheeze daydreaming frontline target 
smacks of bureaucratic fudge happily exploit openness death row 
cash-rich henchmen plays into their hands vague talk 
happily exploit that openness wheeze ministers are daydreaming 
remove recklessly underpinning plays into hands smacks of bureaucratic fudge muddling through 
today's menace from terrorists balanced against impairing freedoms playing into their hands 
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Tunnel vision Tunnel vision Tunnel vision 
1-Oct-01 1-Oct-01 
10/1/2001 
P P D 
tendency toward tunnel vision wretchedness draw comfort 
statesmen today are blinded difficult to draw comfort everyday human activity ground to halt 
life will not return to normal until vision is restored noxious covering of dust/ashes tendency toward tunnel vision 
speculating on war against terrorism tunnel vision universal gaze turned toward New York 
swept every issue from agenda universal gaze turned towards NY have eclipsed reports 
halt collapse of world economy state of distraction  what Commonwealth should stand for 
everyday human activity ground to halt eclipsed business as usual 
obscured by noxious covering of dust and ashes speculating  swept every issue from their agenda 
draw eyes to rest of world underlined statesmen blinded to other issues 
universal gaze turned to NYC swept issue from agenda  obscured by a noxious covering of dust 
eclipsed reports halt collapse draw their eyes to the rest of the world 
calling for business as usual restore moral authority Mugabe faced a strong push by Britain 
the explosions in America blinded by explosions in America flouting the Harare principles 
campaign against terrorism return to normal return to normal 
times of loss or wretchedness business as usual restores something of its moral authority 
201 
26 26 
Against evil Against evil Against evil 
2-Oct-01 2-Oct-01 
10/2/2001 
P P P 
flung Bush's ultimatum back in his face flung back in face flung ultimatum back in face 
chaotic heart of terror-ridden, travesty 
boot is on other foot boot is on other foot state 
chaotic heart of primitive, terror-ridden, travesty chaotic heart of terror-ridden state well-oiled armed machine 
Taleban publicly slammed the door hosts calling shots Taleban fires 
only force will prise it open publicly slammed door  Taleban have publicly slammed the door 
tear at roots of terrorism vital impact the long haul 
taunt from Taleban to come and get your man long haul roots of terrorism 
dangers of inaction now outweigh risks tear at roots of terrorism partners in guilt 
given heart to Taleban's internal opponents partners in guilt Washington reticent to declare hand 
medieval horrors/Khan's horde cruelty surpassed declaring its hand storm given heart to Taleban's opponents 
bribed way to power a taunt  military muscle 
ruled more by terror than sword medieval horrors ruled more by terror than by the sword 
compact reduces risk of post-Taleban vacuum strike power post-Taleban vacuum 
forged from hope of help post-Taleban vacuum  Afghanistan's bane 
Afghanistan's bane Afghanistan's bane taunt 
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P P P 
seen spate of attacks spate of attacks  the Establishment 
West has no quarrel with Islam set upon  extending the hand of tolerance to Islam 
Islamophobia determined assaults West has seen a spate of attacks 
opinion-makers  Islamophobia those with no connection set upon 
less vocal on essential first step essential first step  assaults on prejudice 
brought down those towers counter the claims  conference denounced 
besmirch all fellow believers extending hand of tolerance  argument of hatred preached 
counter claims of fanatics reciprocal language the enemies of understanding 
win argument against hatred Muted condemnation Muted condemnation 
stop recruitment of boys from Birmingham confessional solidarity  Muslims in their midst 
speak of extending hand of tolerance enemies of understanding Islam as a tolerant religion 
hear similar reciprocal language make revulsion explicit in the name of Islam 
confessional solidarity Muslims in their midst opinion-makers 
enemies of understanding Christianity/Islam forcefully condemned  it was less vocal 
make revulsion explicit opinion-makers moderates are to win the argument 
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War of nerves War of nerves War of nerves 
5-Oct-01 5-Oct-01 
10/5/2001 
D P D 
dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating lift malaise court of public opinion 
stiffen determination of most coalition leaders faces heart of the Muslim world 
widespread panic spread across America intelligence assembled  evidence hard on heels of Blair's warning 
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signal normal life will not be disrupted first stage of presenting information  room for negotiation 
lift malaise now hanging over Western societies hard on the heels describing terrorists as bacteria 
mass of compelling circumstantial evidence terrible hours  interests on one hand 
elements in encirclement being 
pattern of meticulous long-term planning appalling probability  interlocked 
terrorists as bacteria caught ceasefire has broken down 
turn on his country's protégés lay out America's needs  fear feeds fear 
instill same public commitment in House of Saud courteous but plain language lift the malaise now hanging 
caught between interests on one hand  encirclement interlocked under the pressure of its hardliners 
public opinion menacingly hostile to US presence move diplomacy forward  panic that spread 
lay out US needs in courteous plain language fear feeds on fear move diplomacy forward 
encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked dispel circulating theories sufficient grounds for indictment 
fear feeds on fear widespread panic spread  culpable carelessness began to emerge 
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Just the beginning Just the beginning Just the beginning 
7-Oct-01 7-Oct-01 
10/7/2001 
P P P 
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Sundance to our Butch Cassidy glowing tributes all the hallmarks of this work 
straight out of Ian Fleming story a mythical figure  straight out of Ian Fleming story 
twisted millionaire mastermind holed up in hideout straight out of Ian Fleming story no country is beyond his reach 
not a war in which you can negotiate twisted millionaire mastermind "Sundance to our Butch Cassidy" 
shoring up American-led alliance cells of fanatical followers they came to a sticky end 
came to sticky end fresh attacks  jumping-off point 
West has not lashed out chilling Israel refuses to lie low 
marked return to normal breaks up America courts other Arab leaders 
ring closing around Bin Laden hailed  Mr. Bush has risen to the challenge 
Afghanistan's cruel winter shoring up  New anti-terrorist measures on cards 
humiliated as Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg fragile situation ring is closing around bin Laden 
mistake we made in Gulf War ring is closing spawning of a new generation of followers 
just reprisals about to start choose martyr's fate Taliban leaders showed their guile 
urge White House to repulse Saddam spawning twisted millionaire mastermind 
winning campaign press ahead  purify the Islamic world 
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Another Front Another front Another front 
8-Oct-01 8-Oct-01 
10/8/2001 
R R D 
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at stake are lives and livelihoods of all necessity of speedy response surprise like lightning--a necessity of war 
megalomaniac quasi-fascist that shattering day that shattering day 
share fanatical bigotry or murderous intentions met terrible deaths met their terrible deaths 
global domination by neo-caliphate of extremists an unlooked-for eloquence  information, the lifeblood of democracy 
malign perversion of Islam ruling by fear over tense weeks putting whole of society in "brace position" 
America bears greatest burden of leadership veering most crucial operations likely off-screen 
lightning strikes before thunder gives out report running out of time progress will be hard to chart 
Afghanistan one corner of worldwide 
that shattering day lifeblood canvas 
veering yesterday between defiance and 
blackmail sparse information shattered the West's peace 
lifeblood of democracy hone rhetoric of readiness  diplomatic ground that has to be covered 
putting whole society in brace position balancing act balancing act 
hone rhetoric of readiness off-screen all arms of public life 
one corner of worldwide canvas worldwide canvas no backing away 
when freedom defeats fear crumble freedom defeats fear 
shattered West's peace but not will unimaginable only a month ago  burden of leadership 
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The defeatist chorus The defeatist chorus The defeatist chorus 
14-Oct-01 14-Oct-01 
10/8/2001 
P P P 
doom-mongers are out and about course of war hard to call course of this war 
fundamental weapons=clear-sighted 
overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah hunt down resolve 
new role to play fragile alliance  point to the growing hostility 
mass photo-calls and anti-western grumbling widen the war promises to deliver "a new corpse" 
flag-burning and jihad-mongering unconventional conflict school of defeatism 
rallying Muslim opinion against great Satan clear-sighted resolve overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah 
give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor nurturing a wide alliance  will become a forgotten footnote 
miscalculated like Japanese/US lacked resolve ended their innocence  opens the way to direct American attacks 
plight of people will become more acute theocratic thuggery the "great Satan" 
allies' reluctance to stake everything become a forgotten footnote a long haul 
no precipitate rush to widen war against terrorism long haul give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor 
September 11 ended their innocence friendless plight of people more acute 
Afghans new start/free from perpetual civil war history's losers British will have a new role to play 
rules by theocratic thuggery new role to play battle for public opinion 
challenge to him having peaked and faded 
away reluctance to stake everything nurturing a wide alliance 
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P P P 
wave of emergency legislation beyond its reach beyond the government's reach 
airport insecurity wave of emergency legislation  wave of emergency registration 
take all possible steps to counter terrorism tightened possible steps to counter terrorism 
responsibility split visible measures  broken the rules 
sterile areas sensitive positions  aircraft as weapons 
rules  Responsibility is split sensitive positions in British airports 
breaches threaten every citizen's safety follows rules closely sterile areas 
aircraft as weapons lax rules makes mockery of placement of guards 
beyond reach sensitive time lax rules 
security tightened sterile areas under supervision 
screening passengers unvetted workers airside unvetted workers airside 
makes mockery a mockery security breaches threaten safety 
hold baggage highly visible armed guards less visible measures 
things beyond gov'ts reach use aircraft as weapons responsibility for security is split 
highly visible policing security breaches  follow the rules closely 
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Rock Solidarity Rock solidarity Rock solidarity 
22-Oct-01 22-Oct-01 
10/22/2001 
R R R 
rock solidarity touched hearts messages touched the hearts 
touched hearts of NY stricken city concert was largely the brainchild 
stricken city raucous, cathartic charity  will have moved America 
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revivalist meeting as political rally brainchild revived his 1977 hit 
mountains of money/towers of steel/hearts of 
gold unabashed patriotism  sentiment cloyed the airwaves 
brainchild moved America  this concert had many motives 
NY's resilience, energy, unity flanked voicing America's contempt for terrorists 
unabashed patriotism/conviction moved America revived reviving something of New York's  
terrorist atrocities Britain's solidarity bruised zest and gusto 
brought to US loss UK’s emotions (Diana) Sentiment cloyed airwaves mountains of courage 
sentiment cloyed airwaves/schmaltz dripped schmaltz dripped from stage hearts of gold 
reverence for city's heroes city's heroes raucous, cathartic concert 
Britain's solidarity revivalist meeting schmaltz dripped from the stage 
voicing America's contempt for terrorists bruised zest/gusto revivalist meeting 
reviving something of NY's bruised zest and gusto massive/modern defiance Britain's solidarity 
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A man alone A man alone A man alone 
25-Oct-01 25-Oct-01 
10/25/2001 
P P P 
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Blair saw his duty/course was fixed see his duty see his duty 
support in wearying war against common enemy rumbling debate  his course was fixed 
finger pointed in the direction of bin 
eradicating menace of regime course was fixed/collision course Laden 
finger pointed in direction of bin Laden breathed sigh of relief starve networks of power 
campaign that began on 9/11 many fronts "academies of death" 
hope that road will never turn to Iraq is reckless starve networks this long haul 
logic puts Iraq and West on collision course fractured country coalition will dissolve 
keep fingerprints off operations roused the road will never turn to Iraq 
destroy credibility of no quarrel with Islamic world settle old score Britain could find itself alone 
starve transnational terrorist networks of power living memory fall of France 
destroy academies of death extend spatially no proof positive 
operating within friendless theocratic tyranny Powerful figures  look under rock as hard as possibly can 
Iraq able to keep fingerprints off 
living memory eradicating the menace operations 
Britain as alone as after fall of France keep fingerprints off operations evidence against Iraq were to emerge 
battle doesn't have finite point united view/balance of argument settle an old score in Iraq 
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Nuclear network Nuclear network Nuclear network 
26-Oct-01 26-Oct-01 
10/26/2001 
D P P 
leaden shoe waiting to drop chilling information  chilling information  
chilling info leaden shoe waiting to drop leaden shoe waiting to drop 
terrorise enemies of God hinted acquisition of weapons as "religious duty" 
mastermind behind last month's attacks extravagant claims mastermind behind attacks 
Chechen gangsters  agents move freely the hunt 
nuclear switches hunt confronted the horrors 
bin Laden's source of supply infiltrated lift the spectre of nuclear terrorism 
hunt confronted with horrors dirty bomb 
start chain reaction lift spectre hard evidence 
horrors of full-scale nuclear attack primitive weapons struggle must extend spatially 
lift spectre of nuclear terrorism hard evidence extravagant claims 
dirty bomb most primitive of nuclear weapons What must be assumed Downing Street is noncommittal 
speed and surprise will be all the more 
exposed to radiation poisoning Speed/surprise essential essential 
hard evidence Downing Street noncommittal most primitive of weapons 
Downing Street noncommittal full-scale assumes greater urgency 
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The Blair shuttle The Blair shuttle The Blair shuttle 
2-Nov-01 2-Nov-01 
11/2/2001 
D P P 
this conflict without front lines gloss put the best gloss on  
terrorist threat not weather of future left to insist better to "get your hands dirty" 
spokes of umbrella strong to withstand storm conflict without front lines his value to Bush is that of a conduit 
orthodoxy against usurping Islam for violent ends conduit/lightning conductor even of a lighting conductor 
value as conduit, lightning conductor truth grapple w/ falsehood  truth must grapple with falsehood 
truth must grapple with falsehood brand of charm diplomatic momentum 
let events be driven by extremists diplomatic momentum  sure that he is husbanding his authority 
ended indolent self-satisfaction (Pearl Harbor) secured private assurances collective nervous breakdown 
berates terrorists trying to hijack our religion taking public drubbing "trying to hijack our religion" 
derives solely from capacity to destabilise the Middle Eastern equation a more positive gloss 
road to safer world curves through northerly arc form an inner ring mend fences with Italy 
calculated mixture of discipline and decisiveness collective nervous breakdown terrorist threat not weather of future 
nexus of strategic co-ordination nervous toleration spokes of US umbrella to withstand storm 
broader task of restoring order to world refashioned an a la carte coalition 
refashioned structures of security spokes of US umbrella withstand storm nervous toleration 
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From New York skies From New York skies From New York skies 
13-Nov-01 13-Nov-01 
11/13/2001 
P P D 
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only now returning to normal life long-threatened further act plane climbed for a take-off 
reinforce sense of vulnerability/gripped the city no early indications  returning to normal life 
exacerbating bewilderment no coincidence sense of vulnerability gripped the city 
city/country facing random/indefinite 
let fear push patriotism/courage out of minds all too possible an explanation terror 
facing random and indefinite terror returning to normal life confidence suffered a further blow 
mysterious anthrax attacks spread through 
America vulnerability gripped city wiped 200 points off the Dow Jones 
wiped 200 points off Dow Jones index facing random indefinite terror level-headed response of mayor 
not stop life over city coming to immediate halt further blow life over much of city coming to halt 
outcry over sloppy inspections level-headed response check-in procedures not watertight 
challenge America's leadership up to White 
House sloppy inspections/lax regulations  let fear push patriotism out of  minds 
weather collapse of business confidence Congress stalled move braced for further contraction 
braced for further contraction watertight small comfort to New Yorkers 
let fear push patriotism/courage out of 
infiltrate workforce of baggage handlers minds sloppy inspections 
Taleban suffered first serious setback industry braced lax regulations 
long-threatened further act of terrorism weather collapse Congress has stalled the sensible move 
38 38 38 
One Sunday in 1941 One Sunday in 1941 One Sunday in 1941 
7-Dec-01  7-Dec-01  7-Dec-01 
Sara Stacey 
R R R 
9/11 put Americans back in touch with date of 
infamy fear has ranged itself against freedom slaughter of civilians 
This does not feel like war Pearl Harbor tipped scales fear has ranged itself against freedom 
fear has ranged itself against freedom reluctant, isolationist US  set Islam against the West 
September's slaughter of civilians date which will live in infamy/date of infamy humiliate American power 
US never stronger than when it feels vulnerable This does not feel like war destroy its (America's) confidence 
showing world's mightiest power to be 
aligned the rest of the world on America's side spend for victory, not dig for it impotent 
aim to humiliate Am. Power/destroy confidence speech will deal  lethal weapon of willingness to die 
set Islam against West devastating attacks Osama Bin Laden did not bargain for 
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aligned the rest of the world on America's 
showing world's mightiest power to be impotent US reluctantly concluding side 
tiny bands of fanatical plotters September slaughter of civilians paid heavily for failures 
barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to al-Qaeda's aim to humiliate/destroy 
die confidence  tipped the scales 
showing world's mightiest power to be 
unfamiliar menace impotent  freedom from fear 
people asked to spend for victory, not dig 
these two devastating attacks tiny bands of fanatical plotters for it 
"remember the character of onslaught" valid barely armed with lethal weapon of willingness to 
today die on American soil 
asked to spend for victory, not dig for it Am. Paid heavily for failures tiny bands of fanatical plotters 
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First things first First things first First things first 
11-Dec-01 11-Dec-01 
12/11/2001 
P P P 
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darkness enveloped lower Manhattan darkness enveloped lower Manhattan darkness enveloped lower Manhattan 
fanatics preaching hate engineered mass murder aircraft as missiles aircraft as missiles 
rip apart fabric of civilised society rip fabric of civilised society engineered an act of mass murder 
target was future of everyman everyman victims in their paths 
rhythm of normality quietly returned rhythm of normality quietly returned  rip apart the fabric of civilised society 
grip of al-Qaeda on cities impotence allayed by US pressure future of everyman 
no premature embrace of illusory peace grip rhythm of normality 
miles to go before sleep/spared to carry blankets match mood grip of al-Qaeda on cities and towns 
British public would dearly love to declare war 
over head force  Britain now moves to centre stage 
centre stage centre stage countryside is alive with al-Qaeda 
high profile peace role being generated countryside alive countryside alive 
countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters dangerously invidious position  token international armed presence 
enemies half-defeated take long time to clear out huge scope for local "misunderstandings" premature embrace of illusory peace 
leave Kandahar unchallenged no premature embrace  miles to go before they sleep 
dangerously invidious position miles to go before sleep pressure being generated 
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Not Correct Not Correct Not Correct 
15-Jan-02 15-Jan-02 15-Jan-02 
Sara Stacey 
P P D 
bright side/sign NYC back on path to psychological 
recovery Sesame Street has a lot to answer for look on the bright side 
back on the path to psychological 
kicking the stuffing out of each other struggle against evil recovery 
better than a row about political correctness embraced by entire community kicking the stuffing out of each other 
this pugnacious metropolis back on form city that they defended can grant them this in the style of a Benetton advertisement 
triumvirate of white troopers NYC back on path Sesame Street has a lot to answer for 
multiracial trinity in style of Benetton 
advertisement look on the bright side a struggle against evil 
Sesame Street has a lot to answer for Benetton advertisement embraced by the entire community 
memorial to horror should reflect struggle against glorious legend and inglorious reality of 
evil Mafia  specious philosophies 
base specious philosophies on racial lines Italian community has given Americans should be colour-blind 
uniquely courageous urban army Irish provided Murphia fall back on fact and statistic 
glorious legend and inglorious reality of Mafia sounds innocent accident of the wave of immigration 
traditions that grew from wave of uniquely courageous urban army 
public-spirited Irish provided Murphia immigration (firefighters) 
al-Qaeda may base its specious 
recognition of heroism on their own home ground philosophies on their own home ground 
colours they are blind to appear in correct 
proportions race was motivating factor city that they defended (firefighters) 
accident of the wave of immigration memorial to horror a Murphia of cops and firefighters 
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R P D 
world caught breath in shock world caught breath in shock world caught breath in shock 
ruthlessly contemptuous of life transformation/transfixed by attacks transfixed by the attacks 
world transformed ruthlessly contemptuous of life attack on freedom itself 
vulnerability of world's greatest power unimaginable carnage elusive Hydra-headed opponents 
attack on freedom itself myopically reluctant root out regimes that allied with terrorists 
diminishing of that collective horror attacks revealed turbulent, fractured apology of state 
global menace must and can be beaten back liberty to circulate "academies of death" 
elusive and Hydra-headed opponents collective horror starve international terrorists cells 
America's will and capacity to root out regimes global menace raise game in response to emergency 
turbulent, fractured apology for a state elusive, Hydra-headed opponents enemies within the gates 
aligning to defend order against enemies at gate root out regimes  deeply rooted historical suspicions 
no neutral ground in fight turbulent, fractured apology for state Washington is being high-handed 
transformation in American national mood starve cells  an event receding into the past 
duty and inclination met on 9/11 raise his game puts Iraq on a collision course with West 
9/11 not receding into past but continuing threat no neutral ground  myopically reluctant 
42 42 42 
Coalition Politics Coalition Politics Coalition Politics 
3-Mar-02 3-Mar-02 3-Mar-02 
Sara Stacey 
P D P 
smash terrorists determined to attack liberal dem 
values act of remembrance for victims of terror victims of terrorism 
arrogance born of rapid success matters will develop  War on Terror 
forceful and measure performance campaign drawn to close  action against terror 
work best in concert with coalition idle talk every corner of the planet 
leaders to take on terrorist factions within 
for blackmail or battle mass terror borders 
response to friendly overtures instruments of death the hysterical coverage 
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sentence and sentiment essence of Am. For. 
Policy nations smash terrorists determined a bit over the top 
market for weapons of mass destruction nations outside US should welcome made it clear 
stance that those outside US should welcome US must not feel constrained in the market for weapons 
pushing al-Qaeda deep into mountains plan a bit over the top absolute essence of foreign policy 
no immunity no neutrality leaked  to smash terrorists 
tackle contention directly US had received to attack liberal democratic values 
must never control ultimate instruments of death enormous emphasis for blackmail or battle 
there can be no immunity and no 
hysterical coverage nations will desist neutrality 
men with no respect for life work best in concert with coalition "men with no respect for life [...]" 
43 43 43 
Intelligent intelligence Intelligent intelligence Intelligent intelligence 
6-Jun-02 6-Jun-02 
6/6/2002 
P P P 
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confusion in America is a warning far-fetched  unending struggle to improve vigilance 
intelligent intelligence painstaking reassessment task still has far to go 
re-examination of old assumptions vital installations security in mind 
gossip picked up at mosque leaving nothing to chance scale of the confusion…coming to light 
penetrate Islamic cells first line of defence Britain caught unawares 
human failing led to the atrocities burdensome new routines MI6, the overseas arm 
scale of confusion evil men chain of command 
London as communications/financial capital scale of confusion intel can avert devastation of evil men 
petty infighting coming to light burdensome new routines 
good intelligence avert devastation of evil men caught unawares first line of defence 
thwarted by fences and padlocks came as shock determined terrorism 
burdensome new routines overdue  infighting in two intelligence agencies 
permanent loss of easy access information yielded gossip picked up at the mosque 
clear chain of command penetrate cells confusion is warning 
44 
unclear and present danger permanent vigilance  unclear and present danger 
44 44 
Security matters Security matters Security matters 
8-Jul-02 8-Jul-02 
7/8/2002 
P P P 
terrorism/lightning unlikely strike same twice Terrorism, like lightning Terrorism, like lightning 
take heed of obvious timetable matched more quietly day passed off peacefully 
immediate aftermath of the atrocities day passed peacefully take heed of the obvious timetable 
live their lives in fear of terrorism obvious timetable pass on the slightest concern 
fear of whipping up panic transformed bin Laden's home video efforts 
weapons of an even more sinister nature state of disrepair demonstrate network not extinguished 
residual memory of 1970s pub bombings event to carry clout  event to carry clout  
extinguished by engaging in spectacular activity extraordinary precautions  dirty bomb 
apparent end to bin Laden's home video efforts ordinary life campaigned aimed at inflicting casualties 
bin Laden network in state of disrepair residual memory residual memory 
passage of time led people to act like 9/10/01 weapons of sinister nature weapons of sinister nature 
conduct operations against democratic world stepped up  Government has stepped up activities 
ward off potential terrorist assault whipping up panic whipping up panic 
we are used to terrorism expect unexpected obvious measures 
exaggerate the chance vigilance tenuous information 
45 45 45 
One year on One year on One year on 
11-Sep-02 11-Sep-02 
9/11/2002 
R R P 
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hands on clock barely moved since 9/11 threat undeniably evolved battle over interpretation bitter 
bitter interpretation battle-how deaths 
affairs core of tension between civilsations understood in many spheres, it could be asserted  
transformative moment/became painfully 
US destiny not to have ideology but to be one aware airlines did not collapse 
indulgence ended on 9/11 unlikely revisited importance rarely witnessed wake of Sept. 11 
pattern of human activity being 
dedicated to destruction of advanced world prophesied overturned 
remembrance doesn't equal failure to forget in the wake of September 11 released from hold of Taleban 
transformative moment rarely witnessed enduring "normalcy" core of tension between civilisations 
life would never be the same masked an underlying uncertainty hard information 
changed character of ordinary life scale beyond conventional comprehension suffered from an allergy to publicity 
US citadel to be destroyed/advertisement for 
progress deeply troubled nation balance of presumption 
pattern of human activity overturned overnight still technically hunting legacy of Sept. 11 rests in three theatres 
wake of 9/11 period of innocence and indulgence war to be waged without fingerprints 
Afghanistan not transformed into Sweden many whispers but no hard information  US was advertisement for human progress 
legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres hands on clock barely moved other side of same coin 




The Times' Salient Figures by 
Article 3 
1 Terror for All tempered by fire and changed recover identity as young nation
 9/12/2001 suffered an urban avalanche turbulence 
new truths of a changed world 
true bolt from blue aimed to humble heart of nation 
trying out JFK's shoes 
treacherous political terrain 
2 Still the Enemy hatreds sit alongside/gentler arts we are all Americans 
 9/13/2001 no melting into shadows/shroud preparations sloppy intelligence 
terrorism could hobble American power jockeying 
Schadenfreude muddied/fuzzy policies 
pavement carpeted with flowers 
rivalries buried/Parisian sniping banished 
masked, dust-caked, bone tired, devoted 
3 With one voice sifting the rubble mountain crews 
anger/anguish more likely to mount than 
 9/14/2001 president uses words like pieces of wood subside 
actor in drama whose first act is unfolding towers the very opposite of Babel 
clean their own houses of terrorist taint silent dead of many lands speak to that truth 
world divides into two camps/no middle way Pakistan's corrosive political corruption 
Replies of steel: Answers to 
4 inevitable flexing of America's vast muscle bells tolled yesterday 
criticisms of an inevitable 
response called to the colours moving silence 
 9/15/2001 call spirits from dusty deep make price of terrorism unbearable 
unleashing corrosive cycle of violence justice is civilisation's most potent weapon 




America "freedom's home" 
betraying democracy’s values 
not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength 
democracy noisy, sceptical affair/fool's errand/Shakes/Hegel 
5 This is a world war bring to head struggle shadowing West 
 9/16/2001 fuel flame of terror 
hawks are true peacemakers 
pressure to alleviate root causes of terrorism 
no going back to life before
Muslim "wild west" 
keeps head down 
fortress America was already moribund 
Great Satan 
strike heart 
turning point in history (like Truman Doctrine) 
global cop 
6 The old war invisible enemy without borders 
 9/17/2001 found his voice and hit his stride 
mount leadership campaign 
notion of war/law rests on structure 
best placed to whisper words in right ears 
bewildering range of circumstance 
standing shoulder to shoulder 
gravity of situation 
character to rise to challenge 
parallel to our present times 
7 Pakistan's choice growing Talebanisation of Pakistan 
 9/17/2001 preaching message of hate 
growing grip of Islamic extremism 
cut off any room for manoevre 
run into wall of obscurantist militancy 
tilt world opinion decisively toward India 
grim political position 
Pakistan's indulgence of Taleban 
blunt demands
face 
inspired by zealotry of cleric holding sway 
revealed the hypocrisy 
hand over bin Laden to escape retaliation 
international cover 
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8 Speed not haste legions are invisible track down
 9/18/2001 how many heads the Hydra has as networks regroup trail may go cold 
melt into shadows of anarchic or outlaw lands Kremlin suspicions of NATO designs 
muderous networks hunted down 
little real appetite for war 
Islamist assailants have tentacles everywhere 
flush of horrified sympathy 
9 Back in business fade away into outright recession prolonged slump 
 9/18/2001 deliberate assault on symbol of nation self-inflicted mistakes 
form of economic cavalry big boost 
cushioned from aftershocks make or break sentiment in markets 




10 In the air the nation's life global agreement 
 9/18/2001 stepped up their own vigilance higher standards 
stopping kamikaze terrorists El Al set example 
plane as bomb chemical sniffer to detect explosives 
recovering some of its position 
immediate steps 
fell sharply in value 
laxity of the past 
old habits 
11 Terrorism at home triumphalist bile fills airwaves sleepers ready to strike 
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 9/19/2001 evidence is sifted gave evil abundant opportunity 
clearer the terrible truth becomes turn upside down 
exploit frameworks of freedom against freedom play by the book 
puzzle not pieced together terrorism should have no hiding place 
enemy within gate 
12 Dig deep spectacle of towers of civilised world plummeting dig deep into pockets 
 9/19/2001 scorched into collective consciousness slaughter used as weapon 
replayed in flashback to newly insomniac world humanitarianism at its most epic 
world felt itself to be global village/terrorism is a leveller humankind cannot bear much reality 
gave up lives scaling fatal monoliths assuage feelings 
desire to restore life to city 
glorious mundanity 
abomination's wake 
world waits for dust to settle/caught in obscene free-fall 
13 United home front extinguish all signs of normal political life political headaches 
democracy's best retaliation against terror is 
 9/20/2001 slip into rebellion from one wing to thrive 
temporarily lost stomach for fight democracy itself under attack 
political jousting normal political life 
dug from dust West plans retaliation 
hearts of public and politician crude anti-gov't tactics from the other 
slip into rebellion 
lose little sleep 
appear statesmanlike 
14 It's the economy, still avoidance of serious economic slump crisis bringing economic ruin to millions 
Stability Pact not allowed to become sterility 
 9/20/2001 snatched defeat from jaws of any military victory pact 
psychological blow struck by terrorists build military coalition 
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join int'l drive to avert slump 

so-called war room/real war 

collapse of WTC not world trade

15 Long war White House's brusque insistence
 9/20/2001 bin Laden's Afghan lairs al-Qaeda academies of death 
shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought surgical strikes 
caught by Achilles' heel electronic battlefield 
test of strength against terrorist Hydra in the frame 
mobilisation gathering pace perilously unstable launching pad 
Prime suspect: The Taleban are 
16 playing first step staying America's hand 
out a deadly farce Taleban playing out deadly farce time in hand/bargains to be struck 
 9/21/2001 freedom takes up cudgels against fear speed far outstrips allied response to Iraq 
marathon ahead no avenue neglected 
deadly force of express train bearing down silence surrounds all military detail 
riposte to carnage visited on America utter necessity of this unwelcome war 
Washington is gleaning intelligence 
country alive with troubled and legitimate 
17 Back on the ground Britain girds against present danger questions 
 9/22/2001 sworn to shred fabric of freedom treacherous Afghan wastes on far side of world 
enemy shorn of scruples rhetoric rallying world against common enemy 
not marching but tumbling into front line of war standing shoulder to shoulder 
speed high ground abroad/low road gov't treads at home Britain standing in line of only two abreast 
no shadow of doubt 
shadowy al-Qaeda 
lifted Blair's fatigue 
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most likely third musketeer/France not fallen in line 
18 It won't be quick pouring fuel on flames of Islamic fundamentalism 
 9/24/2001 world standing edgily at brink of war 
struck heart of America 
battle for world opinion 
find excuses otherwise occupied when bullets 
fly 
alliances suffer stresses/strains in heat of battle 
Britain has shown deft hand/resolute eye 
time for steady nerves/precise action 
marathon effort to rid world of terrorist cells 
pale compared to these mega-terrorists 
fighting new kind of war/new kind of enemy 
19 Layer upon layer layer upon layer/layers of global support on core/this outer layer 
 9/24/2001 channel of communication too long clogged 
tackling root cause of extremism 
Muslim world recoils instinctively from attack on fellow 
diplomatic fence around Afghanistan 
America's diplomatic footwork 
won "shoulder to shoulder" backing 
heterodox coalition 
elimination of scourge of terrorism 
common fears make common cause 
tackling 
festering troubles of Middle East 
20 Palimpsest however fluid the chessboard now 
 9/26/2001 careless language costs lives 
shared outrage 
close gaps in this unconventional common front 
enemy of my enemy should be courted 
palimpsest 
intelligence-sharing script constantly rewritten 
starved of funds 
disgusted retreat from medieval theocracy 
set to side Russia's anxieties about US 
penetration 
ask countries to stand against terrorist menace 
balance that US and UK must strike 
pragmatic layering of decisions co-operate 
flexibly 
shift in the course of long campaign ahead 
deftly handled 
223 
21 Crouch, spring, crouch elusive identikit of terror filling out deliver up 
 9/28/2001 pockets of Pashtun heartlands Taleban hurl defiance one day 
Pentagon expects time to fray more nerves sharp memories 
moment intelligence coalesces will be swift 
close down terrorist cells/loopholes spring 
US will not fire more than warning shot or two dismantling 
America is crouched 
waiting game like no other 
as tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch 
22 Intelligence needed evidence emerging of cells and agents/sleepers apparatus of terror 
 9/28/2001 funding Jackal cunning/ slipped between aliases growing aghast 
intelligence by far most deadly new weapon vital pooling of information 
myriad scraps of info hindsight underlines blame 
mask terrible conspiracy of destruction sheltered in London 
scale of terrorists' ambitions 
Islamist terrorist networks more entrenched 
crack down on organized crime 
overseas tip-offs 
closing G8 airspace/ringing venue 
23 Tough on camera crack down on those preaching extremist hatred galvanise public opinion 
 9/29/2001 uncover network that made London terrorist haven Britain must rise to challenge 
root out terrorists in our midst heart of conspiracy 
end cynical exploitation of right of repeated 
American fury at Dickensian pace appeal 
Europe's solidarity with US melts into nothing pussyfooting of prosecutors 




24 Who defends Britain? Whitehall's wobbles tragic side effect of assault on America 
 9/30/2001 smacks of bureaucratic fudge joined the hunt 
vague talk turf warfare 
habit of muddling through fanaticism vs. freedom uneven at best of times 
remove recklessly such underpinning plays into hands exploit every loophole in statute book 
frontline target 
slow business in courts 
daydreaming 
latest Whitehall wheeze 
happily exploit that openness 
25 Tunnel vision tendency toward tunnel vision difficult to draw comfort
 10/1/2001 swept every issue from agenda statesmen today are blinded 
universal gaze turned toward NYC draw eyes to rest of world 
eclipsed reports speculating on war against terrorism 
calling for business as usual halt collapse of world economy 
life will not return to normal until vision is restored everyday human activity ground to halt 
obscured by noxious covering of dust and ashes restore moral authority 
the explosions in America 
26 Against evil flung Bush's ultimatum back in his face long haul
 10/2/2001 chaotic heart of primitive, terror-ridden travesty of state partners in guilt 
Taleban publicly slammed the door declaring its hand 
tear at roots of terrorism boot is on other foot 
compact reduces risk of post-Taleban vacuum given heart to Taleban's internal opponents 
medieval horrors/Khan's hordes cruelty 
taunt suppressed 
Afghanistan's bane ruled more by terror than sword 
27 A Fatwa on Terror seen spate of attacks muted condemnation 
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 10/4/2001 enemies of understanding between Christianity/Islam 
opinion-makers 
less vocal on essential first step 
make revulsion explicit 
confessional solidarity 
hear similar reciprocal language 
speak of extending hand of tolerance 
counter claims of fanatics 
Muslims in their midst 
Islamophobia 
28 War of nerves lift malaise now hanging over Western societies 
 10/5/2001 caught between interests on one hand 
fear feeds on fear 
widespread panic spread across America 
dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating
hard on heels 
encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked 
lay out US needs in courteous, but plain 
language 
move diplomacy forward 
29 Just the beginning straight out of Ian Fleming story 
 10/7/2001 ring closing around Bin Laden 
twisted millionaire mastermind holed up in hideout 
Sundance to our Butch Cassidy 
spawning 
shoring up American-led alliance 
came to sticky end 
30 Another front that shattering day 
 10/8/2001 lifeblood of democracy 
one corner of worldwide canvas 
met terrible deaths 
balancing act 
off-screen 
hone rhetoric of readiness 
shattered West's peace but not will 
greatest burden of leadership 
freedom defeats fear 
31 The defeatist chorus British have new role to play 
 10/8/2001 
overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah
give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor 
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allies' reluctance to stake everything 
no precipitate rush to widen war against 
terrorism 
September 11 ended their innocence 
rules by theocratic thuggery 
course of war hard to call 
clear-sighted resolve 
nurturing a wide alliance 
become a forgotten footnote 
long haul 
32 Airport insecurity sterile areas wave of emergency legislation 
 10/17/2001 rules (lax/follows closely) take all possible steps to counter terrorism 
aircraft as weapons unvetted workers airside 




breaches threaten every citizen's safety 
33 Rock solidarity brainchild touched hearts of NYC 
 10/22/2001 unabashed patriotism/conviction moved America voicing America's contempt for terrorists 
sentiment cloyed airwaves/schmaltz dripped reverence for city's heroes 
mountains of money/towers of steel/hearts of 
reviving something of NY's bruised zest and gusto gold 
Britain's solidarity stricken city 
as much revivalist meeting as political rally 
34 A man alone Blair saw his duty/course was fixed settle old score
 10/25/2001 keep fingerprints off operations Britain as alone as after fall of France 
starve transnational terrorist networks of power living memory 
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35 Nuclear network 
36 The Blair shuttle 
37 From New York skies 
destroy academies of death 
hope that road will never turn to Iraq is reckless 
finger pointed in direction of bin Laden 
eradicating menace of regime 
leaden shoe waiting to drop 	 mastermind behind last month's attacks 
 10/26/2001 chilling info extravagant claims 
hunt speed/surprise essential 
horrors of full-scale nuclear attack most primitive of weapons 
lift spectre of nuclear terrorism 
dirty bomb most primitive of nuclear weapons 
hard evidence 
Downing Street non-committal 
spoke of umbrella strong enough to withstand storm this conflict without front lines 

 11/2/2001 value as conduit, lightning conductor terrorist threat not weather of future

truth must grapple with falsehood	 gloss 
diplomatic momentum 
berates terrorists trying to hijack out religion 
refashioned structures of security 
collective nervous breakdown 
nervous toleration 
only now returning to normal life	 further blow
 11/13/2001 reinforce sense of vulnerability that gripped the city level-headed response 
facing random indefinite terror long-threatened further act of terrorism 
outcry over sloppy inspections/lax regulation weather collapse of business confidence 
not stop life over city from coming to immediate 
braced for further contraction halt 
let fear push patriotism/courage out of minds wiped 200 points of DJIA 
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Congress stalled move 
38 One Sunday in 1941 fear has ranged itself against freedom Pearl Harbor tipped scales 
 12/7/2001 September's slaughter of civilians US paid heavily for failures 
al-Qaeda's aim to humiliate US power/destroy its confidence set Islam against the West 
showing world's mightiest power to be impotent aligned the rest of the world on America's side 
tiny bands of fanatical plotters this does not feel like war 
9/11 put Americans back in touch with date of 
barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to die infamy 
civilians asked to spend for victory, not dig for it 
39 First things first darkness enveloped lower Manhattan aircraft as missiles 
fanatics preaching hate engineered mass 
 12/11/2001 rip apart fabric of civilised society murder 
target was future of everyman dangerously invidious position 
rhythm of normality quietly returned 
grip of al-Qaeda on cities 
no premature embrace of illusory peace 
miles to go before they sleep/spared to carry blankets 
countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters 
centre stage 
to look on the bright side/NY back on path to psychological 
40 Not Correct recovery embraced by the entire community
 1/15/2002 multiracial trinity in style of Benetton advertisement city that they defended can grant them this 
Sesame Street has a lot to answer for kicking the stuffing out of each other 
memorial to horror should reflect struggle against evil uniquely courageous urban army 
base specious philosophies on racial lines glorious legend and inglorious reality of Mafia 
recognition of heroism on their own home 
public-spirited Irish provided Murphia ground 
colour-blind/colours blind to appear in correct 
accident of the wave of immigration proportions 
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41 A World Transformed world caught breath in shock 
 3/9/2002 elusive and Hydra-headed opponents 
America's will and capacity to root out regimes 
turbulent, fractured apology for a state 
transformation in American national mood 
42 Coalition Politics men with no respect for life mustn't control instruments of death 
 3/12/2002 smash terrorists determined to attack liberal democratic values 
43 Intelligent intelligence scale of confusion 
 6/6/2002 good intelligence can avert devastation of evil men 
burdensome new routines 
ruthlessly contemptuous of life
attack on freedom itself 
diminishing of that collective horror 
global menace must and can be beaten back 
starve cells 
raise his game 
9/11 not receding into past but continuing 
threat 
no neutral ground in fight 
aligning to defend order against enemies at 
gate 
myopically reluctant 
act of remembrance for victims of terror 
plan a bit over the top 
hysterical coverage 
there can be no immunity and no neutrality 
stance those outside US should welcome 
in the market for weapons of mass destruction 
for blackmail or battle 
sentence and sentiment essence of US foreign 
policy 
work best in concert with coalition 
permanent vigilance
caught unawares 
clear chain of command 
unclear/present danger 





first line of defence 
terrorism/lightning unlikely to strike same place 
44 Security matters take heed of obvious timetable twice
extinguished by engaging in spectacular 
 7/8/2002 fear of whipping up panic activity 
weapons of an even more sinister nature apparent end to bin Laden's home video efforts 
residual memory of 1970s pub bombings bin Laden network in state of disrepair 
day passed peacefully 
event to carry clout 
stepped up 
45 One year on in the wake of 9/11 hands on clock barely moved since 9/11 
bitter interpretation, battle how deaths 
 9/11/2002 transformative moment/importance rarely witnessed understood 
US a citadel to be destroyed/advertisement for human progress affairs core of tension between civilisations 
indulgence ended on 9/11 unlikely revisited 
pattern of human activity overturned overnight 
many whispers but no hard information 
legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres 
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hatreds sit alongside gentler arts 
world divides into two camps/no middle way 
America "freedom's home" 
betraying democracy's values 
clean own houses of terrorist taint 
democracies have made shackles for themselves 
justice is civilisation's most potent weapon 
terror rots timbers on which civilised coexistence rests 
form of economic cavalry 
global cop 
run into wall of obscurantist militancy 
sleepers ready to strike 
gave evil abundant opportunity 
dig deep into pockets 
assauge feelings 
gave up lives scaling fatal monoliths 
growing grip of Islamic extremism 
Muslim "wild west" 
ask countries to stand against terrorist menace 
Great Satan 
notion of war/law rests on structure 
international cover 
inspired by zealotry of clerics holding sway 
melt into shadows of anarchic/outlaw lands 
global agreement 
higher standards 
exploit frameworks of freedom against freedom 
slaughter used as weapon 
spectacle of towers of civilised world plummeting 
crude anti-gov't tactics from the other 
democracy's best retaliation against terror is to thrive 
democracy itself under attack 
freedom takes up cudgels against fear 
sworn to shred fabric of freedom 
enemy shorn of scruples 
treacherous Afghan wastes on the far side of the world 
pale compared to these mega-terrorists 
common fears make common cause 
shared outrage 
disgusted retreat from theocracy 
balance that US and UK must strike 
deliver up 
crack down on organized crime 
end cynical exploitation of right of repeated appeal 
crack down on those preaching extremist hatred 
happily exploit that openness 
fanaticism vs. freedom uneven at best of times 
restore moral authority 
chaotic heart of primitive, terror-ridden travesty of state 
ruled more by terror than sword 
medieval horrors/Khan's hordes cruelty suppressed 
enemies of understanding between Christianity/Islam 
Islamophobia 
Muslims in their midst 
freedom defeats fear 
aircraft as weapons 
dirty bomb most primitive 
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partners in guilt 
Afghanistan's bane 
this conflict without front lines 
truth must grapple with falsehood 
long-threatened further act of terrorism 
rules by theocratic thuggery 
nurturing wide alliance 
let fear push patriotism/courage out of minds 
rip apart fabric of civilised society 
target was future of everyman 
aircraft as missiles 
ruthlessly contemptuous of life 
attack on freedom itself 
global menace must end and can be beaten back 
turbulent, fractured apology for a state 
aligning to defend order 
only good intelligence can avert devastation of evil men 
weapons of an even more sinister nature 
affairs core of tension between civilisations 
US citadel to be destroyed/advertisement for human 
progress 
men with no respect for life mustn't control instruments of 
death 
smash terrorists determined to attack liberal democratic 
values 
work best in concert with coalition 
for blackmail or battle 
there can be no immunity and no neutrality 
memorial to horror should reflect struggle against evil 
base specious philosophies on racial lines 
recognition of heroism on their own home ground 
this does not feel like war 
fear has ranged itself against freedom 
September's slaughter of civilians 
tiny bands of fanatical plotters 
barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to die 
set Islam against the West 





recover identity as young nation 
tempered by fire and changed 
new truths of a changed world 
we are all Americans 
old rivalries buried/Parisian sniping vanished 
hawks are true peacemakers 
fortress America moribund/shattered forever last 
Tuesday 
no going back to life before 
turning point in history (Truman Doctrine) 
parallel to our present times 
limit damage triggered by last week's atrocities 
laxity of past 
old habits 
turn upside down 
glorious mundanity 
abomination's wake 
replayed in flashback to newly insomniac world 
world felt itself to be global village/terror is a leveller 
extinguish all sigs of normal political life 
so-called war room/real war 
shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought 
utter necessity of this unwelcome war 
fighting new kind of war/new kind of enemy 
heterodox coalition 
intelligence by far most deadly new weapon 
calling for business as usual 
shed habits of thought 
life will not return to normal until vision is restored 
everyday human activity ground to halt 
that shattering day 
shattered West's peace but not will 
September 11 ended their innocence 
last month's attacks 
only now returning to normal life 
facing random, indefinite terror 
not stop life over city from coming to immediate halt 
rhythm of normality returned 
world caught breath in shock 
difficult to draw comfort 
swept every issue from agenda 
transformation in American national mood 
diminishing of that collective horror 
9/11 not receding into past but continuing threat 
permanent vigilance 
caught unawares 
in the wake of 9/11 
hands on clock barely moved since 9/11 
indulgence ended on 9/11 unlikely revisited 
pattern of human activity overturned overnight 
legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres 
bitter interpretation, battle how deaths understood 
transformative moment/importance rarely witnessed 
world caught breath 
act of remembrance for victims of terror 
this does not feel like war 
September's slaughter of civilians 




Language, Literature, Drama 
President uses words like wood 
actor in drama whose first act is unfolding 
towers the very opposite of Babel 
silent dead of many lands speak to that truth 
bells tolled yesterday 
moving silence 
call spirits from the dusty deep 
democracy noisy, sceptical affair/fool's 
errand/Shakespeare/Hegel 
found his voice and hit his stride 
best placed to whisper words in right ears 
blunt demands 
preaching message of hate 
tilt world opinion toward India 
upstaged 
enemy within the gate 
triumphalist bile fills airwaves 
humanitarianism at its most epic 
spectacle of towers plummeting 
humankind cannot bear very much reality 
replayed in flashback 
in the frame 
al-Qaeda academies of death 
Taleban playing out deadly farce 
silence surrounds all military detail 
rhetoric rallying world against common enemy 
battle for world opinion 
channel of communication too long clogged 
careless language costs lives 
palimpsest 
intelligence-sharing script constantly rewritten 
Taleban hurl defiance 
caught by Achilles' heel 
myriad scraps of info 
American fury at Dickensian pace 
terrorism thrives on propaganda 
preaching extremist hatred 
smacks of bureaucratic fudge 
vague talk 
opinion-makers 
less vocal on essential first step 
muted condemnation 
make revulsion explicit 
confessional solidarity 
hear similar reciprocal language 
counter claims of fanatics 
ravings of extremists blacken name of all Islam 
dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating 
lay out US needs in courteous, but plain language 
straight out of Ian Fleming story 
Sundance to our Butch Cassidy 
twisted millionaire mastermind 
came to sticky end 
one corner of worldwide canvas 
balancing act 
off-screen 
hone rhetoric of readiness 
British have new role to play 
overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah 
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become a forgotten footnote 
makes mockery 
as much revivalist meeting as political rally 
sentiment cloyed airwaves/schmaltz dripped 
destroy academies of death 
extravagant claims 
berates terrorists trying to hijack our religion 
miles to go before they sleep 
fanatics preaching hate 
centre stage 
enemies at the gate 
apparent end to bin Laden's home video efforts 
legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres 
many whispers but no hard information 
advertisement 
sentence and sentiment essence of US foreign policy 
plan a bit over the top 
multiracial trinity in style of Benetton advertisement 
Sesame Street has a lot to answer for 
public-spirited Irish provided Murphia 




flexing of America's vast muscle 
standing shoulder to shoulder 
Pakistan's indulgence of Taleban 
little real appetite for war 
Kremlin suspicions of NATO designs 
the nation's life 
El Al set example 
West plans retaliation 
gov'ts appreciate danger they face 
hearts of public and politician 
White House's brusque insistence 
Washington is gleaning intelligence 
Britain girds against present danger 
France not fallen in line 
standing shoulder to shoulder 
Britain standing in line of only two abreast 
country alive with troubled and legitimate questions 
Britain has shown deft hand/resolute eye 
struck heart of America 
world standing edgily at brink of war 
America's diplomatic footwork 
Muslim world recoils instinctively from attack on fellow 
set to side Russia's anxieties about US penetration 
America is crouched 
Taleban hurl defiance one day 
Europe's solidarity with US melts into nothing 
Britain must rise to challenge 
Whitehall's wobbles 
latest Whitehall wheeze 
Taleban flung Bush's ultimatum back in his face 
Taleban publicly slammed door 
given heart to Taleban's internal opponents 
America bears greatest burden of leadership 
shattered West's peace but not will 
give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor 
unabashed patriotism/conviction moved US 
touched hearts of NYC 
reverence for city's heroes 
Britain's solidarity 
reviving something of NY's bruised zest and gusto 
stricken city 
voicing America's contempt for terrorists 
US not mountains of money/towers of steel/ but hearts of 
gold 
Britain as alone as after fall of France 
America's will 
American national mood 
mastermind 
Downing Street non-committal 
spoke of US umbrella 
Congress stalled move 
grip of al-Qaeda on cities 
how many heads Hydra has 
Islamist assailants have tentacles everywhere 
stopping kamikazi terrorists 
terrorist Hydra 
bin Laden's Afghan lairs 
funding Jackal cunning 
elusive and Hydra-headed opponents 
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stance those outside US should welcome 
in the market for weapons of mass destruction 
hysterical coverage 
city that they defended can grant them this 
kicking the stuffing out of each other 
uniquely courageous urban army 
al-Qaeda's aim to humiliate US power/destroy its 
confidence 
showing world's mightiest power to be impotent 
tiny bands of fanatical plotters 
barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to die 
civilians asked to spend for victory, not dig for it 
Pearl Harbor tipped scales 
US paid heavily for failures 
set Islam against the West 
aligned the rest of the world on America's side 




trying out JFK's shoes 
keeps head down 
strike heart 
hand over bin Laden to escape retaliation 
face 
immediate steps 
recovering some of its position 
stepped up their own vigilance 
lose little sleep 
terrible blow 
time in hand (bargains to be struck) 
not marching but tumbling into front line of war 
moment intelligence coalesces will be swift spring 
sharp memories 
slipped between aliases 
heart of conspiracy 
pussyfooting of prosecutors 
daydreaming 
boot is on other foot 
speak of extending the hand of tolerance 
caught between interests on one hand 
beyond reach 
taken all possible steps to counter terrorism 
brainchild 
keep fingerprints off operations 
finger pointed in direction of bin Laden 
living memory 
leaden shoe waiting to drop 
level-headed response 
further blow 
(reinforce sense of vulnerability that) gripped the city 
no premature embrace 






not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength 
make or break sentiment 
prolonged slump 
testing 
play by the book 
puzzle not pieced together 
temporarily lost stomach for fight 
political jousting 
avoidance of serious economic slump 
snatched defeat from jaws of military victory 
electronic battlefield 
test of strength against terrorist Hydra 
marathon ahead 
staying America's hand 
riposte to carnage visited on America 
marathon effort to rid world of terrorist cells 
America's diplomatic footwork 
won "shoulder to shoulder" backing 
tackling 
however fluid the chessboard now 
deftly handled 
waiting game like no other 
vital pooling of information 
overseas tip-offs 
plays into hands 
exploit every loophole in statute book 
joined the hunt 
speculating on war against terrorism 
declaring its hand 
taunt 
move diplomacy forward 
freedom defeats fear 
hard on heels 
allies' reluctance to stake everything 
course of war hard to call 
rules (lax/follows closely) 
settle old score 
raise his game 
no neutral ground in fight 
burdensome new routines 
first line of defence 
stepped up 






flush of horrified sympathy fades 
muddied/fuzzied policies 
no melting into shadows 
shrouding preparations 
bring to head struggle shadowing West 
invisible enemy without borders 
revealed the hypocrisy 
legions are invisible 
melt into shadows 
terrorism should have no hiding place 
clearer the terrible truth becomes 
appear statesmanlike 
no shadow of doubt 
shadowy al-Qaeda 
Britain shown resolute eye 
elusive identikit of terror filling out 
mask terrible conspiracy of destruction 
hindsight underlines blame 
blacken name of all Islam 
uncover network that made London terrorist haven 
tendency toward tunnel vision 
universal gaze turned toward NYC 
eclipsed reports 
life won't return to normal until vision restored 
obscured by noxious covering of dust and ashes 
statesmen today are blinded by explosions in America 
draw eyes to rest of world 




lift spectre of nuclear terrorism 
gloss 
wiped 200 points off DJIA 
illusory peace 
darkness enveloped lower Manhattan 
myopically reluctant 
unclear/present danger 
clear chain of command 
take heed of obvious timetable 
petty infighting coming to light 
habit of muddling through 
colour-blind/colours blind to appear in correct proportions 
to look on bright side 
scene 
Natural Disaster 
suffered an urban avalanche 
sifting the rubble mountain 
masked, dust-caked, bone tired devoted crews 
cushioned from aftershocks 
evidence is sifted 
world waits for dust to settle/caught in obscene free-
fall 
dug from dust 
noxious covering of dust and ashes 
spate of attacks 
strong enough to withstand storm 





tempered by fire and changed 
turbulence 
true bolt from blue aimed to humble heart of 
nation 
no melting into shadows 
Pakistan's corrosive political corruption 
fuel flame of terror 
gravity of situation 
limit damage triggered 
big boost 
plane as bomb 
chemical sniffer to detect explosives 
scorched into collective consciousness 
mobilisation gathering pace 
deadly force of express train bearing down 
speed far outstrips allied response to Iraq 
pouring fuel on flames of Islamic fundamentalism 
alliances suffer stresses/strains in heat of battle 
galvanise public opinion 
melts into nothing 
slow business in courts 
compact reduces risk of post-Taleban vacuum 
no precipitate rush to widen war 
wave of emergency legislation 
responsibility split 
speed/surprise essential 
value as conduit, lightning conductor 
diplomatic momentum 
extinguished by engaging in spectacular activity 
terrorism/lightning unlikely to strike same place 2x 
residual memory 
notion of war/law rests on structure 
build military coalition 
layer upon layer 
this outer layer 
layers of global support 
pragmatic layering of decisions cooperate 
flexibly 
dismantling 
apparatus of terror 
scale of terrorists' ambitions 
remove recklessly such underpinning plays 
refashioned structures of security 
engineered mass murder 
scale of confusion 





make the price of terrorism unbearable 
pressure to alleviate root causes of terrorism 
growing Talebanisation of Pakistan 
formula 
fade away into outright recession 
fortress America was already moribund 
triumphalist bile 
desire to restore life to city 
economic victims of terrorism 
self-inflicted mistakes 
robust efforts 
lifted Blair's fatigue 
political headaches 
psychological blow struck by terrorists 
Stability Pact not allowed to become sterility 
pact 
collapse of WTC not collapse of world trade 
join int'l drive to avert slump 
surgical strikes 
elimination of scourge of terrorism 
festering troubles of Middle East 
too long clogged 
starved of funds 
fray more nerves 
tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch 
evidence emerging of cells 
tragic side effect of assault on America 
Whitehall wheeze 
halt collapse of world economy 
widespread panic spread across America 
lift malaise now hanging over Western societies 
spawning 
lifeblood of democracy 
sterile areas 
sensitive positions 
reviving something of NY's bruised zest and 
gusto 
stricken city 
eradicating menace of regime 
starve transnational networks of power 
nervous toleration 
collective nervous breakdown 





penetrate Islamic cells 
terrorism could hobble American power 
day passed peacefully 






anger/anguish more likely to mount than 
subside 
terror rots timbers 
called to the colours 
time for steady nerves/precise action 
channel of communication 
shift in the course of long campaign ahead 
US will not fire more than warning shot or two 
Pentagon expects time to fray nerves 
long haul 
shoring up American-led alliance 
stiffen response 
long haul 
breaches threaten every citizen's safety 
unvetted workers airside 
wave of emergency legislation 
Blair saw his duty/course was fixed 
weather collapse of business confidence 
turbulent 
event to carry clout 
timetable 
bin Laden network in state of disrepair 
act/agency 
Rooting out/Closing in 
pressure to alleviate root causes of terrorism 
cut off any room for maneovre 
murderous networks hunted down 
track down 
tackling root cause of extremism 
diplomatic fence around Afghanistan 
close gaps in this unconventional common front 
close down terrorist cells/loopholes 
as tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch 
Islamist terrorist networks more entrenched 
closing G8 airspace/ringing venue 
root out terrorists in our midst 
joined the hunt 
tear at roots of terrorism 
encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked 
ring closing around bin Laden 
holed up in hideout 
hunt 




Responding to danger 
mount leadership campaign 
character to rise to challenge 
deliberate assault on symbol of nation 
crisis bringing economic ruin to millions 
bargains to be struck 
find excuses otherwise occupied when bullets fly 
enemy of my enemy should be courted 
growing aghast 
sheltered in London 
frontline target for retaliation 
fear feeds on fear 
met terrible deaths 
horrors of full-scale nuclear attack 
chilling info 
reinforce sense of vulnerability 
outcry over sloppy inspections/lax regulations 
spared to carry blankets 
fear of whipping up panic 
scene 
Terrain 
treacherous political terrain 
pavement carpeted with flowers 
bewildering range of circumstance 
grim political position 
as networks regroup trail may go cold 
slip into rebellion from one wing 
perilously unstable launching pad 
no avenue neglected 
treacherous Afghan wastes 
world standing edgily at brink 
pockets of Pashtun heartlands 
turf warfare 
hope road never turns to Iraq is reckless 
dangerously invidious position 
countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters 
first step down long road 
speed gov't takes in high ground abroad 
low road gov't treads at home 





The Times' Themes by Article





New truths of changed world yet to be seen 

US tempered by fire and changed by ordeal

No single stroke will slay invisible enemies 

Battle between terror and entire free world can only be met by standing shoulder to shoulder 

2 	 Still the Enemy 
 Civilised/Uncivilised---Before/After 
Old rivalries buried;  "we are all Americans" 
West must establish beyond doubt that civilised world is abl
extremists and aggressive dictators anywhere they arise 
3 	With one voice
 Civilised/Uncivilised---Before/After 
Never an American catastrophe, but the world's

World divides into 2 camps 

9/13/2001 
e and determined to defeat religious 
9/14/2001 
4 Replies of steel: Answers to inevitable criticisms of an inevitable response 
Duty/Appeasement 
9/15/2001 
Failure to strike will be trumpeted as proof of impotence 
Foolish, immoral to shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength 
5 This is a world war 
New War/New Kind of Enemy 
9/16/2001 
9/11 brings to head the struggle that has shadowed the West for decades 
New battlefield, different kind of conflict 
When faced by such an enemy, hawks are true peacemakers 
Constant pressure to alleviate root causes of terror 
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6 	The old war 
Visible/Shadowy---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
War with invisible enemy without borders seems surreal 
7 	Pakistan's choice 
 Civilised/Uncivilised 
 Musharraf must choose

Growing grip of Islamic extremism vs. democratic world 

8 	 Speed not haste 
 Civilised/Uncivilised---Duty/Appeasement 
West must at least be equal to terrorists in the will to prevail 
The more concentrated the targets, the better 
Once first flush of horrified sympathy and common fear fades, al
monstrosity as a "one-off" 
9	 Back in business 




lies may be tempted to treat this 
9/18/2001 
Strong case for conventional free market principles being place to one side 
Sustained, international intervention is required to maintain prosperity 
10 In the air 
New War/New Kind of Enemy 
Old habits hard to change 
Best air safety enforced only by global agreement 
9/18/2001 





West's most cherished values and legal traditions gave evil abundant opportunity 
Puzzle not pieced together 




9/11 = humanitarianism at its most epic 
Terrorism is a leveller 
Never before has the world felt itself to be such a global village 
13 United home front 
 Before/After--Civilised/Uncivilised 
9/20/2001 
Democracy's best retaliation against terror is to thrive 
Circumstances demand measure of restraint 
Hearts of public and politician alike are not in political jousting 
14 It's the economy, still 
New War/New Kind of Enemy 
9/20/2001 
Crisis bringing economic ruin to millions would snatch defeat from jaws of any military victory that free 
world won 
Collapse of world trade would bring almost as much satisfaction as collapse of WTC--must not be 
allowed 
Join international drive to avert slump 
15 Long war 
Duty/Appeasement---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
9/20/2001 
Afghanistan is a foretaste only of a vastly more ambitious campaign, waged the world over, in new kind 
of total war 
As US engages in struggle, it will require great steadiness 
US will judge countries by their willingness to stay the same long course 
16 Prime suspect: The Taleban are playing out a deadly farce 
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Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
9/21/2001 
On every front, through every channel, multi-faceted counter-terrorist alliance coming together 
First step down very long road 
Taleban playing out a deadly farce, unable to comprehend enormity of outrage 
Taleban's stance demonstrates utter necessity of this unwelcome war 
17 Back on the ground 
Duty/Appeasement 
9/22/2001 
UK = a country alive with troubled and legitimate questions 
UK standing in line of only 2 abreast--US's sole partner 
UK girds against present danger 
18 It won't be quick 
New War/New Kind of Enemy--Duty/Appeasement 
9/24/2001 
US's measured response reassuring for a world standing edgily on brink of war 
Allies have rallied with varying degrees of commitment 
Fighting new kind of war against new kind of enemy 
Time for steady nerves, precise action 
This is a war without end and a war we can never be certain we have won 
19 Layer upon layer 
New War/New Kind of Enemy 
9/24/2001 
Place layers of global support on NATO core 
Common fears make common cause 
Tackling root cause of extremism in festering troubles of Middle East 
20 Palimpsest 
New War/New Kind of Enemy 
9/26/2001 




However fluid the chessboard now, one constant is that in Middle East, careless language costs lives 
21 	Crouch, spring, crouch 
Visible/Shadowy Elusive identikit of terror is filling out 
Moment intelligence coalesces there will be swift spring--US is crouched--this is a wai
other 
22 	Intelligence needed 
New War/New Kind of Enemy--Visible/Shadowy 
Freedoms of West have been used to mask a terrible conspiracy of destruction 
Hindsight underlines blame but clarifies the need for action 
New war demands new weapons--intelligence by far most deadly 
23 Tough on camera 
Visible/Shadowy---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
Uncover network that has made London terrorist haven of Western world 

Terror thrives on propaganda and delay--both must end 

24 	 Who defends Britain? 
Duty/Appeasement---Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
UK joined hunt for OBL so it became frontline target for retaliation 

Fanaticism vs. freedom uneven contest 

Need for greater security balanced against impairing our freedoms 

25 Tunnel vision 
 Visible/Shadowy---Before/After 
Everyday human activity has ground to a halt

Tendency toward tunnel vision as universal gaze has turned toward NYC 

9/28/2001 





Statesmen today are blinded by explosions in America--life will not return to normal until vision is restored 
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26 Against evil 
Duty/Appeasement 
10/2/2001 
Afghanistan only one battleground in long campaign 
Dangers of inaction now outweigh risks 
27 A Fatwa on Terror 
 Civilised/Uncivilised---Duty/Appeasement 
10/4/2001 
Essential first step from Muslim community = widespread and unambiguous condemnation of terrorists 
and those who support them 
Those complaining of prejudice should not be surprised by false Western assumptions if they do not 
counter claims of fanatics 
28 War of nerves 
 Civilised/Uncivilised 
10/5/2001 
Blair:  defeat terrorists or be defeated 
Fear feeds on fear 
Success of Washington's war aims will decide outcome 
All elements in encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked 
29 Just the beginning 
Duty/Appeasement---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
10/7/2001 
OBL straight out of Ian Fleming novel 
"Special relationship" is proving its worth 
Not a war in which you can negotiate 
So long as OBL is free, no country is beyond his reach and nobody is safe 
Butch and Sundance came to a sticky end--US/UK must not 
30 Another front 




Hone rhetoric of readiness without creating unrealistic expectations or putting whole society in "brace 
position" 
Most crucial operations likely off-screen 
Afghanistan only one corner of worldwide canvas 
Pulverising of WTC shattered West's peace but not will 
National interests of UK are directly engaged because at stake are lives and livelihoods of all 
31 The defeatist chorus 
 Duty/Appeasement---Civilised/Uncivilised 
10/8/2001 
We are in for the long haul 
West has resolve to win war 
Prolonged campaign makes need to win battle for public opinion more important than ever 
32 Airport insecurity 
New War/New Kind of Enemy 
10/17/2001 
Rules are too lax 
Breaches threaten everyone's safety 
33 Rock solidarity 
 Before/After 
10/22/2001 
Send a message understood by millions 
Celebrate NYC's resilience, energy, and unity 
Massive and modern defiance 
34 A man alone 
Duty/Appeasement 
10/25/2001 
Blair saw his duty; his course was fixed 
The struggle against global terrorists is "a battle that doesn't have a finite point" 
Return to Iraq would divide Blair's party, his country, and his allies abroad 
35 Nuclear network 
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Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
10/26/2001 
OBL--the acquisition of WMD "to terrorise the enemies of God" = "religious duty" 
Hunt now assumes still greater urgency than before 
Speed and surprise will be all the more essential/ The threat is even greater than was previously known 
36 The Blair shuttle
 Duty/Appeasement---Civilised/Uncivilised 
11/2/2001 
Part of Blair's value to Bush = conduit, even of lightning conductor 
Needs to be sure he is husbanding his authority--and UK's--for times far harder than these 
Not arrogance to assert values of civilised society, but necessity. Their defence requires calculated 
mixture of discipline and decisiveness,
              considered risktaking, and imaginative caution little mastered by post-Cold War leaders 
37 From New York skies 
 Before/After 
11/13/2001 
New Yorkers believe that their city and country are facing random, indefinite terror

Life over much of city comes to immediate halt (with every scare)

38 One Sunday in 1941 
New War/New Kind of Enemy---Civilised/Uncivilised 
12/7/2001 
September's slaughter of civilians had no basis in strategic calculation 
Aim was to humiliate American power, destroy its confidence and set Islam against the West 
Show the world's mightiest power to be impotent against tiny bands of fanatical plotters, barely armed 
other than with the lethal weapon of their readiness to die 
Struggle is frustrating for civilians because there cannot be a clearcut military victory and because it is 
so much less clear what individuals can do 
39 First things first 
Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy 
12/11/2001 
Terrorists desire to rip apart the fabric of civilised society. Their target was the future of everyman 
 "win the peace" 
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UK, valiant but ancillary in Afghanistan, now moves to centre stage

No premature embrace of illusory peace--miles to go before they sleep

40 Not Correct 
 Civilised/Uncivilised---Before/After 
1/15/2002 
New York is back on the path to psychological recovery when its citizens are kicking the stuffing out of 
each other 
Al-Qaeda may base its specious philosophies on racial lines but Americans should be colour-blind 
Injustice being done to this uniquely courageous urban army becomes clearer if one reverses the ethnic 
model 
41 A world transformed 
 Before/After---Civilised/Uncivilised--New War/New Kind of Enemy 
3/9/2002 
After 9/11, the world caught its breath in shock, disgust, and fear, transfixed by attacks 
Attacks revealed vulnerability of world's greatest power and every society in which fanatics were at 
liberty to circulate--an attack on freedom itself 
Diminishing of that collective horror and helplessness due to the steady determination of US to beat 
back global menace 
Early days in global campaign, against elusive, Hydra-headed opponent, "that does not have a finite 
point" 
Blair has raised his game in emergency, asserted there is no neutral ground in fight 
Blair's decisions yet to come immeasurably harder 
Europe slow to accept 9/11 not as event receding into the past but part of continuing threat, and 
slower to understand transformation in American national mood 
42 Coalition Politics 
New War/New Kind of Enemy---Civilised/Uncivilised---Duty/Appeasement 
3/12/2002 
The US must not feel constrained to act by the concerns of others but would still work best in concert 
with a coalition 
"Men with no respect for life must never be allowed to control the ultimate instruments of death." That 
sentiment is the absolute essence of American foreign policy 
There can be no immunity and no neutrality 
43 	Intelligent intelligence 




Security is unending struggle to improve vigilance and update intelligence--reexamination of old 
assumptions 
Only good intelligence can avert the devastation of evil men 
44 Security matters 
New War/New Kind of Enemy---Before/After 
7/8/2002 
We need to expect the unexpected 
Ordinary life not affected since 9/11--simple passage of time led most people in most places to act as 
they did on 9/10 
45 One year on 
 Before/After---Civilised/Uncivilised 
9/11/2002 
9/11 was transformative moment of importance rarely witnessed--life would never be the same 
Legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres:  America's relationship to the world; Islam's attitude toward rest of 
humanity; central structure of international system 
Innocence and indulgence that ended on 9/11 not likely revisited soon 
Only at beginning of the attempt to understand what will be demanded of capitalist democracies 
Hands on the clock have barely moved since 9/11 
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The Times' Relevancy Ratings 
Date M R L D A Mean 2 1.75 1.5 
12-Sep-01 3 3 3 3 3 3 Y Y Y 
13-Sep-01 3 2 3 2 3 2.6 Y Y Y 
14-Sep-01 3 3 3 3 3 3 Y Y Y 
15-Sep-01 2 0 3 1 1 1.4 
15-Sep-01 3 2 3 2 3 2.6 Y Y Y 
16-Sep-01 3 3 3 3 3 3 Y Y Y 
17-Sep-01 3 2 3 2 3 2.6 Y Y Y 
17-Sep-01 2 1 3 1 2 1.8  Y Y 
18-Sep-01 3 1 3 1 3 2.2 Y Y Y 
18-Sep-01 3 0 3 1 2 1.8  Y Y 
18-Sep-01 3 1 3 1 2 2 Y Y Y 
19-Sep-01 3 0 3 1 3 2 Y Y Y 
19-Sep-01 3 2 3 3 3 2.8 Y Y Y 
20-Sep-01 3 1 3 2 3 2.4 Y Y Y 
20-Sep-01 3 2 3 1 2 2.2 Y Y Y 
20-Sep-01 3 2 3 1 3 2.4 Y Y Y 
21-Sep-01 3 1 3 2 3 2.4 Y Y Y 
22-Sep-01 3 1 3 2 3 2.4 Y Y Y 
23-Sep-01 3 2 3 3 3 2.8 Y Y Y 
24-Sep-01 2 1 3 0 3 1.8  Y Y 
24-Sep-01 1 0 1 1 0 0.6 
25-Sep-01 1 1 3 0 2 1.4 
25-Sep-01 1 0 1 0 0 0.4 
26-Sep-01 2 2 3 0 2 1.8  Y Y 
26-Sep-01 1 0 1 0 1 0.6 
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27-Sep-01 2 1 3 1 3 2 Y 
27-Sep-01 1 1 1 1 2 1.2 
28-Sep-01 2 1 3 0 3 1.8  Y Y 
28-Sep-01 2 0 3 1 3 1.8  Y Y 
29-Sep-01 2 1 3 1 3 2 Y Y Y 
30-Sep-01 2 2 3 2 3 2.4 Y Y Y 
1-Oct-01 1 2 3 2 2 2 Y Y Y 
1-Oct-01 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1-Oct-01 2 1 2 0 3 1.6 Y 
2-Oct-01 2 2 3 0 3 2 Y Y Y 
3-Oct-01 1 1 2 0 2 1.2 
3-Oct-01 1 1 2 0 1 1 
4-Oct-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4-Oct-01 0 1 0 0 1 0.4 
4-Oct-01 2 2 3 1 3 2.2 Y Y Y 
5-Oct-01 2 1 3 2 3 2.2 Y Y Y 
5-Oct-01 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
6-Oct-01 1 1 2 1 1 1.2 
6-Oct-01 1 0 1 1 1 0.8 
7-Oct-01 1 3 3 2 3 2.4 Y Y Y 
8-Oct-01 1 1 3 2 3 2 Y Y Y 
9-Oct-01 1 1 3 0 3 1.6 Y 
10-Oct-01 0 1 2 1 1 1 
11-Oct-01 1 0 3 1 3 1.6 Y 
12-Oct-01 1 1 2 1 3 1.6 Y 
13-Oct-01 1 2 1 1 2 1.4 
14-Oct-01 1 1 3 1 3 1.8  Y Y 
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15-Oct-01 1 0 1 1 0 0.6 
15-Oct-01 2 0 3 1 1 1.4 
16-Oct-01 1 0 2 0 3 1.2 
17-Oct-01 2 1 3 1 2 1.8  Y Y 
17-Oct-01 1 0 2 2 3 1.6 Y 
18-Oct-01 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
18-Oct-01 1 0 1 0 0 0.4 
19-Oct-01 1 0 3 0 3 1.4 
19-Oct-01 1 1 1 1 3 1.4 
20-Oct-01 1 0 2 0 1 0.8 
20-Oct-01 1 0 1 0 0 0.4 
21-Oct-01 1 1 2 0 3 1.4 
22-Oct-01 2 2 3 3 3 2.6 Y Y Y 
22-Oct-01 1 1 1 0 3 1.2 
23-Oct-01 1 1 1 0 3 1.2 
24-Oct-01 0 0 1 0 1 0.4 
25-Oct-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25-Oct-01 2 2 3 3 3 2.6 Y Y Y 
26-Oct-01 1 1 2 2 3 1.8  Y Y 
28-Oct-01 1 0 3 1 3 1.6 Y 
29-Oct-01 1 0 2 0 1 0.8 
31-Oct-01 0 0 0 0 2 0.4 
31-Oct-01 0 0 2 1 2 1 
31-Oct-01 2 0 3 1 2 1.6 Y 
1-Nov-01 1 0 3 2 1 1.4 
2-Nov-01 1 0 3 2 3 1.8  Y Y 
3-Nov-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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3-Nov-01 1 0 2 0 3 1.2 
4-Nov-01 0 1 2 0 0 0.6 
5-Nov-01 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
6-Nov-01 1 0 1 1 0 0.6 
6-Nov-01 0 0 2 0 2 0.8 
7-Nov-01 1 0 1 0 2 0.8 
8-Nov-01 1 0 1 2 0 0.8 
11-Nov-01 0 0 2 0 3 1 
13-Nov-01 1 2 2 2 1 1.6 Y 
13-Nov-01 2 2 3 3 2 2.4 Y Y Y 
15-Nov-01 0 0 2 0 3 1 
16-Nov-01 0 0 3 0 3 1.2 
17-Nov-01 1 2 2 0 1 1.2 
17-Nov-01 0 1 2 0 1 0.8 
18-Nov-01 1 0 3 1 3 1.6 Y 
18-Nov-01 0 0 2 0 1 0.6 
19-Nov-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20-Nov-01 1 1 2 1 2 1.4 
20-Nov-01 1 1 2 1 0 1 
22-Nov-01 1 0 1 0 0 0.4 
24-Nov-01 1 0 1 0 0 0.4 
24-Nov-01 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
24-Nov-01 1 0 2 0 1 0.8 
27-Nov-01 1 0 3 0 1 1 
27-Nov-01 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
29-Nov-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-Dec-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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3-Dec-01 1 0 2 1 1 1 
3-Dec-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4-Dec-01 1 0 3 1 0 1 
4-Dec-01 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
5-Dec-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7-Dec-01 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
7-Dec-01 3 3 3 3 3 3 Y Y Y 
8-Dec-01 0 0 3 0 3 1.2 
8-Dec-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11-Dec-01 2 2 3 2 3 2.4 Y Y Y 
13-Dec-01 0 0 3 0 3 1.2 
13-Dec-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14-Dec-01 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 
14-Dec-01 0 0 3 1 1 1 
17-Dec-01 1 0 2 1 0 0.8 
18-Dec-01 1 0 1 1 1 0.8 
19-Dec-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22-Dec-01 0 0 1 0 1 0.4 
26-Dec-01 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
27-Dec-01 0 0 3 0 2 1 
29-Dec-01 1 1 3 1 2 1.6 Y 
30-Dec-01 1 0 1 0 0 0.4 
31-Dec-01 1 0 3 0 2 1.2 
31-Dec-01 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
2-Jan-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3-Jan-02 1 0 3 0 3 1.4 
5-Jan-02 1 0 2 2 2 1.4 
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6-Jan-02 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
10-Jan-02 1 0 3 0 3 1.4 
11-Jan-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12-Jan-02 1 0 1 1 0 0.6 
14-Jan-02 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 
15-Jan-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15-Jan-02 1 2 3 2 2 2 Y Y Y 
16-Jan-02 1 0 3 0 1 1 
17-Jan-02 1 0 3 0 3 1.4 
19-Jan-02 0 0 2 0 2 0.8 
22-Jan-02 0 0 3 0 3 1.2 
26-Jan-02 0 0 2 0 2 0.8 
28-Jan-02 1 0 2 0 3 1.2 
29-Jan-02 1 0 3 1 3 1.6 Y 
31-Jan-02 1 1 3 0 3 1.6 Y 
3-Feb-02 0 0 2 0 1 0.6 
4-Feb-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
5-Feb-02 0 0 2 0 3 1 
8-Feb-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
9-Feb-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
9-Feb-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
14-Feb-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
15-Feb-02 0 1 2 1 0 0.8 
16-Feb-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
18-Feb-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23-Feb-02 0 0 3 0 0 0.6 
25-Feb-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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27-Feb-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
2-Mar-02 0 0 3 0 2 1 
4-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5-Mar-02 0 0 3 0 3 1.2 
6-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7-Mar-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
8-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9-Mar-02 3 3 3 3 3 3 Y Y Y 
10-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11-Mar-02 1 0 1 0 1 0.6 
12-Mar-02 2 0 3 2 3 2 Y Y Y 
13-Mar-02 0 2 1 0 0 0.6 
15-Mar-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
19-Mar-02 0 0 3 0 0 0.6 
21-Mar-02 0 0 2 0 1 0.6 
21-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22-Mar-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
23-Mar-02 0 0 3 0 0 0.6 
25-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28-Mar-02 1 2 3 0 2 1.6 Y 
29-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31-Mar-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2-Apr-02 0 0 3 0 2 1 
4-Apr-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
5-Apr-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
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7-Apr-02 0 0 3 0 0 0.6 
10-Apr-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
11-Apr-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
11-Apr-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
16-Apr-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
17-Apr-02 0 0 3 0 2 1 
24-Apr-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26-Apr-02 0 1 2 0 1 0.8 
9-May-02 0 0 2 0 1 0.6 
10-May-02 0 0 3 1 2 1.2 
13-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14-May-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
15-May-02 0 0 2 1 1 0.8 
17-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18-May-02 1 0 2 1 1 1 
18-May-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
19-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23-May-02 0 0 2 0 1 0.6 
23-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24-May-02 0 0 2 0 2 0.8 
24-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27-May-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
30-May-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
31-May-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4-Jun-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
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3-Jun-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6-Jun-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
6-Jun-02 1 2 3 2 3 2.2 Y Y Y 
12-Jun-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
19-Jun-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
23-Jun-02 1 0 2 1 3 1.4 
24-Jun-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25-Jun-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
26-Jun-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
4-Jul-02 0 0 1 0 1 0.4 
6-Jul-02 1 0 2 0 3 1.2 
8-Jul-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8-Jul-02 2 3 3 3 3 2.8 Y Y Y 
16-Jul-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
19-Jul-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25-Jul-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27-Jul-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29-Jul-02 1 0 2 1 1 1 
30-Jul-02 0 0 3 0 1 0.8 
31-Jul-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
3-Aug-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
4-Aug-02 0 2 2 1 1 1.2 
7-Aug-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
8-Aug-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10-Aug-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
15-Aug-02 0 1 2 0 3 1.2 
18-Aug-02 0 0 3 0 0 0.6 
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20-Aug-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
23-Aug-02 0 0 1 0 0 0.2 
26-Aug-02 0 0 3 0 0 0.6 
31-Aug-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
1-Sep-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
3-Sep-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6-Sep-02 0 1 3 0 1 1 
7-Sep-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
8-Sep-02 0 0 2 0 0 0.4 
11-Sep-02 3 3 3 3 3 3 Y Y Y 
AVG 0.71 0.4 1.7 0.5 1.2 34 45 
Month Average 
2 1.75 1.5 
9/12/2001 10/11/2001 1 25 30 33 
10/12/2001 11/11/2001 2 2 6 10 
11/12/2001 12/11/2001 3 3 3 5 
12/12/2001 1/11/2002 4 0 0 2 
1/12/2002 2/11/2002 5 1 1 4 
2/12/2002 3/11/2002 6 1 1 1 
3/12/2002 4/11/2002 7 1 1 3 
4/12/2002 5/11/2002 8 0 0 0 
5/12/2002 6/11/2002 9 1 1 1 
6/12/2002 7/11/2002 10 1 1 1 
7/12/2002 8/11/2002 11 0 0 0 




Historical References by Number 
 
 
5 or more 
 
 
Pearl Harbor 10  
African Embassy bombings 6 
Gulf War/Kuwait 16 
 
 
2 or more 
 
 
Cold War 4 
USS Cole 3 
World War II 3 
Kosovo 3 
Hydra 3 
John Kennedy/Cuban Missile Crisis 
1962  3 
Franklin Roosevelt 2 
Bill Clinton/Osama bin Laden 1998 2 
Masood assassination 2 
Ronald Reagan 2 
Margaret Thatcher 2 
Nazis 2 
Israel/Palestine Conflict 2 
Slobodan Milosevic 2 
Vietnam 2 







17th century—30 Years’ War 
WWII scrap metal collecting  
Japanese invasion of China WWII 
Dhahran bombing 1996  
Northern Ireland conflict 
Durban Conference on Racism 
Mikhail Gorbachev 
Berlin Wall 
Ayatollah Khomeini in France 1970’s 
Somalia 1993 
Tower of Babel 
“bells tolled”—John Donne 
Thomas Hobbes—“common power  




Carl von Clausewitz 
Georg Hegel 




Berlin bombing 1986 
Moammar Gadaffi supporting  
Islamic terror 
Lockerbie 
Gadaffi arming the IRA 
Great Satan 
Omaha Beach 








Savings and Loan Scandal 
Tony Blair to UN 1998 
T.S. Eliot 
Bill Clinton 1992 election 
1994 California earthquake 
Stability Pact—currency 
Osama bin Laden leaves Sudan 1996 
Tony Blair’s deal with the PIRA 
IRA terror 
1998 US sanctions on Pakistan 
Iran/Iraq war 
Soviets in Afghanistan 
US State Dept 2000 report on Iran  
and terror 
Taliban takeover of Afghanistan 
US Paris Embassy bombing plot 
Genoa G8 summit 
267 
British Ambassador in Cairo  
answering charges of UK not  




Afghan King Shah 
Ian Fleming 
Butch Cassidy/Sundance Kid 
Nuremburg Trials 
Iwo Jima—famous photograph 
Bosnia 
Falklands War 
Edward Heath—worry over oilfields  
Gulf War 
Book of Jeremiah 





Fall of France 1940 
1993 WTC bombings 
Iraq boots IAEA/UN 1998 
UN Resolutions 686 and 687 
David Bowie 1977 “Heroes” 
Robert Frost’s “miles to go” 
1970’s IRA pub bombings 







Winston Churchill’s “special relationship” 
The Psalms—“enemies in the gates” 
FDR’s “date which will live in infamy” 





Anne Snellen received her A.B. from Youngstown State University in 1995 with 
concentrations in the history of ideas, Middle Eastern history, and religious studies, 
and her M.A. from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in 1997 with 
concentrations in English literature and language and the history of ideas.  She 
will receive her Ph.D. from the University Of Tennessee-Knoxville in 2006, with 
concentrations in language, rhetoric, and psycholinguistics. 
